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executive summary
Introduction
The 2013 Infection Prevention and Control (IP&C) Guideline
for Cystic Fibrosis (CF) was commissioned by the CF Foun-
dation as an update of the 2003 Infection Control Guideline
for CF.1 During the past decade, new knowledge and new
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challenges provided the following rationale to develop up-
dated IP&C strategies for this unique population:
1. The need to integrate relevant recommendations from
evidence-based guidelines published since 2003 into IP&C
practices for CF. These included guidelines from the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)/Healthcare Infec-
tion Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC), the
World Health Organization (WHO), and key professional so-
cieties, including the Infectious Diseases Society of America
(IDSA) and the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of Amer-
ica (SHEA). During the past decade, new evidence has led to
a renewed emphasis on source containment of potential path-
ogens and the role played by the contaminated healthcare en-
vironment in the transmission of infectious agents. Further-
more, an increased understanding of the importance of the
application of implementation science, monitoring adherence,
and feedback principles has been shown to increase the effec-
tiveness of IP&C guideline recommendations.
2. Experience with emerging pathogens in the non-CF pop-
ulation has expanded our understanding of droplet trans-
mission of respiratory pathogens and can inform IP&C strat-
egies for CF. These pathogens include severe acute respiratory
syndrome coronavirus and the 2009 influenza A H1N1. Les-
sons learned about preventing transmission of methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and multidrug-resis-
tant gram-negative pathogens in non-CF patient populations
also can inform IP&C strategies for CF.
3. As the use of molecular technologies increased through-
out the past decade, there is an improved understanding of
the epidemiology of newer CF pathogens that are increasing
in prevalence and are associated with increased morbidity
and mortality. Such pathogens include MRSA, Mycobacte-
rium abscessus, new species in the Burkholderia cepacia com-
plex (eg, Burkholderia dolosa), and epidemic clones of Pseu-
domonas aeruginosa (eg, the Liverpool epidemic strain).
Methods for Document Development
An interdisciplinary committee of healthcare personnel with
expertise in CF, 3 parents of children with CF, and an adult
with CF determined the scope of the guideline, reviewed the
evidence (including that from a systematic review), and de-
veloped and voted anonymously on specific recommenda-
tions. Whenever appropriate, this guideline has integrated
relevant recommendations from the 2003 Infection Control
Guideline for CF and from other existing IP&C guidelines.
The focus of the updated guideline is to provide recom-
mendations to prevent individuals with CF from transmitting
and/or acquiring respiratory tract pathogens from others with
CF in ambulatory care and inpatient settings. Recommen-
dations for nonhealthcare settings represent efforts to respond
to questions and concerns voiced by people with CF and their
caregivers and, thus, are intended to educate the CF com-
munity about potential risks and to help people with CF and
their families and friends make informed choices in their
personal lives. Recommendations for nonhealthcare settings
are not intended to be enforced by healthcare personnel.
This guideline is intended for use by all healthcare per-
sonnel involved with the care of people with CF and the IP&C
teams that support CF care centers in the United States. The
recommendations for healthcare settings apply to inpatient
settings, CF clinics and other ambulatory care areas, diag-
nostic and therapeutic areas, and all clinical research activities.
Successful and consistent implementation of IP&C practices
must include the ongoing participation of people with CF
and their families as well as auditing the IP&C practices of
healthcare personnel and feedback about their performance.
The goal of this guideline is to reduce substantially the risk
of transmission and acquisition of CF pathogens, while rec-
ognizing that the risk is unlikely to reach zero.
A draft of the guideline was made available to the CF and
IP&C communities for review, and all comments were con-
sidered by the committee. This guideline was reviewed and
endorsed by SHEA and by the Association for Professionals
in Infection Control (APIC).
Recommendations
The recommendations are divided into 7 sections.
I. Core recommendations, intended for all people with CF
(including following lung or liver transplantation) in all
settings
II. Recommendations for microbiology and molecular epi-
demiology
III. Recommendations for CF clinics and other ambulatory
settings
IV. Recommendations for inpatient settings
V. Recommendations for nonhealthcare settings
VI. Recommendations for healthcare personnel with CF
VII. Recommendations regarding the psychosocial and med-
ical impact of IP&C
To facilitate use of the guideline, the relevant sections of
“Background Information Supporting the Recommendations”
(Sections I–III) and strategies to reduce transmission and ac-
quisition of pathogens (Sections IV–VII) are provided with
each recommendation. The recommendations emphasize that
healthcare personnel, people with CF, and their family and
friends receive education about IP&C that fosters understand-
ing of the rationale for the recommendations.
The recommendations highlight the importance of part-
nering with local IP&C teams to facilitate implementation
and the use of existing audit and feedback tools to monitor
adherence to IP&C practices. The recommendations empha-
size source containment of the respiratory secretions of peo-
ple with CF, appropriate use of personal protective equip-
ment, and cleaning and disinfection to prevent acquisition
of CF pathogens from the contaminated healthcare environ-
ment. Furthermore, the CF community is encouraged to
share best practices, written policies, quality improvement
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initiatives, educational materials, strategies for non-face-to-
face interactions among individuals with CF, and outcome
studies related to IP&C practices.
The key recommendations in this document that are new
for the CF community are as follows:
1. Develop strategies to monitor adherence to IP&C practices
by healthcare personnel and provide them with feedback
for improvement.
2. Partner with IP&C teams to implement the recommen-
dations in this guideline, especially those that are likely to
be followed in areas of the facility that are not dedicated
only to people with CF.
3. Implement Contact Precautions (ie, wear a gown and
gloves) when caring for all people with CF, regardless of
respiratory tract culture results, in both ambulatory and
inpatient settings.
4. Separate all people with CF from others with CF, regardless
of their respiratory tract culture results, at least 6 feet (2
meters) in all settings, to reduce the risk of droplet trans-
mission of CF pathogens.
5. All people with CF and their family members and friends
should perform appropriate hand hygiene (with either
alcohol-based hand rub or antimicrobial soap and water)
when there is the potential for contamination of hands
with pathogens. Contamination of hands may occur when
entering and exiting a CF clinic, clinic exam room, or
hospital room or from respiratory secretions after cough-
ing, performing pulmonary function tests, or performing
chest physiotherapy.
6. All people with CF, regardless of respiratory tract culture
results, should wear a surgical (also called procedure or
isolation) mask when in a healthcare setting to reduce the
risk of transmission or acquisition of CF pathogens.
7. Perform pulmonary function tests (PFTs) to reduce trans-
mission from one person with CF to another person with
CF by performing the test in one of the following ways:
• In the exam room at the beginning of the clinic visit,
allowing 30 minutes to elapse between CF patients;
• In a negative pressure room (airborne infection isolation
room);
• In a PFT laboratory with high-efficiency particulate
(HEPA) filters; or
• In a PFT laboratory without HEPA filters, allowing 30
minutes to elapse between individuals with CF.
8. Updated recommendations for care of nebulizers in the
hospital.
9. Only 1 person with CF may attend a CF Foundation–
sponsored indoor event.
I–III. Background Information Supporting the
Recommendations
I. CF Microbiology and Molecular Typing
The recommendations for processing CF respiratory tract
specimens in the 2003 Infection Control Guideline for CF1
are endorsed in the updated guideline. Several molecular typ-
ing strategies are reviewed, with a focus on newer technol-
ogies, such as whole-genome sequencing. The importance of
international efforts in understanding the molecular epide-
miology of CF pathogens is discussed, as is the need to use
molecular epidemiology as one tool to monitor the success
of IP&C strategies. An update on the epidemiology of CF
pathogens is provided, with an emphasis on gram-negative
pathogens, including Burkholderia spp., small colony variant
S. aureus, and nontuberculous mycobacteria (NTM). This
section also emphasizes the importance of surveillance strat-
egies to assess the impact of therapeutic interventions, to
identify potential outbreaks, and to monitor the success of
IP&C strategies.
II. Routes of Transmission of CF Pathogens
In this section, as in the 2003 Infection Control Guideline
for CF, the importance of contact and droplet transmission
is emphasized. While the precise routes of transmission are
unclear for every acquisition, data support transmission by
direct contact with infectious secretions; indirect contact with
infectious secretions through contaminated intermediate ob-
jects, such as healthcare surfaces, equipment, or the hands of
healthcare personnel; and/or infectious droplets. New data
are provided demonstrating that droplets can travel as far as
6 feet (2 meters), the complexities of droplet transmission
are described, and the potential role played by droplet nuclei
in transmission of CF pathogens is discussed.
III. Potential Sources of CF Pathogens
In this section, as in the 2003 Infection Control Guideline
for CF, it is again emphasized that the source of CF pathogens
is often unknown and that many individuals with CF are
infected with unique strains. However, molecular epidemi-
ology tools have expanded the evidence that people with CF
can share epidemic strains of P. aeruginosa, Burkholderia spp.,
MRSA, and M. abscessus. Less commonly, strains of other
gram-negative pathogens (eg, Stenotrophomonas maltophilia,
Achromobacter xylosoxidans, Ralstonia, Cupriavidus, and Pan-
doraea spp.) may be shared by people with CF. The adverse
clinical impact of epidemic strains is highlighted. The sources
of and role played by filamentous fungi in CF lung disease
(eg, Aspergillus spp.) are also considered.
While transmission of CF pathogens among people with
CF is very well described, transmission of CF pathogens from
individuals without CF to individuals with CF appears to be
almost exclusively limited to respiratory viral pathogens. Ac-
quisition of CF pathogens from animals has not been de-
scribed. In contrast, acquisition from the natural environment
(ie, soil, organic matter, and water) is feasible given the eco-
logic niches of some CF pathogens. The potential for acqui-
sition of CF pathogens from contaminated healthcare envi-
ronmental sources, including water, surfaces, equipment, air,
and products, is also discussed.
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IV. Strategies to Reduce Transmission and Acquisition
of CF Pathogens
This section is divided into 9 subsections that describe IP&C
strategies and the rationale for implementing them for all
people with CF, including those who have undergone lung
or liver transplantation. The subsections include education
strategies for healthcare personnel and for people with CF
and their families, including audits and feedback for health-
care personnel performance; hand hygiene for healthcare per-
sonnel, people with CF, and their families; use of personal
protective equipment, including the appropriate use of gowns
and gloves by healthcare personnel for all interactions with
people with CF; mask use by healthcare personnel as per CDC
recommendations; mask use by individuals with CF; cleaning
and disinfection of the healthcare environment and equip-
ment, including recommendations for nebulizer care; CF
clinic strategies, including recommendations for performing
pulmonary function testing; transmission-based precautions
for hospitalized people with CF; construction and renovation;
and strategies for nonhealthcare settings (eg, camps, indoor
and outdoor events, and schools).
Three additional sections have been developed: “Healthcare
Personnel with CF” (Section V ), which provides the rec-
ommendation that people with CF who are interested in
healthcare professions should seek advice from their CF care
teams about lower-risk options on the basis of their health
status; “Psychosocial and Medical Impact of Transmission-
Based Isolation Precautions” (Section VI), in which the un-
intended consequences of transmission precautions in both
CF and non-CF patient populations as well as strategies to
mitigate these are described, including developing non-face-
to-face methods of communicating among people with CF;
and “Challenges to Implementation of IP&C Recommen-
dations” (Section VII), in which challenges experienced by
healthcare personnel and by individuals with CF and their
families—as well as strategies to overcome them—are dis-
cussed.
Tables, Figures, and Research Agenda
Tables are provided to supplement the text. These include (1)
the population, intervention, comparison, and outcome
(PICO) questions the committee developed for the systematic
review; (2) a review of the grading systems used; (3) the
species in the B. cepacia complex; (4) examples of hand hy-
giene opportunities for healthcare personnel, people with CF,
and their families; (5) indications for use of personal pro-
tective equipment by healthcare personnel, people with CF,
and their families; (6) strategies to enhance the effectiveness
of environmental cleaning in healthcare settings; (7) strategies
for CF clinics to minimize risk of transmission of potential
pathogens; (8) strategies to minimize the adverse psychosocial
impact of isolation precautions; (9) knowledge, attitudes, and
practice barriers related to implementing IP&C in CF; and
(10) strategies to enhance implementation of IP&C in CF.
Two figures are also presented: the age-specific prevalence of
CF pathogens in 2012 in the United States, and the changing
prevalence of CF pathogens in the United States from 1988
to 2012.
A research agenda is proposed to address some of the un-
resolved IP&C issues for the CF community, including, for
example (1) the role played by small colony variant S. aureus;
(2) the frequency of shared strains of CF pathogens, including
P. aeruginosa and NTM in the United States; (3) the routes
of transmission of M. abscessus; (4) the role played by specific
niches for CF pathogens in the natural environment; (5) con-
tinued efforts to define best IP&C practices for CF; (6) con-
tinued efforts to assess and overcome challenges to imple-
mentation of IP&C; and (7) additional research into the
unique needs of healthcare personnel with CF.
Summary
In summary, epidemiologic studies have shown that patho-
gens, other than Burkholderia spp., can be transmitted among
individuals with CF, resulting in adverse clinical outcomes,
including increased morbidity and mortality. The updated
guideline is a response to new knowledge and new challenges
in both IP&C and CF. The primary objective of the guideline
is to provide recommendations to reduce the risk of trans-
mission and acquisition of CF pathogens by individuals with
CF and to provide a more comprehensive understanding of
effective strategies to optimize safety for this unique pop-
ulation.
introduction
In 2003, the Cystic Fibrosis (CF) Foundation published rec-
ommendations for infection prevention and control (IP&C)
in an effort to reduce the risk of acquisition and transmission
of pathogens among people with CF.1 However, both IP&C
and CF are dynamic disciplines, and during the past decade
new knowledge and new challenges necessitated the devel-
opment of updated IP&C strategies for this unique pop-
ulation.
1. IP&C experiences in the general population can provide
insight into strategies for people with CF. Numerous evi-
dence-based guidelines for IP&C and clinical practice guide-
lines have been published since 2003 by the Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention (CDC)/Healthcare Infection
Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC), the World
Health Organization (WHO), and professional societies, in-
cluding the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA)
and the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America
(SHEA). These guidelines contain relevant recommendations
for people with CF (see Table 1 for the most relevant guide-
lines).2-13
In addition, each year the CDC/Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP) updates the recommenda-
tions for immunizations in children and adults and the rec-
ommendations for the prevention of influenza for the up-
coming season; these recommendations are published in
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR).14 Relevant
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table 1. Infection Prevention and Control Guidelines Published since 2003
Guideline Organization Reference
Guidelines for Environmental Infection Control in Health-Care Facilities, 2003 CDC/HICPAC 2
Guidelines for Preventing Health-Care–Associated Pneumonia, 2003 CDC/HICPAC 3
Guidelines for Preventing the Transmission of Mycobacterium tuberculosis in Health-Care
Settings, 2005 CDC/NCHHSTP 4
Management of Multidrug-Resistant Organisms in Health Care Settings, 2006 CDC/HICPAC 5
Guideline for Isolation Precautions: Preventing Transmission of Infectious Agents in Health
Care Settings, 2007 CDC/HICPAC 6
Disinfection and Sterilization in Health-Care Facilities, 2008 CDC/HICPAC 7
Strategies to Prevent Transmission of Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus in Acute Care
Hospitals, 2008 IDSA/SHEA 8
Guidelines on Hand Hygiene in Healthcare, 2009 WHO 9
Infection Prevention for Outpatient Settings: Minimum Expectations for Safe Care, 2011 CDC/HICPAC 10
Immunization of Health-Care Personnel: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices CDC/ACIP 11
Infection Prevention and Control in Residential Facilities for Pediatric Patients and Their
Families, 2013 SHEA 12
Clinical Practice Guideline for Vaccination of the Immunocompromised Host, 2013 IDSA 13
note. ACIP, Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices; CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; HICPAC, Healthcare
Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee; HIV, human immunodeficiency virus; IDSA, Infectious Diseases Society of America;
NCHHSTP, National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention; SHEA, Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of
America; STD, sexually transmitted diseases; TB, tuberculosis; WHO, World Health Organization.
recommendations from both IP&C guidelines and ACIP rec-
ommendations have been integrated into this updated IP&C
guideline for people with CF. Furthermore, during the past
decade new evidence has led to a renewed emphasis on source
containment of potential pathogens, the role played by the
contaminated healthcare environment in transmitting infec-
tious agents, and an increased understanding of the impor-
tance of implementation science, monitoring adherence, and
feedback principles to enhance the effectiveness of IP&C prac-
tices as detailed throughout this document.
2. Experience with emerging pathogens can inform IP&C
strategies for CF. The severe acute respiratory syndrome co-
ronavirus (SARS-CoV) and the 2009 influenza A H1N1 pan-
demic expanded our understanding of droplet transmission
of infectious agents.6,14,15 While the incidence of healthcare-
and community-associated infections caused by methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) has been decreasing
in adults in the United States in recent years,16 a similar trend
has not been observed among children.17 Additionally, mul-
tidrug-resistant gram-negative pathogens continue to emerge
and are increasing in healthcare settings,18 which has height-
ened the awareness of healthcare personnel and the public
of the importance of preventing patient-to-patient transmis-
sion of multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs).5,19,20
3. Changes in the demographic characteristics of the CF
population and in the epidemiology of CF pathogens during
the past decade have implications for IP&C. The median
predicted life expectancy of people with CF has increased to
41 years of age.21 In the United States and in many other
countries, the number of adults with CF is comparable to or
has surpassed the number of children with CF. Newborn
screening for CF is now mandated in all 50 states in the
United States. Newer CF pathogens are increasing in prev-
alence and are associated with increased rates of morbidity
and mortality among individuals with CF. Such pathogens
include MRSA,22,23 Mycobacteria abscessus,24 Burkholderia do-
losa,25 new species in the Burkholderia cepacia complex,26 ep-
idemic clones of Pseudomonas aeruginosa (eg, the Liverpool
epidemic strain [LES]),27-29 and others.30 Thanks to the in-
creasing use of molecular typing, strains that are shared
among people with CF continue to be identified, suggesting
that new strategies beyond those recommended in the 2003
Infection Control Guideline for CF are needed to improve
the implementation of IP&C practices and to reduce the
transmission of CF pathogens.
While extraordinary advances have been made in the treat-
ment of CF, including the use of potentiators and correctors
aimed at correcting the abnormal CF transmembrane con-
ductance regulator (CFTR),31 the CF and the IP&C com-
munities must continue to prioritize minimizing the risk of
acquisition and transmission of CF pathogens. To update the
2003 Infection Control Guideline for CF, the CF Foundation
assembled an interdisciplinary committee to (1) review ex-
isting literature and present new knowledge that served as
the basis for the updated IP&C practice recommendations;
(2) assess the relevance of existing guidelines and integrate
appropriate recommendations, including those from the 2003
Infection Control Guideline for CF; (3) craft updated rec-
ommendations; and (4) address strategies to improve imple-
mentation of IP&C practices, including education and over-
coming challenges to implementation.
The process the committee undertook to complete its tasks,
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including the systematic review, is described below. The
groups of updated IP&C recommendations are as follows: (I)
core recommendations for all people with CF (including
following lung or liver transplantation) in all settings; (II)
recommendations for microbiology and molecular epide-
miology; (III) recommendations for CF clinics and other am-
bulatory care settings; (IV) recommendations for inpatient
settings; (V) recommendations for nonhealthcare settings;
(VI) recommendations for healthcare personnel with CF; and
(VII) recommendations for the psychosocial and medical im-
pact of IP&C. To facilitate use of the guideline, the relevant
sections of “Background Information Supporting the Rec-
ommendations” (Sections I–III) and strategies to reduce
transmission and acquisition of pathogens (Sections IV–VII)
are provided for each recommendation as supporting ra-
tionale.
This guideline is intended for use by all healthcare per-
sonnel involved with the care of people with CF and the IP&C
teams that support CF care centers in the United States. The
recommendations for healthcare settings are intended to be
implemented in CF clinics and other ambulatory care areas,
in inpatient settings, in diagnostic and therapeutic areas, and
during all clinical research activities. The recommendations
for nonhealthcare settings presented in this updated guideline
are not intended to be enforced by healthcare personnel but
instead represent efforts to respond to questions and concerns
voiced by people with CF and their caregivers and to provide
education about the potential risks associated with various
activities or exposures. People with CF and their families and
friends will then be better prepared to make informed choices
in their personal lives.
methods for document development
Committee Structure
In March 2011, the CF Foundation requested volunteers to
participate in developing an update of the 2003 Infection
Control Guideline for CF. The 21-member interdisciplinary
committee consisted of 4 infectious disease specialists (all of
whom had expertise in IP&C and CF microbiology), 4 pul-
monologists, 4 nurses, 1 respiratory therapist, 1 infection pre-
ventionist, 3 parents of children with CF, 1 adult with CF, 1
social worker, and 2 CF Foundation staff members (a pul-
monologist and a nurse).
In November 2011, the committee assembled and devel-
oped the scope of the guidelines by identifying clinical ques-
tions to be addressed, using the population, intervention,
comparison, and outcome (PICO) format.32 To evaluate the
published evidence for answers to these questions, the CF
Foundation commissioned an evidence review from a Johns
Hopkins University team under the leadership of an epide-
miologist (K.A.R.) with experience in conducting systematic
reviews, including those assessing interventions used in the
CF population. The PICO questions used to guide the evi-
dence search are presented in Table 2.
Systematic Review Process
For the systematic review, searches of PubMed, Embase, and
the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Studies were
conducted by the Johns Hopkins University research team in
June 2012. Searches of reference lists for all eligible articles
and Cochrane reviews were also completed. Committee mem-
bers provided additional potentially eligible studies. Studies
performed in the CF population were sought preferentially,
but studies conducted in other populations considered rel-
evant were also reviewed. Two independent reviewers
screened search results for eligible studies. Details about el-
igible studies were abstracted and a report, including evidence
tables and qualitative synthesis, was submitted to the CF
Foundation and disseminated to the committee.
Additionally, the Johns Hopkins University research team
identified relevant guidelines and Cochrane reviews through
searches (completed in August 2012) of the National Guide-
lines Clearinghouse, United Kingdom CF Trust website, CF
Foundation guidelines database, the Cochrane Library, and
lists provided by the committee chairs. Details from these
sources, including recommendation statements, were ab-
stracted and provided to the committee.
Results of the Systematic Review
The search identified 16 eligible articles reporting 15 unique
studies. These included 4 before-and-after studies, 4 cross-
sectional studies, and 7 nonconcurrent cohort studies, but
these studies provided insufficient evidence to use the US
Preventive Services Task Force grading system that has been
used for other recent CF practice guidelines.33,34 The system-
atic review team also abstracted 2,403 recommendation state-
ments from 47 relevant IP&C guidelines. Evidence tables
can be obtained from the CF Foundation on request
(resources@cff.org).
Process for Inclusion of Recommendations
Each recommendation from the 2003 Infection Control
Guideline for CF was reviewed for continued relevance and
modified if clarification was needed or if new data were avail-
able. The grade of evidence from the 2003 Infection Control
Guideline for CF was retained. Relevant recommendations
from other CF practice guidelines were included verbatim.
Relevant recommendations from other guidelines developed
for non-CF populations by other expert professional orga-
nizations, including CDC/HICPAC, SHEA, IDSA, WHO,
APIC, and ACIP were also included, and their grade of evi-
dence was retained without a vote by the committee (Table
3).1,9 New recommendations that had not been published
previously were developed by the committee. Inclusion of the
recommendations was determined by anonymous voting. At
least 80% approval by the committee members (ie, consensus)
was set as the threshold for acceptance of new recommen-
dations, relevant recommendations from the 2003 Infection
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table 2. Population, Intervention, Comparison, and Outcome (PICO) Clinical Questions Developed for the Guideline for Infection
Prevention and Control in Cystic Fibrosis (CF): 2013 Update
Microbiology
1. Does identification of small colony variant Staphylococcus aureus versus not performing identification of small colony variant S.
aureus affect clinical outcomes of people with CF experiencing exacerbation?
Transmission: Personal Protective Equipment
2a. What is the evidence for benefit or harm of people with CF wearing masks in the healthcare setting versus not wearing masks?
2b. What is the evidence for benefit or harm of healthcare providers wearing masks versus not wearing masks when caring for
people with CF?
3a. What is the evidence for benefit or harm of people with wearing gowns versus not wearing gowns in healthcare settings?
3b. What is the evidence for benefit or harm of healthcare providers wearing gowns versus not wearing gowns when caring for
people with CF?
4a. What is the evidence for benefit or harm of people with CF wearing gloves versus not wearing gloves in healthcare settings?
4b. What is the evidence for benefit or harm of healthcare providers wearing gloves in healthcare setting versus not wearing gloves
among people with CF?
Transmission: Distance for Droplets
5. What is the evidence that more than 3 feet distance between people with CF versus 3 feet or less is required to prevent droplet
transmission?
Transmission: Methicillin-Resistant S. aureus (MRSA)
6a. What is the evidence that separation versus nonseparation reduces MRSA transmission from people without CF who have
skin and soft-tissue infection (SSTI) to prevent respiratory tract infection in people with CF?
6b. What is the evidence that separation versus nonseparation of people with CF with MRSA respiratory tract infections reduces
MRSA transmission to others with CF?
6c. What is the evidence that separation versus nonseparation of people with CF with MRSA respiratory tract infections reduces
MRSA transmission and prevents SSTI in people without CF?
Transmission: Nonhealthcare Settings
7. What is the evidence that restriction versus nonrestriction reduces transmission of CF pathogens in indoor and/or outdoor
nonhealthcare settings where more than 1 person with CF is present (eg, fund-raising events, cystic fibrosis chapter offices, phar-
maceutical company venues, Great Strides)?
8a. What is the evidence among people with CF that restriction versus nonrestriction reduces transmission of CF pathogens from
leisure activities involving soil and plants (eg, gardening and lawn care)?
8b. What is the evidence that among people with CF restriction versus nonrestriction reduces transmission of CF pathogens from
leisure activities involving aquatic settings, hot tubs, swimming pools, and natural bodies of water?
Transmission: Animals
9a. What is the evidence that among people with CF restriction versus nonrestriction reduces transmission of CF pathogens from
pet therapy?
9b. What is the evidence that among people with CF restriction versus nonrestriction reduces transmission of CF pathogens from
personal pets or farm animals?
Transmission: Healthcare Personnel with CF
10. What is the evidence that a healthcare provider with CF should be restricted versus not restricted from working with people
with CF to prevent transmission of CF pathogens from a healthcare provider with CF to his or her patients and vice versa?
Transmission: Scheduling CF Clinic Visits
11. What is the evidence that scheduling CF clinic visits on the basis of pathogen status (separate clinic times) versus not sched-
uling CF clinic visits on the basis of pathogen status (no separate clinic times) reduces transmission of CF pathogens?
Cleaning Respiratory Equipment
12a. What is the evidence for cleaning and disinfecting respiratory equipment of people with CF after each use versus some other
frequency for cleaning to prevent contamination and transmission of CF pathogens in the hospital?
12b. What is the evidence for cleaning and disinfecting respiratory equipment of people with CF after each use versus some other
frequency for cleaning to prevent contamination and transmission of CF pathogens in the home?
12c. What is the evidence for cleaning and disinfecting respiratory equipment of people with CF with one method versus another
method for cleaning to prevent contamination and transmission of CF pathogens in the hospital?
12d. What is the evidence for cleaning and disinfecting respiratory equipment of people with CF with one method versus another
method for cleaning to prevent contamination and transmission of CF pathogens in the home?
Control Guideline for CF, or relevant recommendations from
other guidelines developed for non-CF populations.
The CDC/HICPAC guidelines and the WHO hand hygiene
guideline cited in this document used a unique HICPAC grad-
ing system that was used for HICPAC guidelines published
before 2009. The Grading of Recommendations, Assessment,
Development, and Evaluation (GRADE) system35 was
adopted for use by CDC/HICPAC/ACIP in 200936,37 and is
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table 3. Grading Systems Used in the Updated Infection Prevention and Control (IP&C) Guidelines for Cystic Fibrosis (CF), 2013
Source of recommendation Grading strategy Comments





WHO Guidelines on Hand Hy-






Strongly recommended for implementation and strongly supported by well-
designed experimental, clinical, or epidemiologic studies
Strongly recommended for implementation and supported by some experimen-
tal, clinical, or epidemiologic studies and a strong theoretical rationale
Required for implementation, as mandated by federal and/or state regulation
or standard
Suggested for implementation and supported by suggestive clinical or epidemi-
ologic studies or a theoretical rationale
Unresolved issue;a practices for which insufficient evidence or no consensus re-
garding efficacy exist
Systematic review Not applicable Limited evidence was found by the systematic review conducted for the 2013
IP&C guideline; thus, the grading of evidence was not used




≥80% agreed with statement by anonymous voting
!80% agreed with statement by anonymous voting and thus insufficient evi-
dence exists to recommend for or against
note. CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; HICPAC, Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee; WHO,
World Health Organization.
a The unresolved issue category was not included in the 2009 WHO hand hygiene guidelines.
used by more than 70 organizations worldwide. However, the
GRADE system can result in IP&C guidelines that are more
likely to include expert consensus compared with guidelines
developed for specific treatment regimens that have random-
ized clinical trials as their evidence base. Limitations of the
GRADE system that may impact developing IP&C guidelines
include (1) questions for which little or no evidence is avail-
able on which to base a recommendation, (2) little or no
requirement for evidence given the high probability of a rec-
ommendation’s success, and (3) difficulty assessing the
strength of evidence from studies performed in varying pop-
ulations with varying study designs.37,38 The evidence base for
this updated guideline had similar limitations; thus, the rec-
ommendations in this guideline are often based on expert
consensus.
External Review
In May 2013, the CF Foundation made a draft of the updated
guideline available for comment to the CF community, in-
cluding the teams at CF care centers and people with CF.
Infection preventionists and healthcare epidemiologists were
also notified of the availability of the document for comment.
All comments were considered by the committee, and the
recommendations and background information were revised
as appropriate. This guideline was reviewed and endorsed by




The CF Foundation recommends implementation of the fol-
lowing core IP&C recommendations to minimize the risk of
transmission and acquisition of pathogens among all people
with CF, including following lung or liver transplantation, in
all settings.
Education/Adherence Monitoring for Healthcare Personnel,
People with CF, and Families
1. The CF Foundation recommends that all healthcare per-
sonnel caring for people with CF (eg, the CF care team,
inpatient staff, environmental services staff, research staff, and
staff in diagnostic and therapeutic areas, including pulmonary
function test [PFT] laboratories, radiology, phlebotomy, op-
erating room, and physical therapy) receive education re-
garding IP&C for CF, using principles of adult learning. Ed-
ucation should be repeated at intervals each center deems
appropriate.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category II; 2006 MDRO guideline, Category IB; 2007
transmission guideline, Category IB
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: III.D.2; IV.B
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2. The CF Foundation recommends that the CF care team
develop strategies to monitor adherence to IP&C practices
by healthcare personnel and provide feedback. Feedback to
the CF care team includes immediate feedback to an indi-
vidual when a lapse in practice is observed and feedback to
the entire CF care team of trends of overall adherence rates
at regular intervals (eg, quarterly) on the basis of consistency
of practices.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category IB; 2006 MDRO guideline, Category IB; 2007
transmission guideline, Category IB
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: IV.B; IV.E.1
3. The CF Foundation recommends that all people with CF
and their families receive education regarding IP&C for CF,
using age appropriate tools and reading/language level appro-
priate to the target audience. Involve people with CF and their
families in the development of educational programs and im-
plementation of recommended practices. Education should be
repeated at intervals each center deems appropriate.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category II
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: IV.B
Partnering with Institutional IP&C Teams
4. The CF Foundation recommends that CF care teams
collaborate with their institutional IP&C teams to implement
the recommendations in this guideline.
Source of supporting evidence: 2006 MDRO guideline,
Category IB
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: I.D; IV.B; IV.E.1, 2; IV.F
5. The CF Foundation recommends that CF care teams
collaborate with their institutional IP&C teams to develop
protocols, checklists, and audits to standardize implemen-
tation of practices for the following:
a. Single-patient-use, disposable items
b. Cleaning and disinfecting multiuse items (eg, patient care
equipment, oximeters, iPads and similar tablets, and
computers)
c. Cleaning and disinfecting surfaces in the healthcare en-
vironment (eg, CF clinics, PFT rooms, hospital rooms, and
sinks and showers)
Source of supporting evidence: 2008 disinfection and ster-
ilization guideline, Category II; http://www.cdc.gov
/HAI/toolkits/Evaluating-Environmental-Cleaning.html
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: III.D.2; IV.E.2; IV.F.6, 7
6. The CF Foundation recommends ensuring that dust
containment during renovation and construction and water-
leak remediation policies and practices are followed according
to institutional and national guidelines in all ambulatory care
areas and inpatient settings where people with CF receive
care.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category IB/IC; 2003 CDC environmental guideline,
Category IB/IC
2013 IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: III.D.3; IV.H
7. The CF Foundation recommends that healthcare per-
sonnel assume that all people with CF could have pathogens
in respiratory tract secretions that are transmissible to other
people with CF.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category IA
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: IV.F.1; IV.G
Practices for Healthcare Personnel
8. The CF Foundation recommends that all healthcare fa-
cilities caring for people with CF ensure ready availability of
alcohol-based hand rub or antimicrobial soap and water in
all patient rooms, PFT rooms, and waiting areas.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category IA; 2009 WHO and 2002 hand hygiene guide-
lines, Category IA
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: IV.B; IV.F.3
9. The CF Foundation recommends that healthcare per-
sonnel perform hand hygiene (either using alcohol-based
hand rub or washing hands with antimicrobial soap and wa-
ter), as per CDC and WHO guidelines, in the following clin-
ical situations:
a. Before entering the room and when leaving the room of
any patient
b. Before and after direct contact with any patient
c. Before putting gloves on and after removing gloves, for
both sterile and nonsterile procedures
d. After contact with patient’s skin, mucous membranes, re-
spiratory secretions, or other body fluids
e. After contact with inanimate objects (including medical
equipment) in the vicinity of the patient that may be po-
tentially contaminated with respiratory secretions
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category IA; 2009 WHO and 2002 hand hygiene guide-
lines, Category IA
Sections in the text: IV.C; IV.F.3
10. The CF Foundation recommends that healthcare per-
sonnel should not wear artificial fingernails or nail extenders
when having direct contact with people with CF.
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Source of supporting evidence: 2002 HICPAC hand hygiene,
Category IA for high-risk patients; 2009 WHO hand
hygiene, Category IA for all patients
Sections in the text: IV.C
11. The CF Foundation recommends that healthcare per-
sonnel should disinfect their stethoscopes before and after
use on each patient in accordance with institutional IP&C
policies. Stethoscopes that remain in the patient’s room and
are dedicated for use only for that patient do not need to be
disinfected before and after use.
Source of supporting evidence: 2006 MDRO guideline,
Category IB
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: III.D.2; IV.E.2; IV.F.7; IV.G
12. The CF Foundation recommends that healthcare per-
sonnel caring for people with CF should not be routinely
screened for MRSA colonization unless they are epidemi-
ologically linked to a cluster of MRSA infections in accor-
dance with institutional IP&C policies and national guide-
lines.
Source of supporting evidence: 2006 MDRO guideline,
Category IB
Sections in the text: III.B.2
Isolation Precautions
13. The CF Foundation recommends that all healthcare
personnel implement Contact Precautions (ie, wear a gown
and gloves) when caring for all people with CF regardless of
respiratory tract culture results, in ambulatory and inpatient
settings.
Source of supporting evidence: 2007 transmission guideline,
Category IB/IC
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: II.A; IV.D.1; IV.G
14. The CF Foundation does not recommend that health-
care personnel wear a mask routinely when caring for people
with CF. However, the CF Foundation recommends mask use
per CDC guidelines, as follows:
a. Surgical (procedure, isolation) masks are worn by health-
care personnel caring for any patient under Droplet Pre-
cautions with suspected or confirmed pathogens that are
transmitted by the droplet route (eg, adenovirus, rhino-
virus, influenza virus, or Mycoplasma pneumoniae).
b. Masks and eye protection should be worn by healthcare
personnel if splashes or sprays of respiratory tract secre-
tions are anticipated as per Standard Precautions.
c. N-95 respirators (masks) or powered air-purifying respi-
rators (PAPRs) are worn by healthcare personnel caring
for any patient under Airborne Precautions (in an airborne
infection isolation room [AIIR]) for suspected or con-
firmed infection with Mycobacterium tuberculosis.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category IA; 2007 transmission guideline, Category IB;
2007 transmission guideline, Category IB; 2005 tuber-
culosis (TB) transmission guideline
Sections in the text: II.C; IV.D.2; IV.G
15. The CF Foundation recommends placing people with
CF who are acid-fast bacilli (AFB) smear positive for the first
time under Airborne Precautions (AIIR requirements: nega-
tive-pressure single room, more than 12 air exchanges per
hour, air exhausted to the outside) in ambulatory and in-
patient settings until M. tuberculosis infection has been ex-
cluded. Alternatively, in geographic locations with a very low
incidence of TB, a risk assessment that includes the likelihood
of exposure to individuals with TB (eg, travel or visitors from
high-prevalence areas) may be used to guide the use of AIIRs.
Consult with institutional IP&C staff and/or infectious disease
physicians.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category IA; 2005 M. tuberculosis transmission guide-
line; 2007 transmission guideline, Category IA/IC
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: IV.D.2; IV.G
16. The CF Foundation concludes that there is insufficient
evidence at the time of publication of this document for or
against placing people with CF who are infected with NTM
under Airborne Precautions.
2013 CF IP&C guideline, certainty: low
Sections in the text: III.A.5; III.D.2; IV.G
Practices by People with CF and Family Members/Friends
17. The CF Foundation recommends that all people with
CF, regardless of their respiratory tract culture results, be separated
by at least 6 feet (2 meters) from other people with CF in all
settings, to reduce the risk of droplet transmission of CF path-
ogens. This does not apply to members of the same household.
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: II.A; II.B; II.C; III.D.2; IV.F.1, 2
18. The CF Foundation recommends that all people with
CF and their family members/friends perform hand hygiene
(with either alcohol-based hand rub or antimicrobial soap
and water) when there is potential for contamination of hands
with pathogens, such as the following:
a. Entering and exiting CF clinics, clinic exam rooms, or
hospital rooms
b. Hands become contaminated with respiratory secretions
(eg, after coughing or performing PFTs or chest physio-
therapy)
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category IA
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: II.A; IV.C; IV.F.3
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19. The CF Foundation does not recommend that people
with CF wear gowns or gloves in CF clinics, in other am-
bulatory healthcare settings, or while hospitalized.
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: IV.C; IV.D.1
20. The CF Foundation recommends that people with CF
be instructed to follow Respiratory Hygiene practices to con-
tain their secretions when coughing or sneezing (ie, cough
into a tissue, immediately discard soiled tissue into a trash
receptacle, and perform hand hygiene after disposing of soiled
tissues). A covered trash receptacle with a foot pedal is pre-
ferred.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category II; 2007 transmission guideline, Category IB
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: IV.A; IV.D.2; IV.F.4
21. The CF Foundation recommends that all people with
CF wear a surgical (procedure, isolation) mask when in a
healthcare facility to reduce the risk of transmission or ac-
quisition of CF pathogens. Masks should be worn throughout
the facility, including in restrooms. Masks should not be worn
during pulmonary function testing, in the clinic exam room,
or in the patient’s hospital room. If the optimal size mask is
not available (eg, for small infants), use the smallest mask
available. If a mask is not tolerated by an individual with CF
who is having respiratory distress, encourage that person to
follow Respiratory Hygiene practices. Masks should be
changed when wet.
Source of supporting evidence: 2007 transmission guideline,
Category IB
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: II; IV.F.4
22. The CF Foundation recommends that all people with
CF who do not live in the same household avoid activities
and risk factors that are associated with transmission of CF
pathogens in nonhealthcare and healthcare settings, including
the following:
a. Social contact between people with CF
b. Physical contact between people with CF (eg, handshakes,
kissing, and intimate contact)
c. Car rides with another person with CF
d. Sharing hotel rooms with another person with CF
e. Fitness class with another person with CF
Activities that all people with CF, including those who live
in same household, should avoid include the following:
a. Sharing personal items (eg, toothbrush and drinking uten-
sils) with another person with CF
b. Sharing respiratory therapy equipment
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category IA; 2013 residential facility guideline
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: III.A.1; IV.I
23. The CF Foundation recommends that
a. Tap water or well water that meets local public health




iii. For cleaning nebulizers and other respiratory equip-
ment (eg, airway clearance devices, spacers, and neti
pots) if followed by disinfection
iv. For the water needed for heat disinfection (eg, boiling,
microwaving, and steam sterilizing)
b. Only sterile water be used for nasal rinses (eg, neti pots),
filling of humidifier reservoirs, and as a final rinse of re-
spiratory equipment (eg, after cold disinfection)
2013 IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: III.D.1; III.D.2; IV.E.3; IV.E.4
Immunizations/Influenza Chemoprophylaxis
24. The CF Foundation recommends that, as per CDC/
ACIP recommendations, all healthcare personnel (unless
there is a medical contraindication to immunization) should
be immunized or have evidence of immunity to mumps,
measles, rubella, varicella, pertussis (Tdap), and hepatitis B
and receive an annual influenza immunization.
Source of supporting evidence: MMWR 2013;62(RR-07):1–
43; http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/schedules/index.html
Sections in the text: IV.I.5
25. The CF Foundation recommends that, as per CDC/
ACIP recommendations, all people with CF and their family
members/close contacts receive recommended vaccines at the
recommended schedule, age, dose, and route of administra-
tion unless there is a medical contraindication.
Source of supporting evidence: MMWR 2013;62(RR-07):1–
43; http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/schedules/index.html
Sections in the text: IV.I.5
26. The CF Foundation recommends use of antiviral che-
moprophylaxis or treatment (eg, oseltamivir) for prevention
or treatment of influenza according to ACIP recommendations.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline, Cat-
egory 1A; http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/antivirals
/summary-clinicians.htm (2012–2013 season)
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: IV.I.5
Research Settings
27. The CF Foundation recommends that for all research
activities, people with CF, their family members/friends, and
healthcare personnel follow relevant IP&C recommendations
for that healthcare setting.
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: III.A
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II. Recommendations for Microbiology and
Molecular Epidemiology
In addition to the microbiology recommendations for pro-
cessing CF respiratory specimens described in the 2003 Infec-
tion Control Guideline for CF, the CF Foundation recommends
implementation of the following recommendations:
Review Center-Specific Microbiology Data
28. The CF Foundation recommends that all CF centers
obtain and review center-specific quarterly surveillance re-
ports (eg, data from the local clinical microbiology laboratory
or the CF Foundation Patient Registry) of the incidence and
prevalence of respiratory tract pathogens at their centers. This
review should be conducted in collaboration with institu-
tional IP&C teams and microbiology laboratory directors.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category IB; 2006 MDRO guideline, Category IB
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: I.D; IV.F.1
Molecular Typing
29. The CF Foundation recommends that CF isolates of
Burkholderia spp. be sent to the laboratory at the University
of Michigan (US) for confirmation of identification, speci-
ation, and molecular typing, as follows:
a. All initial isolates from every patient
b. At least 1 isolate per patient per year
c. Any isolates suspected of being associated with transmis-
sion or an outbreak
d. Any other nonfermenting gram-negative organism for
which species identification remains equivocal after routine
analysis should be sent for confirmation of identification
CF Foundation Burkholderia cepacia Research Laboratory
and Repository
University of Michigan
8323 MSRB III, SPC 5646
1150 West Medical Center Drive
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-0646
Tel: 734-936-9767; fax: 734-764-4279; e-mail: jlipuma
@umich.edu
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category IB
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: I.B; III.A.1
30. The CF Foundation recommends that molecular typing
of B. cepacia complex isolates and other microorganisms (eg,
P. aeruginosa and NTM) be performed when epidemiologically
indicated (eg, suspected patient-to-patient transmission).
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category IA; 2006 MDRO guideline, Category IB
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: I.B; I.D; III.A
31. The CF Foundation recommends that molecular typing
be performed using an appropriate genotyping method (eg,
pulsed-field gel electrophoresis, random-amplified poly-
morphic DNA polymerase chain reaction [PCR], repetitive
sequence-based PCR, or multilocus sequence typing).
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category IA; 2006 MDRO guideline, Category IB
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: I.B; III.A.2; III.A.4; III.A.5
Surveillance
32. The CF Foundation and European CF Society (ECFS)
recommend that screening cultures for NTM should be per-
formed annually in individuals with a stable clinical course.
Culture and smears for AFB from sputum should be used
for NTM screening.
In the absence of clinical features suggestive of NTM pul-
monary disease, individuals who are not capable of sponta-
neously producing sputum do not require screening cultures
for NTM. The CF Foundation and ECFS recommend against
the use of oropharyngeal swabs for NTM screening.
Source of supporting evidence: 2013 NTM in CF guideline
2013 IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: I.C.5; III.A.5
33. The CF Foundation concludes that there is insufficient
evidence at the time of publication of this document to rec-
ommend criteria by which to consider a person with CF who
previously had Burkholderia species isolated from respiratory
tract cultures to be Burkholderia-free.
2013 IP&C guideline, certainty: low
Sections in the text: IV.F.1
III. Recommendations for CF Clinics and Other
Ambulatory Care Settings
In addition to the core recommendations, the CF Foundation
recommends implementing the following recommendations
in CF clinics and other ambulatory care areas, including those
clinics where people with CF who have undergone lung or
liver transplantation are followed.
Scheduling in CF Clinics
34. The CF Foundation recommends that CF clinics sched-
ule and manage people with CF in ways to minimize time
in common waiting areas. Such strategies include the follow-
ing:
a. Stagger clinic schedule
b. Place people with CF regardless of their respiratory culture
results in an exam room immediately on arrival to the clinic
c. Use a pager system or personal cell phone to alert people
with CF that an exam room is available
d. Keep a person with CF in one exam room while the CF
care team rotates through the exam room
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e. Do not share common items (eg, clinic computer and
toys), and request that people with CF bring their own
recreational items to clinic appointments
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category II
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: II; III.D.2; IV.F.1, 2, 7
35. The CF Foundation recommends that infants under 2
years of age be separated from other people with CF in CF
clinics until adequate infection control education has been
provided to and is understood by the caregivers.
Source of supporting evidence: 2009 CF Foundation guide-
line Management of Infants with CF Consensus, cer-
tainty: low; benefit: moderate
Sections in the text: II; III.A; IV.B; IV.F.1, 2, 7
36. The CF Foundation recommends that all newly diag-
nosed people with CF be separated from other people with
CF in CF clinics until adequate IP&C education has been
provided to and is understood by newly diagnosed individuals
and their caregivers.
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: II; III.A; IV.B; IV.F.1, 2
37. The CF Foundation concludes that there is insufficient
evidence at the time of publication of this document for or
against routinely scheduling CF clinics on the basis of specific
pathogens isolated from respiratory tract cultures.
2013 CF IP&C guideline, certainty: low
Sections in the text: III.A; IV.F.1
Pulmonary Function Testing
38. The CF Foundation recommends that PFTs be per-
formed in one of the following ways:
a. In the exam room at the beginning of the clinic visit
b. In a negative-pressure room (AIIR)
c. In a PFT laboratory with either portable or integrated
HEPA filters
d. In a PFT laboratory without HEPA filtration, allowing 30
minutes to elapse before the next person with CF enters
the PFT laboratory
2013 IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: II.E; III.D.2; IV.A; IV.F.6
Environmental Practices
39. The CF Foundation recommends that exam rooms be
cleaned and disinfected between patients using a 1-step pro-
cess and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)–registered
hospital-grade disinfectant/detergent designed for house-
keeping in accordance with institutional IP&C policies.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category IB
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: III.D.2; IV.F.7
Designing a New CF Clinic
40. The CF Foundation recommends that the leadership
staff of CF centers collaborate with the institutional IP&C
and planning design and construction departments when de-
signing a new CF clinic to ensure a design that includes the
following:
a. Provision for management of people with CF who require
Airborne Precautions
b. Appropriate number of exam rooms
c. Single-person restrooms
d. Adequate space for personal protective equipment (eg,
masks, gowns, and gloves) at the point of use
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: II.E; III.D.2; IV.F; IV.G
IV. Recommendations for Inpatient Settings
In addition to the core recommendations, the CF Foundation
recommends implementing the following recommendations
in inpatient settings, including those units where people with
CF who have undergone lung or liver transplantation are
located.
Room Placement
41. The CF Foundation recommends that people with CF
be placed in a single-patient room. Only people with CF who
live in the same household may share a hospital room.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category II; 2006 MDRO guideline, Category IB
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: II; IV.G
42. The CF Foundation recommends placing people with
CF who are solid-organ transplant recipients in a single-
patient room in accordance with institutional policy and na-
tional guidelines. There is insufficient evidence to recommend
for or against Protective Environment (ie, positive pressure
room and HEPA filtration) for solid-organ recipients.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category II; 2007 transmission guideline, no recommen-
dation, unresolved issue
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: II; IV.G
Practices for People with CF and Their Families
43. The CF Foundation recommends evaluating people
with CF on a case-by-case basis in accordance with institu-
tional IP&C policies for participation in activities outside the
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hospital room (eg, walking in the hallway, going to the play-
room, physical therapy, exercise room, or school room) only
when no other person with CF is present and under the su-
pervision of a trained staff member.
Considerations include the capability of a person with CF
to contain his or her respiratory tract secretions, age, endemic
levels of pathogens in an individual center, and adherence to
the following practices:
a. Perform hand hygiene and put on a mask immediately
before leaving patient rooms
b. After a person with CF has left a hospital activity room,
clean surfaces and touched items with an EPA-registered
hospital disinfectant/detergent
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category IB/II
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: II; IV.E.1; VI
44. The CF Foundation recommends that all people with
CF perform all respiratory interventions (eg, aerosol therapy,
airway clearance, and collection of respiratory tract cultures)
in the patients’ rooms. If 2 people with CF who live in the
same household are sharing a room, these procedures should
be performed when the second person is not in the room,
whenever possible.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category IB
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: II; II.C; II.D; II.E; III.D.2
45. The CF Foundation recommends that airway clearance
devices (eg, flutter, acapella, pep device, and therapy vest) be
for single-patient use only, in accordance with institutional
IP&C policies.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category II
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: III.D.2; IV.A; IV.G
46. The CF Foundation recommends following institu-
tional IP&C policies for the use of masks, gowns, and gloves
by individuals who are visiting hospitalized people with CF.
Source of supporting evidence: 2007 transmission guideline,
no recommendation, unresolved issue
2013 IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: II; IV.D.1; IV.D.2
Care of Nebulizers in the Hospital
47. The CF Foundation recommends the following:
a. Nebulizers are for single-patient use only
b. Aseptic technique is always followed when handling the
nebulizer and dispensing medications
c. Single-dose vials of medication used in nebulizers are
always preferred
d. Handheld disposable nebulizers are managed as follows:
i. After each use, rinse out residual volume with sterile
water and wipe mask/mouthpiece with an alcohol pad
ii. Discard the nebulizer every 24 hours
e. Handheld reusable nebulizers (eg, home equipment) are
managed as follows:
i. After each use, clean, disinfect, rinse with sterile water
(if applicable, following cold disinfection method), and
air dry away from sink
ii. After each use, the nebulizer can be reprocessed (eg, by
steam sterilization) if the reprocessing is performed ac-
cording to the manufacturer’s instructions and the CF
Foundation recommendations for home care (rec. 59)
and if the nebulizer can be returned to the patient in
time for the next treatment
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline, Category
II; 2003 pneumonia guidelines, Category IB; 2008 ster-
ilization and disinfection guidelines, Category IB
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: III.D.2; IV.E.2
Animals
48. The CF Foundation recommends that people with CF
can participate in animal-assisted (“pet”) therapy in accor-
dance with institutional policies.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 environmental guide-
line, Category II
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: III.C
Designing New Inpatient Facilities
49. The CF Foundation recommends that the leadership
staff of CF centers collaborate with the institutional IP&C
and the planning, design, and construction departments when
designing a new inpatient unit to ensure a design that
a. Provides an adequate number of single-patient rooms to
care for people with CF
b. Includes a provision for people with CF who require pos-
sible Airborne Precautions
c. Provides access to exercise during hospitalization (eg, ad-
equate space for exercise equipment)
d. Provides adequate space for personal protective equipment
(eg, masks, gowns, and gloves) at the point of use
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: I.C.5; II.D; IV.D.1; IV.D.2; IV.G; VI
V. Recommendations for Nonhealthcare Settings
In addition to the core recommendations, the CF Foundation
recommends implementing the following recommendations
in nonhealthcare settings.
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Families with More than 1 Person with CF
50. The CF Foundation recommends that it is preferable
that people with CF who live in the same household perform
airway clearance with only 1 person with CF in the room
during treatment.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category II
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: II; II.C; II.D; II.E
Events and Activities
51. The CF Foundation recommends against CF-specific
camps or CF-specific educational retreats for groups of people
with CF. Only 1 individual with CF should attend any camp
or educational retreat unless they live in the same household.
However, family members who do not have CF may attend
educational retreats. People with CF are encouraged to par-
ticipate in camps and sports with non-CF individuals.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category IB
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: II; III.A; IV.I.1
52. People with CF and their parents or legal guardians
are not obligated to disclose the diagnosis of CF or the results
of respiratory tract cultures to school or day care personnel.
However, the CF Foundation recommends disclosure so that
school or day care personnel can be made aware of the im-
portance of IP&C principles and practices for the protection
of students with CF and can make the recommended accom-
modations. Such information must be maintained as confi-
dential medical information unless the person with CF and/
or parent or legal guardian choose to make this information
known.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category II
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 95%
Sections in the text: II; III.A; IV.I.4
53. The CF Foundation recommends that people with CF
attending the same day care and/or school should not be in
the same room at the same time unless they live in the same
household. The CF Foundation recommends education of
day care/school personnel on the principles of IP&C for CF
so they can work with people with CF and/or parents or legal
guardians to develop strategies to minimize contact between
people with CF (eg, assignment to separate classrooms and
separation during other scheduled common activities, in-
cluding lunch, physical education, and recess).
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category II
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: IV.I.4
54. The CF Foundation recommends that only 1 person
with CF attend CF Foundation–sponsored, healthcare-spon-
sored, or CF center–sponsored indoor events (eg, CF Edu-
cation Days) unless they live in the same household, to reduce
the risk of person-to-person transmission of CF pathogens.
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: II; III.A; IV.I.2
55. The CF Foundation recommends developing and uti-
lizing alternative CF education programs, (eg, videotapes,
video conferencing, CD-ROM web-based learning, and apps)
that do not require face-to-face meetings among people with
CF.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category II
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: IV.B; IV.I.1; IV.I.2; VI
56. The CF Foundation recommends that people with CF
can attend CF Foundation–sponsored, healthcare-sponsored,
or CF center–sponsored outdoor events (eg, Great Strides)
providing they maintain a distance of at least 6 feet (2 meters)
from others with CF.
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: II; III.A; IV.I.3
MRSA
57. The CF Foundation recommends that people with CF
should avoid direct contact with people with skin and soft-
tissue infections caused by MRSA unless wounds are covered,
hand hygiene is performed frequently, personal items (eg,
towels) are not shared, sports equipment is cleaned between
use, and cleaning protocols for environmental surfaces are
established to reduce the risk of MRSA transmission.
Source of supporting evidence: CDC guidance (http://
www.cdc.gov/mrsa/prevent/personal.html)
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: III.B.2
58. The CF Foundation recommends that people with CF
and respiratory cultures positive for MRSA should not be
restricted from contact with people without CF in congregate
settings (eg, sports teams, classrooms, and the workplace) if
the person with CF performs appropriate hand and respi-
ratory hygiene.
Source of supporting evidence: CDC guidance (http://
www.cdc.gov/mrsa/prevent/personal.html)
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: III.A.4; III.B.2
Nebulizers: Cleaning and Disinfecting
59. The CF Foundation recommends that the following
steps be performed for nebulizers used in the home as soon
as possible after each use:
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a. Clean the nebulizer parts with dish detergent soap and
water
b. Disinfect the nebulizer parts using one of the following
methods:
Heat methods:
a. Place in boiling water and boil for 5 minutes
b. Place in a microwave-safe receptacle submerged in water
and microwave for 5 minutes
c. Use a dishwasher if the water is more than or equal to
70C or 158F for 30 minutes
d. Use an electric steam sterilizer
Cold methods:
a. Soak in 70% isopropyl alcohol for 5 minutes
b. Soak in 3% hydrogen peroxide for 30 minutes
i. Rinse off the cold-method disinfectant using sterile wa-
ter, not tap water; the final rinse must be with sterile
or filtered (less than or equal to 0.2-micron filter) water
ii. Air dry the nebulizer parts before storage
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category II
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: III.D.1; IV.E.3
60. The CF Foundation recommends that nebulizers used
in the home should not be disinfected with acetic acid (vin-
egar), bleach solutions, or benzalkonium chloride (eg, “Con-
trol III”).
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: IV.E.3
Leisure Activities
61. The CF Foundation recommends that people with CF
should limit prolonged and/or repeated exposure to activities
that generate dust from soil and organic matter (eg, gardening
and lawn mowing) to decrease exposure to potential soilborne
pathogens (eg, Burkholderia spp. and Aspergillus spp.).
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: IV.D.1
62. The CF Foundation recommends that people with CF
should avoid exposure to construction and renovation activ-
ities that generate dust to decrease exposure to potential path-
ogens (eg, Aspergillus spp.).
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: III.D.1; III.D.3
63. The CF Foundation recommends that people with CF
can swim in pools or water parks with adequate disinfection
(eg, chlorination).
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: III.D.1
64. The CF Foundation recommends that people with CF
avoid activities in hot tubs, whirlpool spas, and stagnant water.
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: III.D.1
65. There is insufficient evidence at the time of publication
of this document for the CF Foundation to recommend for
or against people with CF avoiding activities in natural bodies
of water that are not stagnant (eg, ocean, ponds, and hot
springs).
2013 CF IP&C guideline, certainty: low
Sections in the text: III.D.1
Contact with Pets or Farm Animals
66. The CF Foundation recommends that people with CF
perform hand hygiene after changing the litter, handling feces,
cleaning and disinfecting the cages or fish tanks of their pets,
or interacting with farm animals.
Source of supporting evidence: http://www.cdc.gov
/healthypets/
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: III.C
67. The CF Foundation recommends that people with CF
avoid cleaning stalls, pens, or coops.
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: III.C
VI. Recommendations for Healthcare Personnel
with CF
In addition to the core recommendations, the CF Foundation
recommends implementing the following recommendations
for healthcare personnel with CF.
68. The CF Foundation recommends that healthcare per-
sonnel with CF should not provide care for other people with
CF.
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: III.A; V
69. The CF Foundation recommends that people with CF
interested in a career in healthcare receive counseling from
their CF care team regarding specialty areas wherein job duties
minimize the risk of transmission or acquisition of potential
pathogens.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category II
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: III; V
70. The CF Foundation recommends that healthcare per-
sonnel with CF consider informing their employers’ work-
force health and safety department about their diagnosis of
CF to ensure that job duties are assigned and care practices
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are adopted that minimize the risk of acquisition or trans-
mission of potential pathogens. This disclosure is legally re-
quired to be kept confidential.
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: V
71. The CF Foundation recommends that when it is known
that a healthcare provider with or without CF is infected/
colonized with MRSA, work assignments should be made
according to local hospital policy.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category II
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: V
72. The CF Foundation recommends that healthcare per-
sonnel with CF be assigned to care for patients without CF
on a case-by-case basis, considering health- and behavior-
related factors, such as
a. Frequency and severity of coughing episodes, quantity of
sputum production during these episodes, and ability to
contain respiratory tract secretions;
b. Ability to use barrier precautions and adhere to IP&C
guidelines, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,
HICPAC, and CDC guidelines; and
c. Risk of transmission of pathogens by healthcare personnel
with CF in the context of specific job duties.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category II
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: III.A; V
VII. Recommendations for Psychosocial and Medical
Impact of IP&C
The CF Foundation recommends implementing the following
recommendations to reduce the psychosocial impact of IP&C
for people with CF, their families, and healthcare personnel.
73. The CF Foundation recommends educating, when ap-
propriate, friends, teachers, employers, and coworkers about
the rationale for the IP&C recommendations.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category II
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: IV.B; VI
74. The CF Foundation recommends identifying CF center–
specific concerns for the potential psychosocial impact of the
IP&C guideline for people with CF in the hospital, clinic,
community, school, and home and strategies, including an
available counselor, to minimize the negative impact.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category II
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: VI
75. The CF Foundation recommends that the CF care team
inform people with CF and their parents or legal guardians
of their microbiologic status. People with CF and their parents
or legal guardians will then determine whom they will inform.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 IP&C guideline,
Category II
2013 IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: IV.I.1; IV.I.4; VI
76. The CF Foundation recommends collaboration with
the child life staff to ensure individualized programs consis-
tent with the recommended IP&C guidelines.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category II
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: IV.B; VI
77. The CF Foundation recommends making accommo-
dations (eg, providing entertainment, enhancing communi-
cation with the outside world, facilitating visits with non-CF
individuals, and adapting child life programs) to relieve the
psychosocial stress of inpatient and outpatient IP&C guide-
lines without placing people with CF at risk for transmission
or acquisition of pathogens.
Source of supporting evidence: 2003 CF IP&C guideline,
Category II
2013 CF IP&C guideline consensus: 100%
Sections in the text: VI
background information supporting
the recommendations
I. CF Microbiology and Molecular Typing
I.A. General Microbiology Methods
The 2003 Infection Control Guideline for CF provided de-
tailed recommendations for obtaining and processing CF re-
spiratory tract specimens that were endorsed by the American
Society for Microbiology and the National Committee for
Clinical Laboratory Standards (now the Clinical and Labo-
ratory Standards Institute).1 Others have supported these rec-
ommendations.39,40 Furthermore, review of the protocols of
clinical microbiology laboratories in the United States ob-
tained in 2003–2004 demonstrated excellent adherence to the
2003 Infection Control Guideline for CF recommendations
for processing CF specimens.41 Thus, the majority of clinical
laboratories processing the CF respiratory tract specimens
have standardized their techniques, use appropriate selective
media and prolonged incubation, and identify gram-negative
organisms to the species level. The CF Foundation recom-
mends continued use of the methods described in the 2003
Infection Control Guideline for CF for when to perform re-
spiratory tract cultures, how to transport specimens, and the
use of selective media.1 A detailed description of processing
lower respiratory tract specimens for NTM will be provided
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in a joint CF Foundation and ECFS guideline (B.C.M., written
personal communication, April 2013).
The committee reviewed the following microbiology topics
but agreed not to develop revised recommendations in the
updated guidelines: (1) The relative merits of different types
of respiratory tract specimens. The positive and negative pre-
dictive values of deep throat specimens or oropharyngeal
specimens for the lower airway specimens have been studied
with varying results, presumably due to the different patient
populations and pathogens studied.42 The yield of induced
sputum relative to upper airway specimens has also been
assessed in research settings, and induced sputum generally
yields more potential pathogens.43 The 2003 Infection Control
Guideline for CF recommendations for processing all types
of respiratory tract specimens (throat, sputum, or bronchoal-
veloar lavage) continues to be appropriate. (2) The relative
merits of different frequencies of respiratory tract cultures.
Cultures of the respiratory tract can detect new pathogens,
guide therapy, monitor the success of eradication strategies,
and distinguish transient versus persistent colonization/in-
fection. However, more frequent surveillance is associated
with increased incidence and prevalence of CF pathogens.44
The 2003 Infection Control Guideline for CF recommen-
dation for quarterly cultures—or more frequently if clinically
indicated—continues to be supported by published studies.45
(3) The role played by matrix-assisted laser desorption ion-
ization time-of-flight (MALDI-TOF) mass spectrometry
platforms for identification of gram-negative bacilli from
patients with CF. Several studies have found an advantage
of this technology for rapid identification of pathogens that
require many days using traditional phenotypic and genomic
sequencing methods.46-48 However, this technology is not
widely available in the United States. (4) The relative merits
of susceptibility testing to guide treatment of CF pathogens.
Recent studies have questioned the clinical utility of performing
routine susceptibility testing.49,50 Nonetheless, antimicrobial
susceptibility can distinguish methicillin-susceptible S. aureus
(MSSA) from MRSA, identify unique multidrug-resistance
patterns, and has been crucial for epidemiologic investiga-
tions. For example, CF clinicians were alerted to the trans-
mission of epidemic strains of P. aeruginosa due to the
emergence of ceftazidime-resistant,51 colistin-resistant,52 or
multidrug-resistant strains.30,53 Thus, susceptibility testing is
still recommended as per the 2003 Infection Control Guide-
line for CF. (5) Clinical implications of the CF microbiome.
The reader is referred to several recent studies for information
on this increasingly important topic.54-57
I.B. Molecular Typing Methodologies
Overview
While earlier methods for typing bacteria from the respiratory
tract of individuals with CF for epidemiologic purposes were
based primarily on comparison of phenotypic (physical) fea-
tures, molecular methods using analysis of the genetic content
of bacteria are now preferred. Compared with phenotypic
methods, genotyping methods are more reproducible and
provide greater discriminatory power in differentiating epi-
demiologically related strains from unrelated strains. Further
attributes of the ideal genotyping system include ease of use,
low cost, and unambiguous interpretation.58-60
Random-Amplified Polymorphic DNA (RAPD)
RAPD typing is based on PCR amplification of random sec-
tions of the bacterial genome.61 The amplified DNA segments
are separated by gel electrophoresis, and the resulting banding
pattern is compared with that of other bacteria visually or
by means of computer-imaging software. Bacterial isolates
with a high level of similarity in RAPD pattern are considered
indistinguishable or highly likely to be the same strain.
Repetitive-Element PCR (rep-PCR)
Another PCR-based genotyping method relies on the ampli-
fication of certain repetitive genetic elements found within
the bacterial genome. A frequently used target for such rep-
PCR typing is a genetic element referred to as the BOX A1R
element (so-called BOX-PCR typing).62 As with RAPD, the
DNA banding patterns of bacterial isolates revealed by rep-
PCR are compared; those with a highly similar pattern are
considered highly likely to be related.
Pulsed-Field Gel Electrophoresis (PFGE)
PFGE has been a mainstay of bacterial genotyping for the
past 2 decades. PFGE evaluates genetic polymorphisms within
the entire bacterial genome by macrorestriction, a technique
that extracts genomic DNA from bacterial cells and then
cleaves the DNA into large fragments using a restriction en-
zyme. These DNA fragments are separated by size using gel
electrophoresis. The resulting banding pattern is compared
among bacterial isolates; those with highly similar patterns
are considered highly likely to be related.60
Multilocus Sequence Typing (MLST)
MLST has become a preferred method for bacterial genotyp-
ing.63 This method measures DNA sequence variations in a
set of housekeeping genes that are present in all strains of a
given species and characterizes strains by their unique allelic
profiles. For each housekeeping gene of interest, the different
sequences found within a bacterial species are designated as
distinct alleles. For each isolate, the alleles identified for each
of the housekeeping genes define the allelic profile or se-
quence type (ST). Compared with PFGE and PCR-based ge-
notyping methods, MLST has distinct advantages, as it yields
unambiguous, reproducible results that can be compared be-
tween laboratories. Public-access ST databases make MLST
particularly well suited to global studies of the epidemiology
of CF pathogens.64
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figure 1. Age-specific prevalences of respiratory organisms, 2012. Age-specific prevalences of Pseudomonas aeruginosa, methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), Haemophilus influenzae, Achromobacter xylosoxidans, Burkholderia cepacia complex, Stenotrophomonas maltophilia,
Staphylococcus aureus, and multidrug-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa (MDR-PA) among patients with cystic fibrosis in the United States in
2012 are shown. These data reflect an analysis of the US Cystic Fibrosis Foundation Patient Registry.
Whole-Genome Sequencing
Most recently, whole-genome sequencing has been used to
help define the epidemiology of bacterial pathogens for which
conventional molecular typing may not have the resolution
to accurately analyze population structure. Notably, whole-
genome sequencing was used to assess transmission of NTM
between individuals with and without CF.65,66 The slow mu-
tation rate of NTM is another reason for the need for whole-
genome sequencing methods with these pathogens.
Summary
Several molecular typing strategies have been developed that
have been instrumental in documenting shared strains of CF
pathogens and identifying potential environmental sources,
as described below. It is likely that whole-genome sequencing
will become more widely used to delineate the epidemiology
of some pathogens, such as NTM and MRSA, while other
strategies, such as MLST, will continue to be used for Burk-
holderia and Pseudomonas spp. National CF organizations in
Canada, the United States, and several countries in the Eu-
ropean Union have established research and referral labo-
ratories for molecular typing of CF bacterial isolates that
interact with one another through international networks,
such as the International Burkholderia cepacia Working
Group.67 Such interactions help determine whether bacterial
strains are found in more than 1 country, and thanks to the
efforts of these laboratories, our understanding of the mo-
lecular epidemiology of CF pathogens has greatly expanded,
as described further below.
In addition to its use in outbreak investigations, molecular
typing is a critical tool in active surveillance programs and
in monitoring the success of IP&C strategies. It should be
emphasized, however, that molecular typing is best used to
augment conventional shoe-leather epidemiology, since most
genotyping methods are not performed routinely in diag-
nostic clinical microbiology laboratories and active surveil-
lance using molecular methods is not a component of routine
CF care in the United States.
I.C. Epidemiology of CF Pathogens
I.C.1. Overview
The CF Foundation Patient Registry (CFFPR) is an invaluable
source of data to further our understanding of the epide-
miology of CF pathogens. The CFFPR has improved data
collection for CF microbiology by creating numerous drop-
down menus for both common and emerging pathogens. The
CF Foundation provides annual data on the epidemiology of
CF pathogens, as shown for 2012 in Figure 1.68 S. aureus is
the most common CF pathogen in the first 2 decades of life.
While MSSA is more prevalent than MRSA, the prevalence
of MRSA is highest in 11–24-year-olds. P. aeruginosa is de-
tected in more than 20% of young infants, and nearly 80%
of adults are infected with this pathogen. The prevalence of
multidrug-resistant gram-negative organisms, including Sten-
otrophomonas maltophilia, Achromobacter xylosoxidans, and B.
cepacia complex, increases with age.
The CF Foundation analyzed the changing prevalence of
CF pathogens from 1988 to 2012, as shown in Figure 2.68
Several pathogens, including MRSA, S. aureus, and S. mal-
tophilia, have increased during this time. The explanation for
these increases is unknown. It is likely that improved micro-
biology laboratory processing and data collection have im-
proved our ability to detect and report these microorganisms,
but increasing longevity, antimicrobial selective pressure, and
potentially person-to-person transmission may also contrib-
ute to these findings. In contrast, the prevalence of P. aeru-
ginosa and B. cepacia complex has decreased, which suggests
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figure 2. Respiratory organism prevalences, 1988–2012. Prevalences of Staphylococcus aureus, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), Stenotrophomonas maltophilia, and Burkholderia cepacia complex among patients with cystic fibrosis in the
United States of all ages from 1988 to 2012 are shown. These data reflect an analysis of the US Cystic Fibrosis Foundation Patient Registry.








B. cepacia I 1950, 1997 69, 74
B. multivorans II 1997 74
B. cenocepacia III 1997, 2003 73, 74
B. stabilis IV 1997, 2000 74, 75
B. vietnamiensis V 1995, 1997 74, 80
B. dolosa VI 2001, 2004 79
B. ambifaria VII 2001 70
B. anthina VIII 2002 71
B. pyrrocinia IX 2002 71
B. ubonensis … 2000, 2008 76, 77
B. latens … 2008 76
B. diffusa … 2008 76
B. arboris … 2008 76
B. seminalis … 2008 76
B. metallica … 2008 76
B. contaminans … 2009 72
B. lata … 2009 72
B. pseudomultivorans … 2013 78
that treatment paradigms, including early eradication strat-
egies for P. aeruginosa and improved IP&C, may have influ-
enced the epidemiology of these CF pathogens. The following
sections provide a brief overview of the epidemiology of se-
lected CF pathogens. Potential sources of these pathogens,
including person-to-person transmission, are discussed in
Section III.
I.C.2. Burkholderia spp.
At present, the B. cepacia complex consists of 18 distinct yet
closely related species (Table 4).69-80 The frequency of detec-
tion of these species in people with CF varies considerably,
although Burkholderia cenocepacia and Burkholderia multi-
vorans are most common.26,81 Burkholderia gladioli is the third
most frequently isolated Burkholderia species among CF pa-
tients in the United States.26 However, while B. gladioli are
phenotypically quite similar to the species in the B. cepacia
complex, it is not a member of the B. cepacia complex.82
I.C.3. Other Gram-Negative Species
The Burkholderia Reference Laboratory and Repository at the
University of Michigan has expanded our understanding of
the epidemiology of less commonly isolated gram-negative
organisms in CF, including Ralstonia spp. (eg, R. picketti and
R. paucula) and Pandoraea spp.26 Readers are referred to sev-
eral excellent reviews that have highlighted the recent epi-
demiology of CF pathogens.26,81,83
I.C.4. Small Colony Variant (SCV) S. aureus
In the past several years, there has been increasing interest
in the clinical and therapeutic implications of SCVs of S.
aureus in CF. S. aureus persists in the airways of people with
CF for years and can develop a hypermutator phenotype that
promotes adaptive changes, including SCVs, thought to fa-
cilitate survival of this organism within the CF airway.84,85
SCVs are detected visually on laboratory agar plates and ex-
hibit slower growth rates due to metabolic defects (eg, thy-
midine biosynthesis deficiency86), and they therefore require
special susceptibility testing. However, the testing method has
not been standardized by the Clinical and Laboratory Stan-
dards Institute.
Several potential clinical implications of SCV strains have
been proposed. SCV strains of S. aureus are thought to have
increased resistance to the innate immune system and in-
creased resistance to antibiotics.85,87,88 In vitro, SCVs have an
increased ability to infect normal and CF airway epithelial
cells.89 In non-CF patients, SCV S. aureus are associated with
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chronic or recurrent infections, such as endocarditis and
osteomyelitis.86,90
SCV strains have been isolated from 8% to 33% of indi-
viduals with CF who are infected with S. aureus.91-93 SCV S.
aureus are associated with older age, coinfection with P. aeru-
ginosa, lower lung function,92 and treatment with antibiotics,
specifically trimethoprim-sulfamethosoxazole. In vitro, SCV
strains can be induced by exoproducts expressed by P.
aeruginosa.94
Recently, a causal relationship was suggested between the
emergence of SCV S. aureus and a decline in lung function.
In a CF center in the United States, 100 children with CF, of
whom 24 had SCV S. aureus, were followed for an average
of 1.7 years.95 Those with SCV strains had lower lung function
at the beginning and end of the study, but they had a similar
rate of pulmonary exacerbations. Notably, 33% of the chil-
dren with SCV strains did not have normal-colony S. aureus
strains, which suggests that these children would not have
been identified as infected with S. aureus had SCV strains not
been sought.95 In addition, 2 pairs of subjects had the same
SCV strains, suggesting possible transmission of SCVs be-
tween children with CF.
Currently, it is unknown how many clinical laboratories
have instituted methods to detect SCV strains of S. aureus,
and there are no standardized methods for detection and
susceptibility testing. Additional studies are needed to further
describe the epidemiology of SCV S. aureus as well as the
treatment and IP&C implications for CF. Furthermore, SCVs
of other bacteria, including Pseudomonas,93,96 Stenotropho-
monas,97 and B. cepacia complex,98 have been described in
people with CF.
I.C.5. Nontuberculous Mycobacteria
Among the NTM are several opportunistic human pathogens,
including Mycobacterium intracellulare and the species in the
Mycobacterium avium complex (MAC; M. avium subsp. av-
ium, M. avium subsp. silvaticum, and M. avium subsp. par-
atuberculosis).99 The rapid-growing NTM species include
those in the M. abscessus complex. Although the taxonomy
of the M. abscessus complex was uncertain at the time of
publication, currently 3 closely related subspecies are de-
scribed: M. abscessus subsp. abscessus, M. abscessus subsp. mas-
siliense, and M. abscessus subsp. bolletii.100,101
The prevalence of NTM in people with CF varies between
countries and centers and appears to be increasing. The 2
most common species of NTM seen in individuals with CF
are MAC and M. abscessus. Although MAC is more prevalent
in North America, M. abscessus is more common in Europe
and Israel.102-104 In France, MAC was detected in older patients
with less severe disease.104 Thus, it appears that MAC and M.
abscessus may target different subpopulations of people with
CF.
I.C.6. Aspergillus spp.
People with CF are at increased risk for colonization with
filamentous fungi. The most frequently identified filamentous
fungi are Aspergillus fumigatus, Scedosporium apiospermum,
and Aspergillus terreus.105 Less common fungi include Asper-
gillus flavus, Aspergillus nidulans, Exophilia dermatitidis, Sce-
dosporium prolificans, Penicillium emersonii, and Acrophialo-
phora fusispora. People with CF are at risk for allergic
bronchopulmonary aspergillosis (ABPA), but many do not
fulfill the clinical criteria for a diagnosis of ABPA.106-109 Fur-
thermore, criteria for initiation of antifungal therapy in in-
dividuals with positive Aspergillus cultures are incompletely
defined.110 In addition, invasive infection due to Aspergillus
may occur, especially after lung transplantation.111
I.D. Surveillance Strategies for CF Pathogens
Routine real-time surveillance for epidemiologically signifi-
cant microorganisms is recommended in acute care settings
to understand endemic rates and to identify outbreaks as soon
as possible.5 Regulatory requirements from state health de-
partments and priorities established by local IP&C depart-
ments determine specific surveillance strategies. Local clinical
microbiology laboratories are crucial partners to ensure ac-
curate and meaningful data. Examples of pathogens for which
surveillance is performed in hospitalized patients without CF,
under defined circumstances, include MRSA, vancomycin-
resistant enterococci (VRE), gram-negative bacilli resistant to
carbapenem agents (CRE), and Clostridium difficile.
Routine surveillance for CF pathogens at individual CF
centers can be used to track and trend the incidence and
prevalence of specific microorganisms. Surveillance can assist
centers in measuring the efficacy of both IP&C measures and
other treatment strategies, such as early eradication. As de-
scribed above, molecular typing is an invaluable tool for as-
sessing potential patient-to-patient transmission, but it is not
yet available routinely. Surveillance data for particular species
can be generated by local clinical microbiology laboratories
or by the CFFPR.
The CF community is continually challenged by the chang-
ing epidemiology of CF pathogens. Not only have new path-
ogens emerged, but the epidemiology of classic CF pathogens
has changed thanks to new treatment strategies (eg, early
eradication of P. aeruginosa) and improved microbiologic de-
tection and identification. To remain vigilant, surveillance
strategies that assess the impact of therapeutic interventions,
identify potential outbreaks, and monitor the success of IP&C
practices must be integrated into CF care.
II. Routes of Transmission of CF Pathogens
II.A. Contact and Droplet Transmission
Several routes of transmission have been described for CF
pathogens, including direct contact with infectious respira-
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 02 Feb 2021 at 19:24:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.
infection prevention and control in cf S23
table 5. Modes of Transmission of Potential Pathogens in Cystic Fibrosis
Type of transmission Mode of transmission
Examples of respiratory
tract pathogens Source






Hands of healthcare workers
Shared toys
Contaminated respiratory therapy equipment
or surfaces










Infectious droplets (general size, 10.5 mm; dis-
tance, 3–6 feet [1–2 meters]) travel from
respiratory tract of infected person to nasal
mucosa, conjunctiva, or mouth of suscepti-
ble person during coughing, sneezing, or
chest physiotherapy







Airborne dissemination of droplet nuclei in
respirable range that remain infectious over
time and distance; may occur for some
pathogens that are usually transmitted by
the droplet route under unusual
circumstances
note. MRSA, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; SARS-CoV, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus.
tory secretions (eg, by kissing), indirect contact with an in-
termediate object contaminated with infectious respiratory
secretions (eg, hands, environmental surfaces, or shared
equipment), and infectious droplets from the respiratory tract
that can travel in the air a distance of 3–6 feet (1–2 meters).
These routes of transmission are summarized in Table 5. Bac-
terial and viral pathogens can remain viable on hands or
inanimate surfaces for minutes, hours, or even days.112,113
Since publication of the 2003 Infection Control Guideline
for CF, several studies conducted in people with and without
CF who are infected with viral or bacterial pathogens have
expanded our understanding of droplet transmission and now
challenge the 3-foot rule. These studies include epidemiologic
data collected during outbreaks of influenza114,115 and SARS
in non-CF individuals,116-118 experimental and observational
studies performed in people with CF,119-121 and studies of the
dynamics of infectious aerosols.119,122,123
II.B. Classic View of Droplet Transmission
In the classic view of droplet transmission, infectious respi-
ratory droplets (more than 5 mm in diameter) are expelled
by one person onto the mucous membranes of the nose,
mouth, or conjunctivae of another susceptible person within
3 feet.124 Infectious droplets are generated by coughing, sneez-
ing, or talking or during such procedures as suctioning, in-
tubation, chest physiotherapy, or pulmonary function testing.
Infectious droplets remain suspended in the air for a short
time, generally minutes, and can contaminate horizontal en-
vironmental surfaces, equipment, and the hands of patients
and healthcare personnel. Droplets are contrasted with much
smaller droplet nuclei (less than 3.3 mm in diameter), which
can travel farther, remain suspended in the air for longer
periods of time, do not require face-to-face contact for trans-
mission, and are directly inhaled into the respiratory tract.
Thus, pathogens transmitted by droplet nuclei do not require
individuals to be in close proximity but do require them to
share common air space.
II.C. Emerging View of Droplet Transmission
New data have challenged the classic view of droplet trans-
mission. Infectious droplets containing influenza virus and
SARS-CoV traveled 3–6 feet.6,114,116,118 Aerosols of droplet nuclei
from patients infected with influenza can be generated during
intubation and suctioning. Droplet size and distance traveled
can be affected by (1) environmental factors (eg, humidity,
temperature, air currents, and number of air changes per hour
in a room), (2) agent factors (eg, infectious load, transferability,
survivability, infectivity, and contagiousness), and (3) host fac-
tors (eg, susceptibility and behavior).122,123
In CF, several recent studies have explored the dynamics
of droplet transmission. In an experimental model, subjects
with CF infected with P. aeruginosa coughed into a chamber,
and both droplets and smaller droplet nuclei containing viable
organisms were collected as far as 6 feet from the subjects.121
CF pathogens were recovered from the air collected 6 feet
from CF subjects who were performing PFTs,125 and P. aeru-
ginosa was recovered from the air in hospital rooms, rooms
after chest physiotherapy was performed, the hospital cor-
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table 6. Relative Frequency of Shared Strains of Different Cystic Fibrosis Pathogens
Species Frequencya Reference(s)
Pseudomonas aeruginosa  27, 28, 30, 130–132
Burkholderia spp.  27, 133–135
Methicillin-susceptible Staphylococcus aureus  136, 137
Methicillin-resistant S. aureus  138, 139
Stenotrophomonas maltophilia  140, 141
Achromobacter xylosoxidans  142–144
Mycobacterium avium complex None described 102
Mycobacterium abscessus subsp. massiliense  66, 129, 145
a Frequency ( to ) is based on the relative number of published reports.
ridor, and a CF clinic.126,127 Factors associated with generating
infectious droplets are unknown, as exacerbations, sick versus
well CF clinic visits, and age were not predictive of the rate
of recovery from air samples.125,128
II.D. Potential Role of Droplet Nuclei
Most recently, the potential for person-to-person droplet and/
or droplet nuclei transmission of M. abscessus subsp. massi-
liense has been suggested.66,129 Transmission in one center was
halted by simultaneous implementation of multiple IP&C
strategies, including separation of people with CF infected
with this pathogen, increased microbiologic surveillance, en-
hanced environmental cleaning, mask use by individuals with
CF, and the use of negative pressure rooms among adults
with CF.129 (See Section III.A.5 for a more detailed description
of NTM transmission.)
II.E. Paradigm for Transmission of Respiratory Pathogens
In an effort to explain observations made during the 2003
SARS epidemics, the following paradigm was proposed to
describe the potential for transmission of respiratory tract
pathogens by both infectious droplets and droplet nuclei un-
der different conditions:117 (1) Obligate transmission is that
which occurs under natural conditions (eg, transmission of
M. tuberculosis by droplet nuclei). (2) Preferential transmis-
sion is that which occurs when one route is the usual route
but another route has been described; for example, trans-
mission of the measles virus (rubeola) usually occurs by in-
halation of droplet nuclei that are deposited in distal airways,
but infectious droplets may also transmit the measles virus.
(3) Opportunistic transmission is that which can occur when
a pathogen usually transmitted by droplets can be transmitted
by droplet nuclei (eg, influenza transmitted by aerosols of
droplet nuclei) under unusual environmental conditions,
such as intubation. Future studies may help define the ap-
plicability of this paradigm to CF pathogens.
Summary
In summary, CF pathogens can be transmitted by direct or
indirect contact with infectious secretions, objects contami-
nated with infectious secretions, or infectious droplets. Recent
data suggest that infectious droplets may travel as far as 6
feet (2 meters) from individuals with CF. While detection of
infectious droplets is not confirmatory of patient-to-patient
transmission, it is highly suggestive of the potential for such
transmission. The potential for people with CF to generate
droplet nuclei has been demonstrated in experimental mod-
els, but the relevance of these observations for transmission,
including that of M. abscessus subsp. massiliense, has not been
established and should be studied.
III. Potential Sources of CF Pathogens
III.A. Person-to-Person Transmission among People with CF
The source of CF pathogens is often unknown, and many
individuals with CF are infected with unique strains of P.
aeruginosa or Burkholderia spp. However, the molecular tools
described above have expanded the evidence that people with
CF can acquire CF pathogens from others with CF in both
healthcare and nonhealthcare settings. These are the primary
transmission and acquisition events targeted by the rec-
ommendations in this guideline. The relative frequency of
shared strains of different CF pathogens is shown in Table
6.27,28,30,66,102,129-145
III.A.1. Burkholderia spp.
B. cenocepacia. Several methods have been used to geno-
type Burkholderia to define the epidemiology of infections in
people with CF.61,146-150 In the late 1980s, genotyping studies
identified common strains in multiple individuals receiving
care at the same CF centers, suggesting person-to-person
spread.149 More compelling evidence soon followed. Trans-
mission of B. cepacia complex was described at a CF edu-
cational retreat134 and among people with CF attending sum-
mer camps.151 Outbreaks were also reported within CF
centers.135
Among so-called epidemic strains, the ET12 (electrophor-
etic type 12) strain was prevalent in eastern Canada and the
United Kingdom.152,153 The Midwest strain and the PHDC
(Philadelphia–Washington, DC) strain were identified in peo-
ple with CF in the Midwest and mid-Atlantic regions of the
United States, respectively.154-157 The ST04 strain (RAPD type
04) was identified in people with CF in western Canada, and
the CZ1 strain (now referred to as ST32) was identified in
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most individuals infected with Burkholderia at the Prague CF
center in the Czech Republic.158-160 Other B. cenocepacia strains
have been shared among multiple individuals with CF in
various Italian CF centers.161,162
Other species of B. cepacia complex. Shared strains from
other species in the B. cepacia complex have been reported
and generally involved smaller numbers of patients.133,161,163,164
A notable exception is B. dolosa strain SLC6, which was iden-
tified in an outbreak in a US CF center and associated with
deterioration in lung function and increased mortality.25,133
The Glasgow strain of B. multivorans was identified in an
outbreak among people with CF in the city in the early
1990s.133,165
However, the majority of Burkholderia-infected CF patients
harbor genotypically distinct strains. B. multivorans and B.
gladioli account for more than half of the Burkholderia infec-
tions in the United States, but it is uncommon that multiple
individuals with CF share strains belonging to these 2 species.
Thus, the majority of new Burkholderia infections in people
with CF currently involve the acquisition of strains from in-
dependent sources, most likely the natural environment, as will
be discussed further in Section III.D.1 below.166,167
Clinical impact of epidemic Burkholderia spp. Poor out-
comes, including more rapid clinical decline, decline in lung
function, and increased mortality both before and after lung
transplantation165,168 have been associated with certain strains
of B. cepacia complex. Outcomes from the Canadian and US
CF patient registries demonstrated a 2.5-fold increase in the
relative risk of death in people with CF who are infected with
B. cepacia complex.169,170 Overwhelming infection (the cepacia
syndrome) has been reported with species of B. cepacia com-
plex other than B. cenocepacia, including B. multivorans164 and
B. dolosa SLC6.25 Both single-center and multicenter studies
suggest that poor outcomes with B. cepacia complex may be
related to species, and such strains as B. cenocepacia ET12
have been associated with the worst outcomes.171 Among 29
lung transplant recipients infected with B. cenocepacia (n p
16), B. multivorans (n p 11), and B. vietnamiensis (n p 2),
all of the deaths occurred in those infected with B.
cenocepacia.172
III.A.2. P. aeruginosa
Shared P. aeruginosa strains. Early strain-typing studies
demonstrated that individuals with CF infected with P. aeru-
ginosa harbored distinct strains, presumably acquired from
the natural environment.61,173,174 Shared strains between sib-
lings were well documented,175-177 and in 1986 a report from
Denmark described the spread of a multidrug-resistant P.
aeruginosa strain in a CF care center.178 In 1996, PFGE analysis
of isolates recovered during an antibiotic trial identified a b-
lactam-resistant strain of P. aeruginosa infecting 55 children
at a CF center in Liverpool, United Kingdom.51 Other reports
described shared or epidemic P. aeruginosa strains in the
United Kingdom and Australia.53,179-181 PFGE analysis of 1,225
P. aeruginosa isolates recovered from people with CF receiving
care in 31 treatment centers in the United Kingdom dem-
onstrated that 28% of those infected harbored a strain shared
with at least 1 other person with CF.173 The 2 most prevalent
strains accounted for more than 20% of the isolates examined.
Some strains, including the Liverpool and Midlands 1 epi-
demic strains, were widely distributed and identified in 48%
and 29% of CF treatment centers, respectively.
In Melbourne, Australia, a strain first detected in children
with CF181 was subsequently identified in half of the individ-
uals with CF who were infected with P. aeruginosa in Syd-
ney.180 This strain, now referred to as the Australian epidemic
strain 1 (AES-1), has also been identified in Brisbane.179 The
Australian epidemic strain 2 (AES-2) is even more common
in Brisbane,182 while the Australian epidemic strain 3 (AES-
3) is common in Tasmania.183 In Copenhagen, Denmark,
PFGE and genomic DNA sequence analyses identified 2 major
P. aeruginosa clones that have been common among and likely
transmitted among people with CF for more than 2 decades.131
In the Netherlands, MLST analysis of 443 P. aeruginosa iso-
lates recovered from 265 individuals with CF in 2 CF centers
identified 2 strains (designated ST406 and ST497) in 15%
and 5% of the patients.184 Furthermore, 60% of the individ-
uals studied harbored a strain also found in at least 2 other
individuals.
Strains common to large numbers of people with CF cared
for in North America have also been described. In Vancouver,
Canada, RAPD and PFGE were used to analyze P. aeruginosa
isolates recovered between 1981 and 1999 from 174 individ-
uals with CF; 157 distinct strains were identified, 123 of which
were unique to individual patients.130 Several strains were
shared by clusters of 2, 3, or 4 individuals, and 2 strains were
shared by 21 and 18 individuals. More recently, in Ontario,
Canada, MLST was used to analyze P. aeruginosa isolates re-
covered from 446 individuals with CF.28 The LES was iden-
tified in 15% of these individuals, while a second strain (des-
ignated ST439) was found in 7%. The route by which the
LES was transmitted to people with CF in Canada is un-
known.
In the United States, the presence of epidemic P. aeruginosa
strains remains uncertain, as very few genotyping studies of
isolates from large numbers of people with CF have been
performed. In Houston, rep-PCR typing identified a multi-
drug-resistant P. aeruginosa strain in 32 (45%) of 71 children
with CF; this strain, designated Houston 1, appears to be
distinct from other epidemic P. aeruginosa strains (J.J.L., writ-
ten personal communication, October 2013).30 Compared
with other strains, new infection with the Houston 1 strain
was significantly more likely to occur in those children hos-
pitalized within the 90 days prior to infection. In addition,
compared with those infected with other strains, those with
the Houston 1 strain spent 12 more days in the hospital in
the year prior to acquisition. The authors found that following
adoption of recommendations from the 2003 Infection Con-
trol Guideline for CF, transmission was halted. Furthermore,
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P. aeruginosa strains from participants in an antibiotic trial
who were cared for at 18 CF centers in the United States
were evaluated with MLST; at each center, shared strains were
noted in 0%–71% of participants, and 15 of 18 centers had
participants with shared strains.132
Most epidemic strains of P. aeruginosa have had a multi-
drug-resistant phenotype, which facilitated their recognition.
The presence of epidemic strains without an unusual or note-
worthy phenotype might be difficult to detect. Active sur-
veillance of sufficiently large numbers of isolates is required
to monitor the presence and ongoing transmission of shared
strains of P. aeruginosa. Such surveillance is not currently a
component of routine CF care in the United States.
Routes of transmission and reservoirs of P. aeruginosa.
The epidemiologic and microbiologic basis for epidemic P.
aeruginosa strains remains poorly understood,27 and it is un-
clear whether all epidemic P. aeruginosa strains have com-
parable capacity for patient-to-patient transmission. Strain
differences in the production of infectious droplets or droplet
nuclei that remain suspended in the air under experimental
conditions may explain the differences in efficiency of trans-
mission of epidemic P. aeruginosa strains.119
Infections with a shared strain130,173,179 are highly suggestive
of patient-to-patient transmission, particularly as institution
of IP&C measures halted transmission.30,185 While acquisition
from a common source is also a possibility, surveillance of
inpatient and outpatient settings have not detected a reservoir
for shared strains.51,53 Strains that are more widely distributed
(ie, found in multiple CF care centers) might suggest contact
among individuals with CF from different centers or, possibly,
acquisition from the natural environment, as described below
in Section III.D.
Clinical impact of epidemic Pseudomonas. The LES has
developed increasing antibiotic resistance,186 and some epi-
demic strains of Pseudomonas are associated with clinical de-
terioration.185-188 The LES has been associated with an in-
creased risk of death or lung transplantation during 3 years
of follow-up and/or decline in lung function.28 Furthermore,
those infected with the LES had a worse quality of life, in-
cluding worse treatment burden, physical functioning, and
respiratory symptoms, compared with those individuals in-
fected with nonepidemic strains.189
III.A.3. Other Gram-Negative Bacteria
Several other nonfermenting gram-negative bacteria can
cause intermittent or chronic infection in people with CF.
Among these, S. maltophilia, Achromobacter spp., Ralstonia
spp., Cupriavidus spp., and Pandoraea spp. are the most
common.26,190
S. maltophilia. In the United States, 33 (80%) of 41 in-
dividuals with CF infected with S. maltophilia harbored ge-
netically distinct strains, and 4 clusters (each of 2 individuals)
were detected, suggesting either patient-to-patient spread or
acquisition from a common environmental source.140 Among
183 S. maltophilia isolates obtained from a multicenter an-
tibiotic trial conducted in the United States, only 3 instances
of shared strains were found.143 More recently, 110 isolates
recovered from 50 individuals with CF were studied, and 5
distinct strains were identified that were each shared by 2 or
3 patients.141 Thus, while there is some evidence for shared
strains of S. maltophilia and possible patient-to-patient trans-
mission, most infections in people with CF appear to result
from independent acquisition, most likely from non-health-
care-associated environmental sources or as a result of an-
timicrobial selective pressure.
A. xylosoxidans. A. xylosoxidans is an opportunistic
pathogen that causes healthcare-associated infections, in-
cluding bacteremia, meningitis, pneumonia, endocarditis,
peritonitis, osteomyelitis, urinary tract infection, and en-
dophthalmitis, in vulnerable hosts, including neonates, burn
victims, and other immunocompromised patients.191-193
Among 341 individuals with CF in the United States in-
fected with Achromobacter, 42% were infected with A. xylos-
oxidans, and 23.5% were infected with Achromobacter
rhulandii.190 In 2 small single-center studies, Achromobacter-
infected individuals each harbored genotypically distinct
strains.194,195 However, there is some evidence that Achro-
mobacter spp. are shared by people with CF. A CF center in
the United States reported that 9 (36%) of 25 Achromobacter-
infected individuals harbored the same strain of A. xylosox-
idans.142 In the same multicenter antibiotic trial described
above, 92 Achromobacter isolates were analyzed, and 5 in-
stances of shared strains (2 individuals each) were detected.143
In Athens, Greece, 5 of 9 individuals with CF infected with
the same strain of A. xylosoxidans were close social contacts.196
In a multicenter study conducted in Belgium, 2 clusters of
A. xylosoxidans strains were identified (one consisted of 4
individuals, and the other consisted of 10 individuals).144
Thus, there is some evidence of shared strains of A. xylos-
oxidans and a suggestion of possible patient-to-patient trans-
mission.
Ralstonia, Cupriavidus, and Pandoraea spp. Several of
the 15 species in the genus Ralstonia, including R. pickettii,
R. mannitolilytica, and R. insidiosa, have been recovered from
people with CF.197 In the United States, 25 (66%) of 38 in-
dividuals infected with Ralstonia species had R. mannitoli-
lytica; 9 had R. pickettii, 2 had R. gilardii, 1 had R. taiwanensis,
and 1 had a Ralstonia species that could not be classified.198
Several of the 14 species included in the genus Cupriavidus,199
including C. pauculus,200 C. gilardii,201 C. respiraculi,202 and C.
taiwanensis,203 have also been recovered from people with
CF.199 Among isolates obtained in the United States from 2004
to 2008, Ralstonia and Cupriavidus species were recovered
from 72 and 73 CF patients, respectively.26 R. mannitolilytica
accounted for 60% of Ralstonia species, while C. respiraculi
was the most common (53%) Cupriavidus species identified.
Genotyping analyses of these isolates have not identified a
strain common to more than 1 person with CF (J.J.L., un-
published data, October 2013).
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The genus Pandoraea, first described in 2000, is currently
comprised of 9 species, all of which have been recovered from
persons with CF.204,205 Among the 74 individuals with CF in
the United States with Pandoraea species recovered between
2004 and 2008, P. apista, P. pnomenusa, and P. sputorum ac-
counted for approximately equal proportions of isolates.26 In
Denmark, a P. apista strain spread among 6 children with CF
attending a winter camp, and most subsequently experienced
a significant deterioration in lung function.206
III.A.4. S. aureus
Shared MSSA strains. S. aureus is normal skin flora and
commonly colonizes the anterior nares. In 2003–2004, the an-
terior nares of approximately 35% of children in the United
States without CF aged 1–19 years were colonized with S. au-
reus,207 and S. aureus can also be recovered from 48% of oro-
pharyngeal swabs of healthy children 18 years of age and youn-
ger.208 In Germany, the anterior nares of 72 individuals with
CF aged 1–25 years and 72 age-matched non-CF controls as
well as 128 family members of 38 children with CF and 79
family members of 23 children without CF were studied to
compare the frequency of S. aureus colonization.209 A signifi-
cantly greater prevalence of nasal carriage of S. aureus (66%)
was found among those with CF who had not been treated
with antistaphylococcal antibiotics during the 4 weeks preced-
ing culture, compared with those recently treated (29%) or
those without CF (32%). The proportion of family members
colonized with S. aureus was similar among CF (32%) and
non-CF (35%) families. PFGE analyses indicated that colonized
individuals within the same family often shared the same S.
aureus strain, indicating that S. aureus can be transmitted
within families. The genome types found in people with CF
and their families were also noted in the community.
Colonization does not usually have consequences, but it is
a risk factor for subsequent disease in people with and without
CF; isolates colonizing the anterior nares and disease-pro-
ducing isolates typically have the identical genotype.209-212 In
people with CF, airway infection may be intermittent or
chronic.91,213-216 Chronic infection of the airways with the same
clone can persist for several years.91,209,213
Shared strains of S. aureus among individuals with CF are
well documented. Four typing methods were used to compare
MSSA strains recovered from individuals with CF before and
after attendance at a 4-week summer camp.136 Four of 20
patients acquired a strain noted in another camper at the
start of camp, consistent with patient-to-patient transmission.
In St. Louis, 2 episodes of transmission of MSSA between
siblings with CF in which transmission to the younger siblings
resulted in considerable morbidity have also been reported.137
Shared MRSA strains. In 2003–2004, the anterior nares
of approximately 1.3% of children in the United States with-
out CF aged 1–19 years were colonized with MRSA.207 In
Australia, healthcare-associated transmission of MRSA
among people with CF and the spread of MRSA from patients
without CF to individuals with CF hospitalized in the same
ward at the same time have been reported.138 In Leeds, United
Kingdom, individuals with CF infected with MRSA spent
more time in the hospital in the year prior to initial isolation
of MRSA than age- and sex-matched uninfected control sub-
jects with CF (19.8 vs 5.5 days; P ! .001).217
The molecular epidemiology of MRSA has also been stud-
ied to (1) understand the relative contribution of community
versus traditional healthcare-associated clones, (2) compare
the types of MRSA strains in CF versus non-CF individuals,
and (3) assess the frequency of shared strains. In Dallas and
Chicago, 88% of strains from children without CF were staph-
ylococcal chromosomal cassette mec (SCCmec) type IV (so-
called community-associated strains), while 65% of MRSA
strains from children with CF were SCCmec type II (so-called
traditional healthcare-associated strains); MRSA strains more
recently acquired in children with CF were more likely to be
SCCmec type IV.218 In addition, the distribution of MLST
clonal complexes (CCs), which are closely associated with
SCCmec types, was different among CF versus non-CF iso-
lates. Among CF isolates, 71% were CC5, 26% were CC8,
and 3% were CC1, whereas among non-CF isolates, 89% were
CC8, 4% were CC5, and 7% were CC1. While the reasons
for differences in the molecular epidemiology of MRSA
strains between non-CF versus CF individuals are unclear,
the presence of common strains in the CF population suggest
patient-to-patient transmission and/or potential virulence
factors that facilitate colonization and infection in CF.
In Chapel Hill, North Carolina, similar findings were
noted, as 72% of individuals with CF were infected with
SCCmec type II strains, while only 17% were infected with
SCCmec type IV strains.219 The latter group consisted of youn-
ger individuals. In a multicenter study conducted in the
United States from 2008 to 2010, SCCmec type II strains were
more common than SCCmec type IV strains, accounting for
71% of MRSA isolates, and 84% of SCCmec type IV strains
that harbored Panton-Valentine leukocidin were USA300, the
most common community-associated MRSA clone.220
In a multicenter study conducted in Italy, MLST analysis
revealed common types in multiple individuals with CF at-
tending multiple CF centers.139 Twenty-nine strains from 6
CF centers were identified as ST8 SCCmec type IV (USA),
and 26 strains from 6 CF centers were identified as ST5
SCCmec type I (also a healthcare-associated clone initially
reported from the United Kingdom). Thus, epidemic lineages
of MRSA from around the world have been identified in the
CF population in Italy. It is not clear why the SCCmec type
I and II strains predominate among individuals with CF at
a time when SCCmec type IV predominates in non-CF pop-
ulations. It is likely that more sensitive testing (eg, rep-PCR221
or whole-genome sequencing) will provide more precise in-
formation about the extent of person-to-person transmission
of MRSA.222,223
Clinical impact of MRSA. Recent reports have demon-
strated that chronic infection with MRSA is associated with
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increased morbidity and mortality. In a study using the
CFFPR, when compared with 13,922 individuals with CF
without chronic MRSA infection, 1,732 individuals chroni-
cally infected with MRSA had an increased rate of decline in
lung function (decline in FEV1 % predicted 1.44% per year
vs 2.06% per year, respectively).22 Similar findings have been
reported by others.224-226 In addition, MRSA has also been
associated with increased mortality; in a cohort study of
19,833 individuals reported to the CFFPR with at least 2 years
of follow-up, those with MRSA had a 1.27 higher risk of
death when adjusted for severity of disease.23
III.A.5. Nontuberculous Mycobacteria
Shared NTM strains. Until recently, there was little evi-
dence for shared strains of NTM species among individuals
with CF.102,227 In a multicenter study conducted in the United
States, most of the 140 NTM isolates appeared to be distinct
by single-locus (hsp65) sequence analysis.102 Among 14 NTM-
infected individuals with CF included in a study in Sweden,
a shared strain was found only in 1 pair of siblings.228
However, a recent report from the United States described
the use of rep-PCR and PFGE typing to show the apparent
spread of a strain of M. abscessus subsp. massiliense from a
chronically infected adult with CF to 4 others attending the
same clinic in Seattle.129 The index case and 2 others died
within several months of becoming infected. Similarly, typing
of 41 strains of M. abscessus complex from 17 individuals
with CF in the United Kingdom using a novel variable-num-
ber tandem repeat scheme and an automated rep-PCR system
found that most were persistently infected with a single clone,
but some shared strains; no differences in clinical outcomes
linked to specific strains was reported.145 In another recent
report of NTM transmission, whole-genome sequencing and
single-nucleotide polymorphism analysis were used to char-
acterize 168 M. abscessus complex isolates from 31 individuals
at a CF care center in the United Kingdom.66 Two clusters
(1 consisting of 9 individuals and 1 consisting of 2 individ-
uals) of M. abscessus subsp. massiliense were identified, with
epidemiologic evidence of opportunities for person-to-person
spread within the hospital setting. The strains from Seattle
and the United Kingdom outbreaks are highly related and
are also related to strains causing soft-tissue infections in
Brazil.229 However, it is currently unknown why these strains
from around the world are related. A third outbreak of M.
abscessus occurred from 2009 to 2011 at a pediatric CF center
in Hawaii, in which 9 (55%) of 17 children were infected
with the same strain as identified by PFGE.230 An investigation
conducted in conjunction with the Department of Health
revealed that the PFT laboratory was the most likely source
of transmission, as the infected patients performed PFTs at
the same time in very close proximity.
Clinical impact of NTM. M. abscessus in particular is
challenging to treat and may be associated with rapid clinical
deterioration and poor outcomes after lung transplanta-
tion.231-233 A multicenter prospective study conducted more
than a decade ago showed no association between M. abscessus
and decline in lung function,102 but a longer single-center
study showed that chronic M. abscessus infection was asso-
ciated with an excess decline of 0.78% predicted FEV1 per
year.66,234
Summary
In summary, epidemiologic studies have shown that individ-
uals with CF can share the same strain of several CF path-
ogens. For decades, person-to-person transmission of Burk-
holderia spp. has been described, while person-to-person
transmission of P. aeruginosa has been increasingly recognized
in CF centers worldwide. MRSA strains detected in people
with CF have been identified as epidemic clones, causing both
healthcare- and community-associated infections in both CF
and non-CF populations. Thus, studies of transmission of
MSSA and MRSA are confounded by the fact that such species
commonly colonize and infect people without CF. Most re-
cently, compelling evidence of person-to-person transmission
of M. abscessus has been described. Currently, the route(s) of
transmission, including the potential for transmission by
droplet nuclei, and the role played by mycobacterial virulence
factors are under investigation. Multicenter studies, core lab-
oratories, and use of advanced molecular methodologies are
needed to understand the frequency and routes of transmis-
sion of mycobacteria in persons with CF. Epidemic strains of
Burkholderia, Pseudomonas, and M. abscessus as well as in-
fection with MRSA have been associated with increased mor-
bidity and mortality. Use of higher resolution typing, such
as whole-genome sequencing, is needed in future studies to
provide a more precise understanding of the dynamics of
transmission.
III.B. Acquisition from People without CF
III.B.1. P. aeruginosa and Burkholderia spp.
Approximately 10% of people without CF may have gastro-
intestinal tract colonization with P. aeruginosa. P. aeruginosa
is a well-described opportunistic pathogen of immunocom-
promised non-CF individuals, including oncology patients,
burn victims, and ventilated patients.235-237 To our knowledge,
there is only 1 case report of transmission of P. aeruginosa
to the non-CF household members of a person with CF. Both
parents of a 22-year-old woman with CF, infected with the
LES, developed pneumonia caused by this strain.238 Both were
carriers of abnormal CFTR, but neither had CF.
B. cepacia complex strains do not colonize people without
CF239 but can cause infections in individuals who are im-
munocompromised, including those with chronic granulo-
matous disease or solid-organ transplantation.240,241 To our
knowledge, there is only 1 case report describing hospital
transmission of Burkholderia from a non-CF individual with
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 02 Feb 2021 at 19:24:53, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.
infection prevention and control in cf S29
chronic respiratory failure to multiple patients with and with-
out CF.242
III.B.2. S. aureus
Unlike other CF pathogens, both MSSA and MRSA can col-
onize and infect non-CF individuals, including household
members and other close contacts. Thus, there is the potential
for acquisition of S. aureus in healthcare and community
settings from people without CF. Furthermore, as described
above, healthcare- and community-associated MRSA strains
can infect people with CF.218,220 Definitive evidence of trans-
mission of MRSA, particularly community-associated strains,
may be confounded by the observation that relatively few
clones have been described, and highly sensitive molecular
techniques have been used only in recent years.
MRSA colonization and infections in non-CF patients.
For decades, MRSA infection and colonization in patients
without CF were exclusively associated with hospitalization,
chronic care facilities, or dialysis units.243 Beginning in the
late 1990s, MRSA infections began to occur in the community
setting in previously healthy individuals, so-called commu-
nity-onset or community-acquired MRSA (CA-MRSA).244
Skin and soft-tissue infections are the most common man-
ifestation of CA-MRSA, but necrotizing pneumonia, bone
infections, and sepsis are also described.245-248 A recent meta-
analysis assessing MRSA colonization of the anterior nares
in children described a prevalence of 5.4% in hospitalized
children and 3% in children in the community, suggesting
that MRSA colonization is relatively common in the general
population.249
Transmission from non-CF patients. To our knowledge,
there is only 1 report describing healthcare-associated trans-
mission of MRSA from patients without CF to patients with
CF. In Australia, transmission of MRSA from patients without
CF to individuals with CF hospitalized in the same ward at
the same time was described.138 However, the authors did not
describe the routes of transmission and the IP&C strategies
that were in place.
CF households. In a multicenter study of children with
CF with MRSA in New York, non-CF household members
had anterior nares colonization with the same strain of MRSA
(14.7% vs 1.6% of case vs control household members).215
While the direction of transmission is unknown, it is likely
that the non-CF family member acquired MRSA from his or
her child with CF. No staphylococcal infections occurred in
household members.
Healthcare personnel. The anterior nares of healthcare
personnel without CF may be colonized with MRSA. How-
ever, routine screening is not recommended, unless healthcare
personnel are epidemiologically associated with ongoing
transmission.20,250-252 In contrast, healthcare personnel without
CF who develop symptomatic MRSA infections (eg, draining
wounds, sinusitis with drainage, and superinfection of
chronic dermatitis) should be placed on administrative leave,
treated until no longer infectious, and obtain clearance from
the facility’s occupational health service before returning to
work.5,8
Other nonhealthcare settings, including sports teams.
Participation in sports has been identified as a risk factor for
the development of MRSA colonization and infection in the
non-CF community, presumably due to skin colonization,
skin abrasions, intimate contact between players, and poor
hygiene.253,254 MRSA has been detected both in the environ-
ment (eg, locker room, strength and conditioning equipment,
and whirlpool equipment) and in samples obtained from ath-
letes (eg, nose, skin sites, and shoes).254-258 In addition, out-
breaks of MRSA skin and soft-tissue infections have been
reported among members of sports teams.255,259-267 However,
to our knowledge there are no reports of transmission of
MRSA from a person with CF on a sports team to another
athlete without CF or vice versa. Thus, there are no data to
support exclusion of an individual with CF with MRSA in
their respiratory tract from participation in sports.
The CDC has developed recommendations to prevent
MRSA transmission among athletes and in athletic facilities.268
They include the following: (1) improve hygiene among ath-
letes by covering and containing wounds, showering after
participating in sports activity, washing and drying uniforms
after each use, not sharing personal items (eg, razors), and
reporting possible infections to the team physician, athletic
trainer, school nurse, or primary care doctor so that treatment
can be initiated promptly; (2) clean and disinfect athletic
facilities, including showers, using appropriate cleaning and
disinfection measures; and (3) exclude athletes with MRSA
wound infections from participation if wounds cannot be
completely covered or if a healthcare provider determines
that the infection poses a risk to the individual with the
infection. Athletes with MRSA infections should not use com-
mon-use water facilities or pools until the infection has
resolved.
III.B.3. Respiratory Viruses
Viral respiratory pathogens, including respiratory syncytial
virus (RSV), rhinovirus, and influenza virus, pose a risk to
people with CF. In adults and children with CF, viral infec-
tions can trigger pulmonary exacerbations,269-272 particularly
influenza virus271,273 and rhinovirus.269,270 Exacerbations in
which a virus is identified are associated with worse clinical
severity compared with viral exacerbations.274 As sensitive vi-
ral detection methods like real-time PCR become increasingly
available and identify a broader range of viruses,275 the role
played by other viral pathogens (eg, coronavirus and human
metapneumovirus) in CF exacerbations will be further
elucidated.
Summary
Transmission of gram-negative bacterial pathogens between
people with CF and people without CF is very rare. Given
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the recent observations that people with CF are infected with
community-associated MRSA, it is feasible that some trans-
mission of S. aureus is occurring between people with and
without CF. Further studies are needed to assess the extent
to which this occurs. In contrast, it is highly likely that viral
pathogens are frequently transmitted between people with
and without CF, given the annual community outbreaks of
seasonal viruses and the high transmissibility of these agents.
III.C. Acquisition from Animals
Overview of zoonotic infection. More than 800 microor-
ganisms can cause zoonotic infections, defined as pathogens
transmitted from animals to humans or from humans to
animals. The CDC’s National Center for Emerging and Zoo-
notic Infectious Diseases is charged with preventing disease
and disabilities from such infections.276 People with CF can
have opportunities for close contact with animals, including
with personal pets, service animals, and pet therapy animals
as well as farm animals and animals in petting zoos.
Pets. A few reports have addressed transmission of path-
ogens from animals to people with CF and from people with
CF to animals.277-281 Following lung transplantation, Bordetella
bronchiseptica pneumonia developed in 2 children with CF
who acquired this pathogen from ill pet dogs, and 1 child
died.278-280 B. bronchiseptica was also detected in the respira-
tory tract of a child with CF who acquired this organism from
an ill kitten, and this child had no adverse effects following
treatment.280 The LES of P. aeruginosa was transmitted from
a 54-year-old man with CF to his pet cat; the cat developed
respiratory symptoms.281 The reptile collection of a person
with CF was cultured and not found to harbor potential CF
pathogens.277
MRSA colonization and infections have been described in
dogs, cats, rabbits, hamsters, guinea pigs, turtles, chinchilla,
and birds.282,283 Outbreaks of MRSA have been described in
animal hospitals, and both hospital- and community-asso-
ciated strains have been identified. Most of these are sporadic
infections, but when outbreaks occurred, they are thought to
reflect initial transmission from people to animals.282,283 There
are limited data on the frequency of MRSA transmission from
animals to humans, and there are no published data describ-
ing this phenomenon in people with CF.
Mycobacterium marinum skin and soft-tissue infections
have been linked to cutaneous exposure to fish tanks.284 In-
fections have occurred in both immunocompetent and im-
munocompromised patients, including transplant recipi-
ents.285 Risk factors included exposure to fish tanks, the
presence of open skin lesions during the cleaning of fish tanks,
fishing, and exposure to aquarium water. There are no pub-
lished reports of M. marinum infections in individuals with
CF linked to fish tank exposure.
The CDC has several IP&C recommendations for people
who own pets that are relevant for people with CF who own
pets.286 These recommendations emphasize using hygienic
principles to prevent zoonotic infections, including (1) hand
hygiene, (2) disinfecting cages or tanks, (3) appropriate pre-
ventive care for pets, (4) prompt assessment of ill pets by a
veterinarian, and (5) wearing gloves while cleaning fish tanks.
Handling of reptiles is not recommended for any individuals
at risk of serious complications of Salmonella infections.
Pet therapy and service animals. Many institutions, par-
ticularly children’s hospitals, have introduced pet therapy
programs that allow pets that have been certified to be free
of certain infections to visit patients in healthcare settings.
Recommendations for such programs include (1) training
programs for the dogs and their owners, (2) stringent criteria
for animal vaccinations and cleanliness, and (3) criteria for
eligible patients.287,288 The importance of hand hygiene before
and after contact with the animals is emphasized. Patients
under Transmission-Based Precautions, those with animal al-
lergies, or children frightened by animals are generally ex-
cluded from participation. To date, there are no reports of
transmission of potential pathogens from pet therapy animals
to people with CF. People with CF can participate in such
programs as per local institutional policies.
Service animals represent unique interactions between peo-
ple and animals by providing guidance and support for both
physical and emotional disabilities. There are no published
reports of transmission of potential pathogens from service
animals to people with CF. People with CF can participate
in such programs when instituted as per relevant state and
federal guidelines.289
Farm animals. Farm animals have been associated with
several types of zoonotic infections. Farm animals have been
linked to transmission of viral pathogens to humans, most
notably influenza virus from pigs (http://www.who.int
/topics/influenza/en/) and coronavirus.290 Animal stalls,
sheds, and coops may become heavily contaminated with fecal
flora as well as with Aspergillus and other molds that prolif-
erate in hay and other organic matter. Thus, it would be
prudent for people with CF to avoid cleaning stalls, pens, or
coops and to perform other chores instead.
To date, there are no reports of transmission of potential
pathogens from farm animals to people with CF. Nonetheless,
farm animals may represent a source of potential pathogens
for people with CF. Theoretical concerns include (1) influenza
infections; (2) ABPA caused by cleaning stables; (3) MRSA
from horses and pigs; and (4) P. aeruginosa from horses.282,291
In summary, while there are limited data describing zoo-
notic infections in people with CF, people with CF and their
families should follow preventive strategies described in na-
tional guidance documents.
III.D. Acquisition from the Inanimate Environment
III.D.1. Nonhealthcare Sources: Soil, Organic Matter,
and Water
Overview. There has been continuing concern that the nat-
ural environment (eg, water and soil) may be a reservoir for
CF pathogens, such as P. aeruginosa, Burkholderia spp., NTM,
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and Aspergillus spp. P. aeruginosa is ubiquitous in rivers,
aquatic areas, soil, and plants worldwide. B. cepacia complex
can be found in rice, wheat, and maize rhizospheres and in
human sewage, and B. gladioli and B. cepacia are well-rec-
ognized plant pathogens. Other species, particularly Burk-
holderia ambifaria, exist within the rhizospheres of certain
plants, while B. multivorans is infrequently recovered from
the environment.292-296 Several investigations since the pub-
lication of the 2003 Infection Control Guideline for CF have
enhanced our understanding of the potential role played by
the natural environment in the acquisition of CF pathogens
and possible strain-specific reservoirs.
Burkholderia spp. Implementation of strict IP&C mea-
sures has eliminated new acquisition of several epidemic
Burkholderia strains, including ET12 and SLC6, among people
with CF.154,297 The incidence of infection with the PHDC and
the Midwest clone has decreased but has not been eliminated
with improved IP&C practices, and individuals with CF have
been infected in the absence of apparent contact with others
with CF (J.J.L., unpublished observations, October 2013).
Strain PHDC has been recovered from agricultural soil in the
United States, including onion fields, and from people with
CF in diverse locations in the United States and Europe,
suggesting that this strain is widely distributed in the natural
environment, which serves as a source of ongoing acquisi-
tion.161,298-300 Strains identical to those found in people with
CF have also been isolated from onions and onion rot.301,302
Furthermore, MLST analysis demonstrated that more than
20% of 381 CF isolates of Burkholderia were indistinguishable
from strains recovered from the natural environment.301 B.
cepacia complex isolates with the same nucleotide identity at
all 7 MLST loci have been isolated from people with CF and
from river water, suggesting another possible environmental
reservoir.302 Finally, B. cenocepacia and Burkholderia viet-
namiensis have been isolated from human sewage in the
United Kingdom, but genotyping of these isolates was not
performed.303 In contrast, the Midwest strain of B. cenocepacia
has not been found in the natural environment in regions
where this strain infects people with CF.157,295
P. aeruginosa. In the homes of people without CF, P.
aeruginosa was detected most often from kitchen and bath-
room drains but not from soil.304 Similarly, in the homes of
people with CF, P. aeruginosa was detected most often from
shower drains and bathroom drainpipes.305,306 While P. aeru-
ginosa was recovered from 34% of the homes of newly in-
fected people with CF (6% of samples), only 9 (18%) of 50
paired environmental and patient isolates were the same
strain.306 It remains unclear whether these P. aeruginosa strains
were transmitted from the individuals with CF to the home
environment or vice versa, but it suggests that cleaning and
disinfection efforts in the homes of people with CF should
focus on bathroom drains. There are insufficient data to de-
termine the optimal frequency of cleaning showerheads.
However, showerheads that have smoother surfaces may be
less prone toward retaining organisms than those that have
more crevices.
In Switzerland, a very low prevalence of P. aeruginosa was
detected in public outdoor pools, standing water, and running
water from the bathroom taps of people with CF.307 P. aeru-
ginosa has been isolated from whirlpool spas and hot tubs,
and outbreaks of folliculitis and more serious infections
caused by P. aeruginosa have been associated with hot tubs
and whirlpool bathtubs.1 In the United States, an observa-
tional study of children with newly acquired P. aeruginosa did
not find that hot tub use was associated with age at P. aeru-
ginosa acquisition but did find that swimming pool use in
the previous year was protective.308 These findings may reflect
the relatively healthy pulmonary status of the children with
CF enrolled in this study.
Natural bodies of fresh water (eg, rivers and lakes) have
not been definitely proven to be a source of CF pathogens,
but stagnant water should always be avoided due to a heavy
burden of potential pathogens that flourish in organic debris.
However, after heavy rains fresh bodies of water may be con-
taminated with sewage overflow, and local/state monitoring
should be reviewed before swimming in such water.
In Germany, the P. aeruginosa strain designated clone C
has been recovered from individuals with CF and from en-
vironmental samples from geographically diverse areas.309
This same strain was subsequently identified from people with
CF in the United Kingdom,173 further suggesting a broad
distribution of this particular strain in the natural environ-
ment. Other P. aeruginosa epidemic strains have not been
identified in environmental samples, although genotyping
surveys of large numbers of strains recovered from the en-
vironment have not been performed.
Other gram-negative bacteria. S. maltophilia is com-
monly found in soil and has been identified in well and river
water, stream sediment, raw milk, frozen fruit, and sew-
age.310,311 Species other than A. xylosoxidans, A. rhulandii, Ach-
romobacter piechaudii, and Achromobacter denitrifican are
found in soil and rarely cause human infections.312
NTM. The natural habitat for NTM is soil and water,313
and the prevalence of NTM in the natural environment has
wide geographical variation. Under experimental conditions,
high numbers of pathogenic NTM were recovered from aero-
sols produced by 2 commercial potting soils. When NTM-
infected individuals without CF submitted their own potting
soils for PFGE analysis, 1 patient-soil pair had indistinguish-
able strains of M. avium and 2 patient-soil pairs had closely
related strains of M. intracellulare, suggesting that potting soil
could be a reservoir for NTM for people with CF who have
intense, repeated exposures.314 Another study isolated M.
avium-intracellulare from 49% of residential soil samples in
Japan and found 6 clinical and corresponding soil isolate pairs
with identical genotypes from non-CF case patients with high
soil exposure, defined as more than or equal to 2 hours/week,
including digging or carrying soils, mowing grass, planting
flowers, and exposure to soil dusts when farming or garden-
ing.315 Thus, although these studies were not conducted in
people with CF, they do suggest that it may be prudent to
limit exposure to soil.
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Aspergillus spp. and other filamentous fungi. The 3
most frequent species of filamentous fungi isolated from peo-
ple with CF are A. fumigatus, Scedosporium apiosporium, and
A. terreus. The natural habitat for Aspergillus spp. is soil, where
they function as saprophytes growing on organic debris and
recycling carbon and nitrogen throughout the environment.
As a result, aerosolized conidia are ubiquitous in the envi-
ronment. Characteristics of A. fumigatus that promote suc-
cessful colonization of the airways include thermotolerance,
small and abundant conidia, fast growth rates, and produc-
tion of toxic metabolites and enzymes that are effective in
breaking down complex polysaccharides. A. terreus is seldom
reported from environmental sources, but in one study of air
and surface samples from patient rooms and soil from the
park adjacent to the hospital, A. terreus was found only in
the soil samples; however, there were no common genotypes
in patient and soil samples.105 S. apiosporium is found in
highly polluted soils and water but is rarely encountered in
the environment. In one study of air and surfaces in the
homes of 6 people with CF, large concentrations of S. apio-
sporium were isolated from 36 (65%) of 55 potted plants, but
no genotyping was reported. In conclusion, the intensity and
duration of exposure to these environmental reservoirs of
filamentous fungi may increase the risk of acquisition by
people with CF. However, without genotyping studies, this
link remains unconfirmed.
Summary. Although many CF pathogens may be found
in the inanimate environment, there are few instances where
the same genotypes are found in the natural environment
and in isolates from the respiratory secretions of people with
CF. Nonetheless, it is prudent to avoid activities that include
prolonged and intense exposure to soil, construction, and
swimming in pools that are not appropriately chlorinated or
swimming in stagnant water.
III.D.2. Healthcare Sources: Water, Surfaces, Equipment,
Air, and Contaminated Products
Water and other fluids. Water has been the source of
healthcare-associated infections and linked to outbreaks
caused by Legionella, Pseudomonas, Stenotrophomonas, Burk-
holderia, and Achromobacter.316 In both inpatient and am-
bulatory healthcare settings where people with CF receive
care, the highest number of positive environmental cultures
for P. aeruginosa were from the sink drains or showers in
patient rooms.127,317 One study found genetic relatedness in
19 of 21 clinical and environmental strains, but it was un-
certain whether P. aeruginosa was transmitted from the in-
dividuals with CF to the clinical environment or vice versa.317
The sources of healthcare-associated infections caused by
S. maltophilia are poorly understood. In non-CF patients, S.
maltophilia has been linked to inappropriate use of hand
moisturizing lotion, rather than soap, by healthcare person-
nel318 and to contamination of faucet aerators in intensive
care unit (ICU) sinks.319 Furthermore, S. maltophilia has been
recovered from hospital sink drains, faucets, and potable wa-
ter.140,320 In general, genotyping analyses have not shown that
isolates obtained from the hospital environmental are the
same as those recovered from patients,141,320 and the majority
of non-CF patients infected with S. maltophilia had genetically
distinct strains.321 None of 24 S. maltophilia isolates recovered
from water, taps, and sinks in patient rooms matched the
strains recovered from individuals with CF.
Despite these occasional outbreaks related to a water
source, routine environmental sampling, including culturing
water supplies, is not advised, except for water-quality de-
terminations in hemodialysis settings and other situations
where sampling is directed by epidemiologic principles, and
results can be applied directly to infection control decisions.2
Removal, cleaning, and disinfecting of showerheads and tap
aerators once a month with an EPA-registered product or a
chlorine bleach solution (500–615 ppm [1 : 100 dilution]) has
been recommended as part of Legionella control measures,
but there are insufficient data to support a widespread rec-
ommendation and specific time intervals, given the infre-
quency of outbreaks associated with faucet aerators.2
Healthcare surfaces. Several studies in healthcare facili-
ties, many of which utilized molecular typing methods, have
identified the same pathogens on inanimate surfaces as those
recovered from non-CF patients, including VRE, MRSA, C.
difficile, Acinetobacter spp., and norovirus.322-325 Pathogens
shed by patients can contaminate healthcare surfaces at con-
centrations sufficient for transmission, can survive for ex-
tended periods of time, and can be transferred to the hands
and clothing of healthcare personnel, leading to further trans-
mission.5 Surface contamination with VRE resulted from the
failure to clean rather than faulty cleaning methods or prod-
ucts, thereby supporting the concept that education about
cleaning and compliance monitoring could reduce environ-
mental contamination.326 As further evidence of the role
played by contaminated surfaces in hospital-associated in-
fections, a patient admitted to a room previously occupied
by a patient colonized or infected with a pathogen (eg, MRSA,
VRE, C. difficile, or Acinetobacter spp.) has an increased like-
lihood of developing colonization or infection with that path-
ogen due to inadequate decontamination of surfaces.5,327-329
In healthcare facilities that deliver care to people with CF,
contamination of dry environmental surfaces with CF path-
ogens was low, but contamination of the hands of people
with CF was higher.128 In a Liverpool CF center, contami-
nation of inanimate surfaces was transient and negative after
patient discharge and routine cleaning.127 Similar findings
have been noted in other CF clinics.128,317
Healthcare equipment. Contamination of medical equip-
ment is another potential source of pathogens for people with
CF. During simulated examinations, stethoscopes acquired and
transferred MRSA and C. difficile nearly as often as gloved
hands,330 and RSV has been detected on stethoscopes in non-
CF settings.331 In CF settings, 26 stethoscopes used in a clinic
were not found to be contaminated with CF pathogens,332 and
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in a more recent study P. aeruginosa and S. aureus were rarely
recovered from stethoscopes, pulse oximeters, and otoscopes.128
Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence to support the im-
portance of cleaning and disinfecting medical equipment after
use by one person with CF prior to use by another person
with CF, according to hospital protocols.
Numerous outbreaks (and pseudo-outbreaks, ie, no evi-
dence of infection or disease linked to recovery of micro-
organism) of P. aeruginosa, other gram-negative bacilli, and
NTM have been linked to contaminated medical devices. For
example, outbreaks of P. aeruginosa have been linked to in-
adequate processing of rigid333,334 and flexible laryngo-
scopes,333 flexible bronchoscopes,335-337 and defective repro-
cessors for bronchoscopes and endoscopes.338 Similarly,
outbreaks and pseudo-outbreaks of NTM have been linked
to bronchoscopes,339 and a hospital hydrotherapy pool con-
taminated with M. chelonei that led to infections in children
with CF.340
Air. Infectious droplets in the air may represent another
source of transmission for CF pathogens. P. aeruginosa was
recovered from the air in hospital rooms 45 minutes to 2
hours after people with CF left,126,127 and the LES of P. aeru-
ginosa was recovered from the corridors of CF clinics as long
as 3 hours after individuals had left the area.127 In the United
Kingdom, after individuals with CF performed PFTs or neb-
ulization, the Manchester epidemic strain of P. aeruginosa as
well as nonepidemic P. aeruginosa were recovered from the
air.341 In France, the concentration of P. aeruginosa was highest
after the person with CF awoke or performed chest physio-
therapy.126 Several CF pathogens (ie, P. aeruginosa, MSSA, and
MRSA) were recovered from air collected 3 feet from CF
subjects in exam rooms; these strains were the same as those
infecting the subjects as assessed by PFGE.128 Similarly, CF
pathogens were recovered from the air 6 feet from CF subjects
performing PFTs.125 Factors associated with generating infec-
tious droplets of P. aeruginosa are unknown, as exacerbations,
sick versus well CF clinic visits, or age were not predic-
tive.125,128 We emphasize that none of these observational stud-
ies were associated with person-to-person transmission, but
such data provide evidence of the potential for such trans-
mission and, thus, the importance of implementing strategies
to prevent droplet transmission. Furthermore, as previously
described the potential for transmission of M. abscessus by
droplets or droplet nuclei has been suggested,66,129 but to our
knowledge no studies to date have demonstrated the specific
route(s) of NTM transmission among people with CF.
Contaminated products. Burkholderia spp. are the most
frequently isolated bacteria in nonsterile and sterile pharma-
ceutical products that have been recalled.342,343 Many healthcare-
associated outbreaks of Burkholderia infections associated with
contaminated skin antiseptics, mouthwashes, ultrasound gels,
medications, and medical devices have been described.344-362
Other products that have become contaminated during use
include nasal irrigation bottles contaminated with P. aeru-
ginosa,363,364 multiuse albuterol vials contaminated with B.
cepacia,348,357 acupuncture devices disinfected with glutaralde-
hyde contaminated with M. abscessus,365 cosmetic surgical sup-
plies contaminated with mycobacterial spp., and supplies used
for liposuction.366 Outbreaks of Achromobacter spp. have been
attributed to contaminated disinfectant solutions, dialysis flu-
ids, saline solution, and deionized water.367 In addition, prod-
ucts used in nonhealthcare settings can become contaminated
during manufacturing and can cause extensive outbreaks.
These have included alcohol-tattoo ink contaminated with M.
chelonae368 and footbaths in nail salons contaminated with
NTM spp.369
Summary. Most potential sources of pathogens that have
been identified in the healthcare environment can be elimi-
nated by following facility processes for the cleaning and
disinfection of surfaces and equipment. Although there are
no published reports of proven acquisition by people with
CF from contaminated products, such sources present a po-
tential risk and should be considered during any outbreak
investigation in people with CF. The CF care team should
receive alerts for contaminated products sent by the Food
and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) MedWatch and the
CDC’s Health Alert Network.
III.D.3. Construction and Renovation
Multiple outbreaks of airborne filamentous fungi, principally
due to Aspergillus spp., have been reported in hospitals as-
sociated with construction, renovation, repair, and demoli-
tion.370-372 While most of the outbreaks were related to con-
struction or renovation, problems with the air supply system
have also been implicated. The most common species in-
volved in the outbreaks were A. fumigatus and A. flavus, al-
though a substantial number involved more than 1 species
of Aspergillus. Groups at highest risk for nosocomial infection
during these outbreaks included persons with hematologic
malignancy, solid-organ transplantation, and other immu-
nocompromising conditions (eg, high-dose steroid therapy).
We were unable to find any studies assessing a healthcare
source for Aspergillus in CF. Furthermore, CF has not been
described as a risk factor for acquisition of invasive asper-
gillosis in nosocomial outbreaks related to construction, ren-
ovation, repair, or demolition. Nevertheless, it is prudent to
ensure that dust-containment strategies are followed through-
out the entire healthcare facility.
IV. Strategies to Reduce Transmission and
Acquisition of CF Pathogens
IV.A. Overview
Several published experiences have described the effectiveness
of stringent IP&C practices and policies for reducing the prev-
alence of epidemic B. cepacia complex,25 the LES strain,1,373,374
and other transmissible strains of P. aeruginosa.30,185,375,376 In-
terventions have included education of healthcare personnel
and people with CF and their families about risk factors for
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routes of transmission and preventive strategies, emphasizing
hand hygiene for people with CF and healthcare personnel,
the use of single-patient rooms when people with CF are
admitted to the hospital, Contact Precautions, avoiding so-
cializing in both healthcare and nonhealthcare settings, im-
proving detection of CF pathogens in microbiology labora-
tories, decontaminating the healthcare environment, and
cohort segregation of patients known to be harboring specific
pathogens while in a CF clinic.1 Most recently, efforts to
prevent further transmission of M. abscessus subsp. massiliense
in an adult CF clinic included educating and reinforcing IP&C
strategies for CF to the CF care team and individuals with
CF, cleaning all clinic and equipment surfaces twice, and the
use of a negative pressure room for all NTM-infected indi-
viduals.66,129 In a pediatric CF center experiencing an outbreak
of M. abscessus, investigators concluded that the PFT labo-
ratory was the most likely source of transmission and changed
from performing PFTs in a central laboratory to performing
portable spirometry in clinic exam rooms.230 Notably, several
strategies were used to control each outbreak and most likely
included enforcing preexisting IP&C practices. Thus, it is
impossible to conclude which intervention(s) were most ef-
fective. However, similar to other prevention programs in
IP&C—such as reducing device-related infections, including
central line–associated bloodstream infections and ventilator-
associated pneumonia—it is likely that implementation of a
bundle of practices is required to reduce transmission of CF
pathogens.377-379
The following sections describe the IP&C strategies rec-
ommended in this updated guideline. The recommenda-
tions are intended for all people with CF, regardless of
respiratory tract culture results. The recommendations
should also be followed for people with CF following lung
or liver transplantation, as such individuals are immunocom-
promised, at risk of becoming infected from others with CF,
and following transplantation may continue to harbor CF
pathogens. The recommendations for healthcare settings are
intended for CF clinics and other ambulatory care areas, in-
patient settings, diagnostic areas, and all clinical research ac-
tivities. Successful and consistent implementation of IP&C
practices must include the ongoing participation of people
with CF and their families and auditing the performance of
healthcare personnel. Depending on available resources, a
center may choose to implement the recommended IP&C
practices in all areas at once or may choose to stage the
implementation by setting.
IV.B. Education Strategies
Overview. To successfully implement the recommendations
in this guideline, several stakeholders must be educated, in-
cluding (1) all healthcare personnel who have contact with
people with CF (eg, physicians, nurses, respiratory and phys-
ical therapists, radiology and laboratory personnel, social
workers, operating room staff members, research coordina-
tors, administrative personnel, and environmental services
personnel); (2) all people with CF, from toddlers to adults
(individuals may have varied age-appropriate experience,
knowledge, and motivation regarding IP&C); and (3) families
and friends of people with CF.
Families of older adolescents and adults with CF may strug-
gle to accept the paradigm shift that has taken place for IP&C
during the past decade on the basis of new knowledge of
transmission of CF pathogens. Families of newly diagnosed
individuals are more likely to be receptive to the current
recommendations, as they have less prior experience. There-
fore, different strategies may be required for educating dif-
ferent groups.
Educators must recognize the needs and levels of under-
standing of various groups of stakeholders to optimize the
effectiveness of educational programs. While the CF Foun-
dation has developed educational tools, individual CF center
staff may also create their own tools and include people with
CF and their families in the development process. Fortunately,
the disciplines of CF and of IP&C have a great deal of expe-
rience providing education to other healthcare personnel, pa-
tients, and families. Some examples include the myriad edu-
cational materials to promote proper hand hygiene, cough
etiquette, and respiratory hygiene aimed at preventing the
spread of pathogens transmitted by the droplet route; these are
available in many languages and literacy levels.380 Information
is also available on the CF Foundation’s website (http://www
.cff.org).
Education should be provided to people with CF and their
families on a regular basis using a variety of learning methods,
including written, visual, demonstration, and return dem-
onstration. In a survey of people with CF and the parents of
children with CF, only 80% reported that they had discussed
hand hygiene with their CF care team; fewer were told to
perform hand hygiene when entering (39%) and leaving
(49%) the CF clinic.381 This study provides just one example
of missed opportunities to improve IP&C education.
The following components of effective education should
be incorporated into IP&C education for CF: (1) developing
knowledge, skills, and attitudes; (2) identifying and engaging
stakeholders; (3) utilizing positive deviance and early adopters
as described below; and (4) performing audits and providing
feedback.
Knowledge, skills, and attitudes. The importance of
knowledge, skills, and attitudes in educating individuals to
change behavior has been described in the CF community381,382
as well as for healthcare personnel.383-387 Knowledge, or facts,
can be taught using didactic or case-based methods at the
bedside or in the clinic. Adults learn best if they perceive the
relevance of the information to their personal situation and
are provided with the rationale. Adult learning is most effective
when flexible and when educational methods encourage net-
working, critical analysis, and reflection on practice and provide
an opportunity for open questioning. In contrast, children will
benefit from methods that are age appropriate. Provision of
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repeated exposure to educational information is critical to re-
inforce the principles and allow for questioning. Skills are prac-
tical tasks that range from very simple procedures to complex
techniques applied to varying circumstances. Observations of
adult learners and return demonstrations by adult learners are
effective methods to assess skill level and competency to per-
form tasks independently. Children are also eager to demon-
strate their mastery of new skills, and their learning can be
validated using a show-and-tell strategy. Attitudes are the prod-
ucts of individual beliefs and professional and personal life
experiences. Focus groups and questionnaires are useful tools
for defining the beliefs of the target audience and addressing
specific attitudes and beliefs; these techniques have been suc-
cessful with environmental services workers.386
Stakeholders. Implementation of the recommendations
in this document will likely require many stakeholders to
change their practices. Therefore, people with CF, their fam-
ilies, and healthcare personnel must believe that change is
necessary. People with CF must believe that change will ben-
efit them. Healthcare personnel must believe that change will
benefit their patients and/or themselves in terms of being
rewarded for their performance and professionalism. Fur-
thermore, effective education must engage clinical opinion
leaders who command the respect of those around them,
understand the reasons for change, and can help implement
needed change. While senior clinical staff members can serve
as role models for needed change, in other settings such in-
dividuals may be the most resistant to change. If the latter
occurs, focused efforts are needed to engage these individuals
and ensure that they understand the importance of the rec-
ommended changes in practice and their unique role in mod-
eling these changes. Notably, the lack of positive role mod-
eling among senior clinical staff was cited as a reason for low
adherence to hand hygiene practices.388
Positive deviance/early adopters. Another successful
strategy to effect change is the use of positive deviance or
early adopters. Positive deviance is based on the observation
that within every community are individuals or groups whose
unique behaviors and strategies enable them to find better
solutions to problems than their peers, despite having access
to the same resources and facing similar or worse challenges.
Positive deviance is an asset-based, problem-solving, com-
munity-driven approach that facilitates discovery of success-
ful behaviors and strategies and the development of an action
plan to promote their adoption by all concerned.389 Positive
deviance has been used to combat seemingly impossible prob-
lems in the community (eg, childhood malnutrition) and in
healthcare settings (eg, reduction of MRSA infections and
improvement in hand hygiene compliance).390 Thus, the CF
community can be innovative and can include the positive
deviance approach to effect change.
Audits and feedback. Auditing healthcare personnel ad-
herence to recommended practices (eg, hand hygiene and
Contact Precautions for patients with MRSA) has become an
important part of routine IP&C and/or quality improvement
programs and is required by credentialing organizations, such
as The Joint Commission. Feedback may occur at any time
and by anyone when a lapse in practice is observed. Trends
of audit results should be provided to clinical teams at regular
intervals (eg, quarterly, semiannually, or annually). Organi-
zational research has demonstrated that the success of ad-
herence to guidelines is determined by the quality of the
feedback.391 Feedback should be timely, individualized, non-
punitive, and customizable and should involve the recipients
of the feedback in the planning of the feedback program.
Thus, collaboration of the CF care team with IP&C staff to
develop an auditing and feedback program is recommended
to facilitate implementation of the recommendations in this
guideline. The interested reader is referred to a discussion of
the theories of feedback interventions.392
IV.C. Hand Hygiene
Hand hygiene is a component of Standard Precautions, which
are practices aimed at preventing the transmission of infec-
tious agents. Standard Precautions are based on the principle
that all blood, body fluids (eg, sputum and saliva), secretions,
excretions (eg, urine, stool, and wound drainage but not
sweat), nonintact skin, and mucous membranes may contain
transmissible infectious agents. Therefore, containing these
potential sources will reduce the risk of transmission of in-
fectious agents. Recommendations for Standard Precautions
are based on strong evidence from healthcare settings that
has been summarized in the CDC/HICPAC 2007 Guideline
for Isolation Precautions.6
Hand hygiene is the single most important measure to
protect people with CF, healthcare personnel, family mem-
bers, and friends from transmission and acquisition of po-
tential infectious agents and to prevent contamination of the
environment. The CDC/HICPAC and the WHO have pub-
lished comprehensive guidelines for hand hygiene in health-
care settings,393,394 and the updated SHEA/IDSA Compendium
of Strategies to Prevent Healthcare-Associated Infections in
Acute Care Hospitals, published in 2014, contains informa-
tion on hand hygiene. Many recommendations in these
guidelines can also be applied to nonhealthcare settings, in-
cluding the home, school, and workplace. Hand hygiene in
nonhealthcare settings has reduced respiratory and gastro-
intestinal tract infections.395,396 Hand hygiene opportunities
for healthcare personnel, people with CF, and families are
summarized in Table 7.
Healthcare personnel should perform thorough hand hy-
giene, as presented in the figures in the 2009 WHO guide-
line,394 before and after contact with patients and whenever
hands are contaminated with respiratory secretions or other
body fluids. Contamination may occur from direct patient
care activities, from contact with surfaces or equipment in a
patient’s environment, and/or following coughing or sneezing
by healthcare personnel. Use of an alcohol-based hand rub
is the preferred hand hygiene method, as these products have
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table 7. Examples of Opportunities for Hand Hygiene by Healthcare Personnel, People with Cystic Fibrosis (CF), and Families
Healthcare personnel People with CF Family members
Entering CF clinic or hospital room X X X
Leaving CF clinic or hospital room X X X
Before or after contact with patient X NA NA
Before and after performing pulmonary function tests X X NA
After obtaining respiratory tract culture X X X
After coughing X X X
Before putting on and after removing gloves X NA NA
When hands are contaminated with respiratory secretions X X X
Before and after cleaning and disinfecting nebulizer equipment X X X
Before donning gloves for performing sterile procedures X NA Xa
After using restroom X X X
note. X, applicable to this population; NA, not applicable to this population.
a If performing activities involving a central venous catheter.
demonstrated greater efficacy in reducing bacterial contam-
ination of hands compared with washing with plain or an-
timicrobial soap and water.393 Alcohol-based hand rubs have
excellent activity against gram-positive and gram-negative
bacteria, including MDROs, NTM, a variety of fungi, and
such viruses as rhinovirus, adenovirus, influenza virus, and
RSV.393,394 However, in healthcare settings soap and water are
used when hands are visibly dirty, sticky, or contaminated
with blood or body fluids. If soap and water are used, an-
timicrobial soap, such as one containing chlorhexidine glu-
conate, is preferred when caring for people with CF. Use of
commercially available antimicrobial soaps in the home is
not recommended, as these products do not provide any
additional benefits compared with nonantibacterial soaps.397
The hands of healthcare personnel caring for people with
CF and the hands of people with CF and their families can
become contaminated with CF pathogens due to contact with
infectious respiratory secretions. In a study conducted in 7
CF clinics, the hand contamination rate among people with
CF (n p 100 participants) was 13.5%, and, in addition, 6.3%
of participants without initial detection of CF pathogens con-
taminated their hands during clinic visits.128
Fingernails are of special concern, as the subungual areas
of hands harbor high concentrations of bacteria.398 Compared
with healthcare personnel with natural nails, those wearing
artificial nails were more likely to harbor gram-negative
organisms on their fingertips before and after hand hy-
giene.399-401 Artificial nails worn by healthcare personnel have
been associated with outbreaks of infectious agents, including
P. aeruginosa.402-405 While no specific studies of the role played
by artificial nails in the transmission of pathogens in CF have
been performed, the clinical experience in ICUs and other
healthcare settings can be applied to CF. Thus, healthcare
personnel who provide care to people with CF should not
wear artificial nails. While studies have not evaluated the risk
of artificial nails worn by people with CF or their families,
it is prudent to avoid this potential risk factor for acquisition
of gram-negative pathogens.
IV.D. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
PPE are wearable barriers intended to protect healthcare per-
sonnel from exposure to or contact with infectious agents.
PPE includes gloves, gowns, facemasks, respirators, and eye
protection (eg, goggles and face shields). Healthcare person-
nel can wear PPE alone or in combination, based on the
anticipated patient interaction and potential for exposure to
blood or body fluids or for exposure to known or suspected
pathogens. PPE is subject to FDA regulations under the device
provisions of the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.406
CDC/HICPAC recommendations for standard and transmis-
sion-based precautions provide detailed indications for PPE
use.6 A summary of the recommended use of PPE by health-
care personnel, people with CF, and their families is provided
in Table 8.
IV.D.1. Gowns and Gloves
Healthcare personnel. As per CDC recommendations,
healthcare personnel wear gowns to protect their skin from
contact with blood and body fluids and to prevent soiling or
contamination of their clothing. Clothing worn by healthcare
personnel can be contaminated with MDROs, including
MRSA, VRE, and gram-negative bacilli.407-410 As per CDC rec-
ommendations, healthcare personnel wear gloves for the fol-
lowing reasons: (1) to prevent possible contact with blood or
body fluids, mucous membranes, nonintact skin, or other
potentially infectious materials; (2) to prevent transmission
of pathogens transmitted by the contact route when having
direct contact with patients colonized or infected with such
pathogens (eg, VRE, MRSA, or RSV); or (3) when handling
or touching visibly or potentially contaminated environmen-
tal surfaces and patient care equipment.5 Gloves worn by
healthcare personnel reduce the transmission of viral and
bacterial pathogens but do not replace hand hygiene—they
are worn in addition to the practice of hand hygiene.411-413
For Contact Precautions, the CDC recommends that health-
care personnel don both gown and gloves on room entry for
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table 8. Use of Personal Protective Equipment by Healthcare Personnel, People with Cystic Fibrosis (CF), and Families
Healthcare personnel People with CF Family members without CF
Gowns Wear when caring for all people
with CF, per Contact Precautions
and per Standard Precautions
Not recommended
Perform hand hygiene as described
in Table 7
Not recommended routinely
Use as defined in local hospital pol-
icy when visiting hospitalized
patients
Perform hand hygiene as described
in Table 7
Gloves Wear when caring for all people
with CF, per Contact Precautions
and per Standard Precautions
Not recommended
Perform hand hygiene as described
in Table 7
Not recommended routinely
Use as defined in local hospital pol-
icy when visiting hospitalized
patients
Perform hand hygiene as described
in Table 7
Masks Wear surgical (also referred to as
isolation or procedure) mask
when caring for patients under
Droplet Precautions
Wear face shield when splashes are
likely to occur as per Standard
Precautions
Wear surgical (also referred to as
isolation or procedure) mask
when in common areas in health-
care settings (eg, corridors, wait-
ing areas, radiology)
Do not wear when in exam room,
in hospital room, or when per-
forming pulmonary function tests
Not recommended in CF clinics
Use as defined by local hospital pol-
icy when visiting hospitalized
patients
Respirator or PAPRa Wear N-95 respirator or PAPR
when caring for patients under
Airborne Precautions
Not recommended
Wear mask as described above
Wear N-95 to enter room for sus-
pected or confirmed tuberculosis
according to hospital policy
a Powered air-purifying respirators (PAPRs) are recommended for individuals who are unable to tolerate or pass a fit test for an N-95
respirator.
all contacts with the patient and/or environmental surfaces
and patient care equipment that could be potentially con-
taminated.5 For Standard Precautions, an isolation gown is
worn only if there is anticipated contact with blood or body
fluids. However, application of appropriate Standard Precau-
tions may be inconsistent, because healthcare personnel can-
not always anticipate potential contact with infectious body
fluids and because PPE are not always readily available.414
All healthcare personnel should wear gowns and gloves
when caring for all people with CF regardless of respiratory
tract culture results. The rationale for the universal use of
gowns and gloves by healthcare personnel caring for people
with CF is that direct and indirect contact with respiratory
secretions that may contain transmissible pathogens is likely
to occur, including through contact with contaminated en-
vironmental surfaces and equipment. Additional support for
this practice is derived from a study in adult medical and
surgical ICUs that demonstrated decreased acquisition of
MRSA in units where healthcare personnel wore gowns and
gloves for all patient contacts and when entering any patient
room.407
People with CF and families/visitors. There are no data
to support a recommendation for people with CF or their
families to wear gowns or gloves in healthcare or nonhealth-
care settings to prevent the transmission or acquisition of
potential pathogens. However, some high-risk units in hos-
pitals may choose to require visitors to wear gowns and
gloves.
IV.D.2. Masks, Eye Protection, and Respirators
Healthcare personnel. As per the CDC recommendations,
facemasks are loose-fitting disposable PPE worn by healthcare
personnel when caring for patients with known or suspected
infections that require Droplet Precautions (eg, influenza, per-
tussis, or adenovirus infection). Masks, in combination with
eye protection, are worn to protect healthcare personnel during
procedures and patient care activities likely to generate splashes
or sprays of blood, body fluids, or secretions (eg, suctioning,
intubation, and operative procedures). These types of masks
may be referred to as surgical, procedure, or isolation masks.
All facemasks are single use and should be changed whenever
damaged, soiled, or damp or if breathing through the mask
becomes difficult. While CF pathogens are transmitted patient
to patient by the droplet route, such pathogens are not trans-
mitted to healthcare personnel. Thus, healthcare personnel are
not required to wear a mask routinely when caring for people
with CF unless there is an infection with a known or suspected
pathogen that requires Droplet Precautions or according to
Standard Precautions as described above.
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A respirator is a tight-fitting device worn on the face, cov-
ering at least the nose and mouth, to reduce the wearer’s risk
of inhaling droplet nuclei containing infectious agents. The
Occupational Safety and Health Administration sets regula-
tory standards for respirator use.415 Healthcare personnel who
may have exposure to airborne infectious agents are medically
evaluated and fit-tested to wear a disposable respirator, usu-
ally one designated N95, which means that while breathing
through it the filter removes 95% of airborne particles.
Healthcare personnel who cannot wear or be adequately fitted
with an N95 respirator may use a PAPR with a disposable
hood. Respirators are worn by all healthcare personnel en-
tering the room of a patient under Airborne Infection Isolation
for pulmonary TB.4,6 Respirators are also worn when per-
forming an aerosol-generating procedure (eg, open suction-
ing, emergency intubation, or bronchoscopy) on a patient
with known or suspected influenza.14 Healthcare personnel
who will be using an N95 respirator should be fit-tested an-
nually to ensure that the proper size is used.
People with CF and families/visitors. Masks prevent ill
individuals from spreading infectious respiratory droplets.
For people entering healthcare settings, availability of face-
masks is an essential component of respiratory hygiene and
cough etiquette, particularly during times of seasonal com-
munity-onset respiratory infections (eg, influenza).6 Masks
are available in adult and child sizes (designed for ages 5–12
years). As described above (Section II), experimental and
clinical data have demonstrated the generation of infectious
droplets by people with CF; these studies confirm the poten-
tial for transmission of CF pathogens to others with CF by
the droplet route.1,120-122,125-127 Thus, to prevent transmission
by the droplet route people with CF should routinely don a
facemask of appropriate size when entering healthcare settings
where they are likely to encounter others with CF. Such set-
tings include the common areas of the CF clinic, when leaving
their hospital room, or when leaving the clinic exam room.
However, it is possible that very young children, people in
respiratory distress, and people exercising may not be able
to tolerate a mask. Such individuals should be instructed to
practice other components of respiratory hygiene (ie, cough
into a tissue, discard the tissue, perform hand hygiene after
coughing, etc) and remain at least 6 feet from others with
CF.
Respirators are not recommended routinely for patient use,
but the CDC recommends that visitors wear respirators when
entering the room of a patient under Airborne Infection Iso-
lation Precautions with suspected or confirmed pulmonary
TB.4
IV.E. Environmental Cleaning and Disinfection
IV.E.1. Overview
Many studies published in the past decade have demonstrated
that contaminated environmental surfaces play a role in the
transmission of healthcare-associated pathogens (eg, MRSA,
VRE, C. difficile, and P. aeruginosa) and that improved en-
vironmental cleaning and disinfection are effective in reduc-
ing the transmission of such pathogens.322-325,416,417 The im-
portance of the principles of environmental contamination
and cleaning and disinfection can be extrapolated to the CF
clinic where surface contamination has been studied exten-
sively.126-128,317 As all people with CF may harbor transmissible
pathogens or are at risk of acquiring such pathogens, envi-
ronmental cleaning and disinfection practices should be im-
plemented when caring for all people with CF.
Four strategies can reduce transmission from contaminated
healthcare surfaces and equipment: (1) improve cleaning and
disinfection of the rooms of patients known to carry health-
care-associated pathogens after discharge (ie, terminal clean-
ing); (2) disinfect high-touch surfaces in isolation rooms
daily; (3) disinfect portable equipment between patients or
use disposable or dedicated equipment in isolation rooms;
and (4) expand efforts to improve cleaning and disinfection
of all rooms if there is concern that patients harboring
MDROs are not identified or are identified after long delays.
Automatic disinfection devices (eg, hydrogen peroxide vapor
and ultraviolet cleaning) are promising but require additional
studies before recommendations for their routine use can be
made.416,418
Contamination of surfaces most often results from the fail-
ure to clean rather than faulty cleaning methods or ineffective
products, which supports the importance of education and
monitoring adherence.326 Standardization of cleaning and dis-
infecting methods, utilizing educational programs, and check-
lists and audits can all improve effectiveness. Three types of
audits after cleaning and disinfecting have been described:
(1) direct observation, (2) use of fluorescein powder or ATP
detection methods to demonstrate the removal of potentially
infectious pathogens, and (3) bacterial cultures of surfaces.
Objective measures utilizing fluorescein dye or ATP detection
are the most effective and practical to implement.419,420 Since
most IP&C departments are currently engaged in monitoring
environmental cleaning, coordination between the CF care
team and the IP&C team is advised. Strategies to enhance
the effectiveness of environmental cleaning in both ambu-
latory and inpatient areas are provided in Table 9. Checklists
and other tools for cleaning and additional background in-
formation are available on the CDC website.419
IV.E.2. Healthcare Facilities: Respiratory Therapy,
Nebulizers, and Diagnostic Equipment
Devices used for respiratory therapy (eg, nebulizers) or for
diagnostic evaluation (eg, bronchoscopes and spirometers)
are potential reservoirs or vehicles for the transmission of
infectious organisms. Routes of transmission may be from a
contaminated device to a patient, from a patient to a patient
via a contaminated device, or from one body site to the
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table 9. Strategies to Enhance the Effectiveness of Environmental Cleaning in Ambulatory and Inpatient Settings for People with Cystic
Fibrosis (CF)
Strategies Elements Monitoring adherence
Type of programs
Level 1 (basic) 1. IP&C program coordinated with EVS with joint
definition of institutional expectations and clearly
stated responsibilities
2. Structured education of EVS staff that includes
techniques of cleaning and disinfection and plans
for monitoring
3. Routine reporting to IP&C and facility leadership
1. Development of measures for monitoring
and identification of individuals to perform
auditing and feedback
2. Interventions to optimize thoroughness of termi-
nal room cleaning to be a standing agenda item
on the IP&C or quality committee agenda
3. Documentation of consideration of moving to
level 2 program in committee minutes
Level 2 (advanced) More comprehensive implementation of above
elements
More comprehensive implementation of above
elements
Checklists Develop checklists for cleaning and disinfecting each
of the following:
a. CF clinic exam room after each patient
b. PFT machines after each patient
c. Common areas of CF clinic daily
d. iPads, computers, medical equipment






Fluorescent marker (eg, Glogerm)
Specialized training Educate CF clinic staff and EVS staff about IP&C
for CF
Appropriate educational level testing to ensure un-
derstanding of rationale for recommendations
note. See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention website for downloadable tools and informational brochures (http://www
.cdc.gov/HAI/toolkits/Evaluating-Environmental-Cleaning.html). EVS, environmental services; IP&C, infection prevention and control;
PFT, pulmonary function test.
respiratory tract of the same patient. Reservoirs of aerosol-
producing devices (eg, nebulizers) are subject to overgrowth
of bacteria that can be aerosolized during device use. Al-
though a patient’s own respiratory flora usually contaminate
nebulizers, it is prudent not to introduce those microorgan-
isms into the lower respiratory tract during aerosol treat-
ments. Thus, processes for proper cleaning and sterilization
or disinfection of reusable equipment are essential compo-
nents of a program to prevent infections of people with CF.
Evidence-based guidelines for the care of bronchoscopes and
other semicritical items have been published, and the latest
developments in reprocessing semicritical items were recently
reviewed.421 Hospitals must follow these recommendations.
Several studies of infections that occurred in association
with contaminated respiratory therapy and diagnostic equip-
ment have provided important insights into preventing such
infections. These include the following: (1) Strict adherence
to aseptic technique is important. (2) Proper training of per-
sonnel responsible for reprocessing equipment is important,
including demonstration of competency initially and then at
least annually, as is consistent adherence to reprocessing
guidelines.421 (3) Single-dose medication vials are always pre-
ferred, due to the risk of contamination349,357,422,423 (if multi-
dose medication vials must be used, then the manufacturer’s
directions for handling, dispensing, and storing must be fol-
lowed precisely to prevent contamination and the transmis-
sion of potential pathogens). (4) Tap water may be used for
cleaning nebulizers and other respiratory therapy equipment,
but sterile water or water processed by filtration (filter size
of less than or equal to 0.2 microns) must be used in the
final rinse because tap water and distilled water may be con-
taminated with CF pathogens.424 Sterile water or properly
filtered water is recommended for filling respiratory therapy
equipment reservoirs (eg, humidifiers), and sterile saline is
recommended for sinus rinses. (5) Equipment should be
cleaned before disinfection or sterilization to ensure that the
sterilization process is maximally effective.7 (6) Air-drying
equipment after it has been cleaned and disinfected is an
essential step prior to storage because items that remain wet
provide favorable conditions for bacterial growth.1,7
Bacterial contamination of nebulizers used during hospi-
talizations has been demonstrated.320 However, methods of
caring for nebulizers in the hospital setting have been widely
disparate424-426 and have included changing nebulizers every
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2–7 days; changing mouthpieces after each use; and rinsing
them with sterile water, drying them, and then placing them
in a plastic bag between uses. In the preparation of recom-
mendations for this guideline, discrepancies in published
guidelines were noted.
Furthermore, there are limited data to inform recommen-
dations for care of disposable nebulizers used in the hospital.
The care of nebulizers was addressed in a study of 30 people
with CF admitted for pulmonary exacerbations who received
aerosolized bronchodilator therapy 4 times daily.427 The neb-
ulizers were not cleaned or disinfected between treatments
but were replaced after 24 hours. Cultures of the residual
fluid inside the nebulizer cup were obtained before admin-
istering successive treatments and prior to discarding the neb-
ulizer after 24 hours of use. None of the 150 nebulizer samples
obtained grew CF pathogens. This study did not address the
use of disposable nebulizers for longer than 24 hours.
Important principles for the care of disposable nebulizers
used in the hospital for individuals with CF are as follows:
(1) nebulizers are for use in a single patient only; (2) when
handling the nebulizer and dispensing the medications, asep-
tic technique should be followed; (3) nebulizers should be
handled away from sinks to prevent contamination; (4) only
sterile water should be used for rinsing nebulizers; (5) after
each use, residual volume should be rinsed out with sterile
water, and masks/mouthpieces should be wiped with an al-
cohol pad; and (6) nebulizer contamination between uses can
be avoided by not placing nebulizers in line with the ventilator
circuit, thereby exposing the nebulizer to tubing condensa-
tion. The safety of storing moist nebulizers in plastic bags is
unknown. Durable, nondisposable nebulizers used in the hos-
pital can be processed in a central sterilization area according
to the methods described below for home use (Section IV.E.4)
if they can be returned to the same patient in time for their
next treatment.
IV.E.3. Nonhealthcare Settings: Nebulizers
Although no published reports have definitively proven that
CF pathogens were acquired from contaminated equipment
during home therapy, bacterial contamination of home neb-
ulizers of people with CF has been documented in several
studies.428-432 Additionally, cleaning and drying home respira-
tory therapy equipment between uses was associated with a
decreased risk of acquiring B. cepacia complex.1 In a study of
experimental contamination of nebulizers, hot water and soap
effectively removed most inoculated bacteria.431 However, these
experimental conditions may not mimic true use by people
with CF, and, as described above, potential pathogens from
environmental sources (eg, tap water) may contaminate equip-
ment inadvertently and thereby cause infection.
Respiratory care equipment used in the home (eg, non-
disposable nebulizers) is durable and designed for long-term
use. Thus, to prevent infections caused by contaminated re-
spiratory therapy equipment used in the home, equipment
should be cleaned, disinfected, and air-dried after each treat-
ment. (1) Equipment must be cleaned well to remove all
organic and inorganic debris before disinfection. After clean-
ing with dish soap and water, disinfect either by immersion
in cold disinfectants or by heat, if permissible by the man-
ufacturer.7 Dried or baked debris on equipment makes re-
moval more difficult, and the disinfection process becomes
less effective or even ineffective.433,434 (2) Equipment must be
disinfected by either heat or cold disinfectant methods, as
permissible by the manufacturer. Heat methods include im-
mersion in continuously boiling water for 5 minutes; washing
in a dishwasher if the equipment is dishwasher safe and the
water achieves a temperature greater than 158F (70C) for
30 minutes;7 use of a microwave oven if the equipment is
microwave safe and can be placed in a bowl of water in a
home microwave oven (2.45 Ghz) for 5 minutes;435-437 or use
of electric steam sterilizer (eg, baby bottle sterilizer).438 Cold
methods include soaking in 70%–90% ethyl or isopropyl al-
cohol for 5 minutes (avoid use near open flames) or in 3%
hydrogen peroxide for 30 minutes.439,440 These preparations
will lose activity over time, and the optimal storage time is
unknown. Vinegar (acetic acid) is not recommended because
it has inadequate activity against some potential CF pathogens
(eg, S. aureus).7,441,442 Bleach is no longer recommended be-
cause a 0.5% hypochlorite solution did not reduce the num-
ber of CF pathogens on home nebulizers.443 Benzyl ammo-
nium chloride (Control III) is also not recommended for use
because it has a narrow spectrum of activity and is slow in
action. Additionally, outbreaks have been related to contam-
ination of this agent.344 (3) Equipment should be rinsed after
use of the cold disinfectant with either sterile water or filtered
(less than or equal to 0.2 microns) water, as described above.
Sterile water can be prepared by boiling tap water and achiev-
ing a rolling boil for 5 minutes. Sterile water can become
contaminated after use and/or storage, but the frequency of
this is unknown. Boiling water immediately before use min-
imizes this possibility. Distilled water is not recommended
for cleaning or rinsing respiratory therapy equipment since
contamination with B. cepacia complex can occur during the
manufacturing process.355
IV.F. Strategies for CF Clinics
Several epidemiologic studies have provided evidence for po-
tential transmission of CF pathogens in CF clinics, as de-
scribed above (Section III.A). While the risk of transmission
in CF clinics cannot be quantified, the health benefits of CF
clinics clearly outweigh the risks of acquisition of CF path-
ogens. The IP&C recommendations for CF clinics are detailed
below and in Table 10.
IV.F.1. Cohort Segregation versus All-Patient Separation
Many CF centers throughout the world practice cohort seg-
regation, whereby separate clinic sessions are held for people
with CF who are infected with the same pathogen. For ex-
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ample, there is a separate clinic for people infected with
MRSA or a separate clinic for people infected with an epi-
demic strain of P. aeruginosa.1,161,185,374,375,444-446 While cohort
segregation has been associated with a reduced incidence of
LES of P. aeruginosa185,373,375,444 and a decrease in the incidence
and prevalence of Burkholderia spp. in the United States,44
additional IP&C practices were also implemented at the same
time. Concurrent practices included recommending no so-
cialization among people with CF in nonhealthcare settings,
alternatives to common waiting rooms, removal of common
toys and books, an emphasis on hand hygiene, single-use
mouthpieces for PFT equipment, and aggressive eradication
protocols for P. aeruginosa.375,444-446 Therefore, it is difficult to
conclude which IP&C practices were most important for suc-
cessfully decreasing transmission.
Furthermore, maintaining cohort segregation is difficult,
as people with CF may (1) harbor more than 1 pathogen,
(2) need urgent care, or (3) have newly identified pathogens
that could change their cohort status. Additionally, respira-
tory tract cultures do not always accurately detect CF path-
ogens, and thus all people with CF could harbor potentially
transmissible pathogens. Specimens obtained from the upper
airway lack sensitivity and specificity for the lower airway.42
Despite standardized protocols for processing CF specimens,
potential pathogens may escape detection due to low organ-
ism burden, overgrowth by other species, or misidentifica-
tion.1,447 Genotyping studies have also demonstrated the po-
tential for replacement of an initial infecting Burkholderia
strain with another strain (ie, superinfection) when CF pa-
tients have been segregated into groups on the basis of in-
fection status.159,448
Many clinicians in centers implementing cohort segrega-
tion have noted the cost, stigmatization, and psychosocial
stresses associated with this practice and emphasize that co-
hort segregation should be considered only when there is
strong epidemiologic and genotypic evidence for transmission
in the CF clinic.185 Thus, cohort segregation could be imple-
mented on a case-by-case basis if ongoing transmission of a
CF pathogen occurs despite implementation of the IP&C rec-
ommendations detailed in this guideline.
To date, studies have not compared the impact of cohort
segregation versus separation of all patients with CF from each
other. Given the lack of definitive support for cohort segre-
gation and the complexity and shortcomings of implementing
cohort segregation, recommendations include separation of all
people with CF, regardless of their respiratory tract culture
results, and practicing the IP&C recommendations detailed in
this guideline. Additionally, given the adverse clinical impact
of many CF pathogens, including MRSA, epidemic strains of
P. aeruginosa, and Burkholderia spp. (Section III.A), and the
insensitivity of respiratory tract cultures to accurately detect all
CF pathogens,1 maintaining a separate cohort for Burkholderia-
infected individuals is not recommended.
IV.F.2. CF Clinic Logistics
As previously described, infectious droplets can travel 6 feet
(2 meters; Section II.C).6 Thus, all people with CF (unless
they live in the same household) should be separated by at
least 6 feet (2 meters) from others with CF to reduce the risk
of droplet transmission.128,447 Strategies to schedule and man-
age people with CF in clinics must include minimizing wait-
ing time in a common reception area or waiting room. Such
strategies could include placement of the individual with CF
in an exam room on arrival, use of a pager system if a room
is unavailable, a staggered clinic schedule, portable pulmo-
nary function testing, and rotating CF team members into
the exam room (Table 9).
IV.F.3. Hand Hygiene
People with CF and their accompanying family members
should perform hand hygiene on entering and leaving a CF
clinic as well as throughout the clinic visit, as contact with
respiratory secretions can occur during coughing, sneezing,
or contact with contaminated environmental surfaces or
equipment. Hand hygiene recommendations for healthcare
personnel, people with CF, and their families are described
in Section IV.C and in Table 7. To promote hand hygiene,
all ambulatory areas should have appropriate supplies for
hand hygiene, including conveniently placed alcohol-based
hand rub in the entryway into the CF clinic, the waiting room,
exam rooms, PFT laboratories, and restrooms.6,393,394 Fur-
thermore, when hand hygiene is not witnessed, people with
CF and their families should be empowered to remind health-
care personnel to perform hand hygiene.
IV.F.4. Mask Use by People with CF
In the 2003 Infection Control Guideline for CF, the routine
use of masks by people with CF was an unresolved issue be-
cause of a lack of supporting evidence that masks prevented
transmission of CF pathogens. In a survey of IP&C practices
conducted in CF centers in the United States in 2005, some
centers (27/76 [35%]) used masks in the ambulatory setting,
but the benefits of this practice had not been studied.449 How-
ever, recent studies have found infectious droplets in the air
of CF clinics (Section III). This supports the use of masks
by people with CF to both contain infectious droplets and
prevent acquisition of potential pathogens.127,128
Thus, all people with CF should wear a mask of appropriate
size in healthcare facilities to reduce droplet transmission and
acquisition of CF pathogens. Mask use by people with CF is
consistent with CDC recommendations to prevent droplet
transmission of pathogens by infected patients and to prevent
the acquisition of potential pathogens by susceptible individ-
uals. Masks should be worn throughout the healthcare facility
unless the individual with CF is in an exam room or per-
forming PFTs.6 To facilitate mask use, all CF clinics should
provide masks of different sizes on entry into the clinic. Some
centers have chosen to implement mask use via respiratory
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hygiene stations on entry into the facility. Reminders, in-
cluding signs in ambulatory settings, can instruct individuals
with CF to contain their secretions, that is, to wear a mask,
cough into a tissue, immediately discard the soiled tissue into
a trash receptacle, and perform hand hygiene after contact
with respiratory secretions.6,450
IV.F.5. Gown and Glove Use by Healthcare Personnel
Gowns and gloves should be worn by all healthcare personnel
caring for all people with CF in healthcare settings. The use
of gowns and gloves by healthcare personnel in CF clinics is
consistent with the principles of Contact Precautions and Stan-
dard Precautions (Section IV.D.1), as all individuals with CF
may harbor potentially transmissible pathogens. By wearing
gowns and gloves when caring for people with CF, healthcare
personnel protect their clothing and hands from possible con-
tamination due to direct or indirect contact with respiratory
secretions and thus avoid serving as vehicles for the trans-
mission of CF pathogens. To facilitate the use of gowns and
gloves, all CF clinics must ensure ready availability of gowns
and gloves of different sizes in a location convenient to room
entry so they can be put on prior to entering the room. They
should be removed in the room and discarded in a covered
receptacle. Furthermore, people with CF and their families
should be empowered to remind healthcare personnel to wear
appropriate PPE on entry into their rooms.
IV.F.6. Pulmonary Function Testing
PFTs often generate coughing and involve the use of common
equipment. Thus, IP&C practices when performing PFTs
must be implemented to minimize the transmission of CF
pathogens by contact with contaminated equipment and/or
by infectious droplets. Hand hygiene should be performed
by healthcare personnel and people with CF before and after
performing PFTs to prevent hand contamination by potential
pathogens. Healthcare personnel performing PFTs should
wear gowns and gloves (changing these after each patient) to
prevent soiling of clothing and hand contamination with po-
tential pathogens. Droplets can be detected at least 6 feet
from people with CF performing PFTs, and these droplets
clear the air 30 minutes after performing PFTs.125 To minimize
exposure to infectious droplets, PFTs should be performed
using one of the following options: (1) in the exam room at
the beginning of the clinic visit, allowing 30 minutes to elapse
between CF patients; (2) in a negative pressure room (AIIR);
(3) in a PFT laboratory with HEPA filters; or (4) in a PFT
laboratory without HEPA filters, allowing 30 minutes to
elapse between individuals with CF.
HEPA filters remove 99.97% of particles (more than or
equal to 0.3 microns in diameter) from the air that passes
through the filter. HEPA filters are used to protect hemato-
poietic stem cell transplant recipients in a Protective Envi-
ronment from mold infections and can be used to prevent
the spread of airborne bacterial and viral infections if air is
recirculated in AIIRs.6 HEPA filters can be located centrally
in the air handler that supplies a specific unit or building or
may be located at the point of use within a room. HEPA
filters must have a preventive maintenance program of mon-
itoring and replacement in accordance with the manufac-
turer’s recommendations to ensure continued filtration ef-
ficiency.451 HEPA filters with metal frames are recommended
rather than those with wood frames, which can get wet and
become contaminated with potential pathogens. The effec-
tiveness of a portable HEPA unit depends on (1) room con-
figuration, (2) the amount of furniture and people in the
room, (3) placement of the unit, and (4) location of the air
supply and exhaust registers.2 Portable HEPA units should be
capable of recirculating all or nearly all of the room air
through the HEPA filter and should achieve the equivalent
of more than or equal to 12 air exchanges per hour.452 The
facility’s engineering department can assist with information
regarding air changes.
Ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI) has been used
as an adjunct air-cleaning measure in healthcare settings to
reduce transmission of bacterial and viral infections.2 UVGI
can be used within air handling units to disinfect air prior
to recirculation or as upper room air irradiation (ie, lamps
suspended from the ceiling or mounted on the wall). Imple-
mentation of upper room air irradiation requires air mixing
between the lower patient care area and the upper room air.
There is also concern about the potential for UV light to
damage the eyes of people in the rooms. Regular maintenance
of UVGI systems is required and includes keeping the bulbs
free of dust and replacing old bulbs when needed. Many
experts do not recommend UVGI as a substitute for HEPA
filtration.2
IV.F.7. Environmental Practices
In CF clinics, there are numerous opportunities for contam-
ination of environmental surfaces and equipment, such as
exam tables, PFT equipment, and high-touch objects (eg,
doorknobs). Thus, healthcare personnel in CF clinics and PFT
laboratories must ensure that the equipment and horizontal
surfaces that people with CF may touch are cleaned and dis-
infected after each CF patient by using a 1-step process and
EPA-registered hospital-grade disinfectant/detergent designed
for housekeeping.1 This includes cleaning and disinfecting
common equipment used for individuals with CF (eg, steth-
oscopes, demonstration equipment for chest physiotherapy,
pulse oximeters, and the outside of PFT equipment). The
same principles of cleaning, disinfecting, and auditing of
cleaning presented in Section IV.E.2 and the tools presented
in Table 10 apply to CF clinics and PFT laboratories. Envi-
ronmental service personnel trained in the principles of CF
IP&C should be available during the hours that people with
CF are cared for in the ambulatory clinic to assist the CF
care team to ensure appropriate environmental cleaning and
disinfection.
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Use of common items, such as toys, books, pens, and com-
puters, should be avoided in CF clinics. Instead, patients and
families should be encouraged to bring such items with them
to the clinic for their own personal use. A recent study ad-
dressed the potential of mobile handheld devices (MHDs; eg,
iPads) to serve as reservoirs for potential pathogens and cre-
ated the iPBundle.453 The iPBundle includes (1) use of a wa-
terproof, nonporous MHD case; (2) disinfection of the MHD
as per institutional policies for noncritical items; (3) regular
disinfection by setting an alarm on the MHD; and (4) hand
hygiene before and after MHD use.
IV.F.8. Use of Restrooms
In the 2003 Infection Control Guideline for CF, use of com-
mon restrooms in ambulatory settings was an unresolved is-
sue.1 While no studies have shown acquisition of potential
CF pathogens from restrooms, these are common areas in
ambulatory settings, including CF clinics. Thus, people with
CF should wear a mask while using the restroom and should
perform hand hygiene before and after using the restroom.
Education, providing proper EPA-registered hospital-grade
disinfectant/detergent, and signage describing these practices
can facilitate adherence to this recommendation. When new
clinic areas are designed, single-person-use restrooms are
preferred.
IV.G. Hospital Room Placement and Transmission-
Based Precautions
Single-patient rooms with bathrooms that are not shared with
other patients are preferred for all non-CF and CF patients
who may harbor MDROs to reduce the risk of transmission.5,6
For people with CF, it is reasonable for individuals who reside
in the same household to share a room. The following types
of isolation are relevant when caring for people with CF.
Contact Precautions are intended to prevent direct and
indirect transmission of infectious agents between patients,
prevent transmission from patients to healthcare personnel,
and prevent transmission from healthcare personnel to pa-
tients. On the basis of the knowledge that we now have about
person-to-person transmission of CF pathogens (Section
III.A) and the possibility of a person with CF harboring an
undetected pathogen, Contact Precautions are recommended
for ALL hospitalized people with CF. When caring for patients
under Contact Precautions, all healthcare personnel must put
on a gown and gloves on entry into the room and discard
the gown and gloves before exiting the room. Availability of
PPE either outside the room or within the room at the point
of entry is necessary to ensure adherence to the recommended
use. Since bacterial contamination of surfaces and equipment
in a patient room can occur, gown and gloves are recom-
mended even if healthcare personnel do not intend to touch
the patient. Medical equipment (eg, stethoscopes or blood
pressure cuffs) should be dedicated to the patient while under
Contact Precautions. Cleaning and disinfection of surfaces and
equipment should be performed according to hospital policy.
A surgical (procedure or isolation) mask or face shield should
be added according to Standard Precautions if there is likely
to be a splash of respiratory secretions.
Droplet Precautions are intended to protect healthcare per-
sonnel from becoming infected by pathogens transmitted by
the droplet route (eg, influenza virus, adenovirus, Bordetella
pertussis, or M. pneumoniae). When caring for patients under
Droplet Precautions, all healthcare personnel must wear a sur-
gical (procedure or isolation) mask on entry into the patient
room. Droplet Precautions are recommended only when car-
ing for people with CF with suspected or proven infection
with pathogens that could cause disease in healthcare per-
sonnel and are spread by the droplet route. People with CF
who require Droplet Precautions will also be under Contact
Precautions; therefore, gowns and gloves in addition to a mask
will be required on entry into the room.
Airborne Infection Isolation is intended to protect health-
care personnel, other patients, and visitors from contracting
infections transmitted by droplet nuclei (eg, M. tuberculosis,
varicella-zoster virus, or measles virus). All healthcare per-
sonnel entering an AIIR that is housing patients with proven
or suspected TB must wear an N95 respirator or a PAPR
(Section IV.D.2). AIIRs utilize engineering controls to prevent
airborne transmission of infectious agents that remain sus-
pended in the air and travel long distances along air currents.2
AIIRs that have been renovated or constructed since 2001
must have more than or equal to 12 air exchanges per hour,
and those renovated or constructed prior to 2001 must have
more than or equal to 6 air exchanges per hour. AIIRs must
be under negative pressure (eg, the direction of the airflow
from the corridor is into the room). Preferably, the air in an
AIIR is exhausted to the outside, but it can be recirculated
if filtered through a HEPA filter.
People with CF who are positive for AFB for the first time
are more likely to have NTM than TB. However, while TB
is uncommon in people with CF, it can occur in those who
live in geographic locations with TB or with a history of
potential risk factors for TB, including exposure to others
with TB, foreign birth, or foreign travel to countries with
high rates of TB. Airborne Infection Isolation is recommended
for people with CF until NTM has been confirmed and M.
tuberculosis has been ruled out. However, in consultation with
local IP&C staff, the use of AIIR can be guided by a risk
assessment if the person who is AFB positive has no risk
factors for TB and lives in a geographic location with a very
low incidence of TB. Furthermore, if there is evidence within
a CF center that NTM are being transmitted by the airborne
route, then people infected with NTM should be placed in
AIIRs whenever they are hospitalized. People with CF who
require Airborne Infection Isolation will also be under Contact
Precautions; therefore, gowns and gloves in addition to an
N95 respirator will be required on entry into the room.
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IV.H. Construction and Renovation
CDC recommendations for preventing infection by filamen-
tous fungi during construction, renovation, remediation, re-
pair, and demolition should be followed in all healthcare
facilities.2 CDC recommendations for preventing nosocomial
aspergillosis and managing potential outbreaks of aspergillosis
should be followed by institutional IP&C departments.372,424
IV.I. Nonhealthcare Settings
Applying the IP&C principles developed for healthcare set-
tings in nonhealthcare settings is challenging. The informa-
tion provided in this section is intended to assist people with
CF and their family and friends to make prudent decisions
for their activities outside healthcare settings. An IP&C guide-
line for individuals residing in Ronald McDonald Houses or
similar residential facilities is one example of how IP&C in
healthcare settings may be adapted to other settings.454 Fam-
ilies of children with CF can now expect such facilities to be
knowledgeable about the importance of separating people
with CF from each other and can expect this accommodation.
Families should be empowered to request this accommoda-
tion if it is not in place.
IV.I.1. Camps and Educational Retreats
In historic descriptions of CF camps or educational overnight
retreats involving more than 1 person with CF, many op-
portunities for transmission of CF pathogens existed. Close
contact between individuals with CF was difficult to avoid,
and activities causing coughing were common. Given the
strong evidence of person-to-person spread of CF pathogens
in CF camps and educational retreats, people with CF should
not participate in these settings with others with CF.151,455-457
However, people with CF are encouraged to attend camps
and retreats with individuals without CF.
IV.I.2. Indoor Events
Given the risks of person-to-person spread of CF pathogens
within healthcare and nonhealthcare settings, the risk of
transmission of CF pathogens between people with CF who
attend indoor events at the same time is also present. While
the risk of transmission of CF pathogens appears to be greater
with epidemic strains of specific pathogens (Section III), the
risk cannot be quantified for specific microorganisms. Ad-
ditionally, the risk of transmission is likely to be higher in
small enclosed spaces (eg, in a car or small conference room),
but the risk associated with specific indoor events cannot be
quantified. Furthermore, there are opportunities for individ-
uals with CF to have inadvertent contact within indoor event
spaces (eg, in elevators, at vendor booths, in hallways, or in
restrooms). Thus, it is recommended that only 1 person with
CF attend indoor events and that accommodations for non-
face-to-face contact, such as webcasts or teleconferences, be
encouraged.
IV.I.3. Outdoor Events
Many of the concerns related to the transmission of CF path-
ogens due to contamination of surfaces or droplet transmis-
sion are minimized at outdoor events. However, if more than
1 person with CF attends such an event, they should be sep-
arated by at least 6 feet, should avoid congregating in com-
mon areas, should avoid participating in common activities
(eg, face painting or meals), and should not travel to the
event in the same vehicle unless they reside in the same house-
hold. Some CF centers offer strategies to avoid inadvertent
contact, for example, identifying people with CF to one an-
other by wearing a colored shirt or a large decorative pin or
by providing box meals rather than open buffets.
IV.I.4. Schools
The risk of transmission of CF pathogens associated with
school if more than 1 child with CF attends the same school
is unknown. People with CF and their parents or legal guard-
ians are not obligated to disclose the diagnosis of CF or the
results of respiratory tract cultures to school personnel. Such
information must be maintained as confidential medical in-
formation unless the person with CF and/or his or her parent
or legal guardian choose to make this information known.
However, the student with CF whose diagnosis is disclosed
will benefit from the disclosure, as school personnel can then
be educated about CF and IP&C principles. This educational
process can ensure the implementation of IP&C practices that
will benefit all students and staff (eg, hand hygiene and re-
spiratory hygiene practices). Thus, provisions for hand hy-
giene and respiratory hygiene must be available for all stu-
dents and for school personnel.
If more than 1 child with CF attends the same school,
disclosure of the diagnosis of CF will allow schools to make
recommended accommodations to minimize the risk of
transmission of CF pathogens. Students with CF and their
families should discuss these recommendations with school
leadership to ensure that accommodations can be imple-
mented within a specific school and then work closely with
school personnel to determine how best to implement them.
The following accommodations can minimize the risk of
transmission of CF pathogens: (1) Students with CF should
be placed in separate classrooms. If they must use the same
classroom at different times, they should not use the same
desk or work station. (2) Students with CF should be assigned
different restrooms, encouraged to carry their own water bot-
tles, avoid using public water fountains or use different water
fountains, and have lockers as far as possible from each other.
(3) Students with CF should be scheduled separately for com-
mon activities, including lunch, physical education, and re-
cess. (4) Students with CF should be assigned to separate
offices to report for routine medications or if they become
ill while at school. (5) Students with CF should not be ex-
cluded from group activities, such as large assemblies or pep
rallies. Such activities are a crucial part of school life, academic
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development, and socialization. Students with CF should en-
ter and leave the communal areas using different routes from
one another and sit as far apart as possible.
Because each school setting is different, strategies may dif-
fer from school to school. Many of the strategies recom-
mended for schools may be applicable to day care centers or
university settings as well. Additional strategies for schools
can be found at the CF Foundation’s website (http://www
.cff.org).
IV.I.5. Prevention of Viral Transmission and
Immunizations
Strategies to prevent all people (including those with CF)
from acquiring respiratory pathogens include (1) hand hy-
giene, (2) respiratory hygiene, (3) routine vaccinations, (4)
influenza vaccinations, and, when relevant, (5) antiviral che-
moprophylaxis for influenza (eg, oseltamivir).458 Antiviral
treatment for influenza should be initiated as early as possible
to shorten the duration of symptoms and reduce influenza
complications. Antiviral agents are approximately 70%–90%
effective in preventing influenza and serve as useful adjuvants
to vaccination. People without CF who have acute respiratory
illness should avoid close contact with individuals with CF
and not share personal items.
Vaccinations for people with CF. Vaccines are critically
important for people with CF to maintain their health and
minimize the risk of morbidity and mortality from vaccine-
preventable illness. The ACIP has guidance for age-appro-
priate vaccination schedules that is updated each year.115,459,460
Additional updates are published as needed throughout the
year. People with CF should receive the same recommended
vaccinations as people without CF; many recommended vac-
cines prevent respiratory tract infections that could exacerbate
CF lung disease, including influenza, pertussis, and pneu-
mococcal vaccines.271 The CF care team should be informed
about changes in immunization recommendations. The most
recent update affecting people with CF is the expanded use
of pneumococcal conjugate vaccine 13 in individuals more
than 2 years of age with chronic lung conditions.461
Currently, there are no commercially available vaccines for
such CF bacterial pathogens as P. aeruginosa or S. aureus.
Trials have not found investigational vaccines to be effica-
cious.462-464
Vaccinations for family members and close contacts of
people with CF. Vaccination of family members and close
contacts of people with CF can help to protect people with
CF from vaccine-preventable illnesses. Annual influenza vac-
cine is recommended for all family members and close con-
tacts of people with CF.465 This is especially important among
the close contacts of infants with CF who may be too young
to receive some vaccines, particularly influenza vaccine. The
term “cocooning” describes this concept and is advocated for
pertussis and influenza.466 For example, women immunized
against influenza during pregnancy had fewer respiratory tract
illnesses in the 6 months after delivery, and their infants had
fewer febrile illnesses.467,468 There are also guidelines for vac-
cination of people who are immunocompromised that are
applicable to individuals with CF who have undergone trans-
plantation and their close contacts.469
Vaccinations for healthcare personnel. Recent ACIP
guidelines have expanded recommendations for healthcare
personnel.459,460 These recommendations are relevant for the
CF care team and include immunization or immunity to
mumps, measles, rubella, varicella, pertussis, and hepatitis B
as well as annual influenza immunization.465
V. Healthcare Personnel with CF
More and more people with CF are living longer, productive
adult lives. The following findings reported in the 2012
CFFPR demonstrate the growing need for career counseling
for adolescents and young adults: (1) the median predicted
survival in 2012 was 41.1 years, nearly 10 years longer than
the 31.3 year median survival reported in 2002; (2) 49% of
individuals in the CFFPR were 18 years of age or older; and
(3) nearly 45% of adults with CF were employed (11.8%
were employed part time, and 33.6% were employed full
time).21
Six studies have reported that 50% of the CF population
studied was working and that approximately 50% of those
individuals were working in professional occupations, al-
though there was no specific information on healthcare pro-
fessions.470 Similarly, a 2003 monograph containing general
information on CF in the workplace471 did not specifically
address healthcare professions. Guidelines for adult CF care
programs in the United States,472 for nurses participating in
this care transition in Ireland,473 and a recent study of the
health outcomes of adults who transitioned from pediatric
to adult care centers474 did not discuss providing career coun-
seling to individuals with CF who were interested in health-
care professions.
While anecdotal experiences suggest that healthcare pro-
fessions have attracted individuals with CF, few published data
exist to inform decisions on choosing a career in healthcare.
In the United Kingdom, a survey of adults with CF conducted
in 1994 found that 6.6% of respondents worked in healthcare
or closely related professions.475 Ten CF associations and
prominent CF center directors worldwide were surveyed, and
none of the 4 countries responding had a written policy for
managing healthcare personnel with CF.476 A French associ-
ation reported that 19% of adults with CF were working in
service fields (eg, education, healthcare, and social care).476
The relevance of these studies is uncertain; all were conducted
prior to the recent era of improved outcomes for adults with
CF.
There are no published reports of transmission of infec-
tious agents between healthcare personnel with CF and their
patients. Thus, the frequency of such events is likely to be
low and goes unrecognized or unreported. Thus, current rec-
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ommendations for healthcare personnel with CF must be
based on common sense, prudence, and individual health
status. An editorial and a review article recommended the
following considerations for an individual with CF selecting
a healthcare profession: (1) the infectious risk to healthcare
personnel with CF from healthcare exposures will vary ac-
cording to the patient population cared for and the healthcare
environment; (2) the infectious risks to patients from health-
care personnel with CF will vary according to the severity of
CF disease, frequency of coughing, types of CF pathogens,
and the ability of the individual with CF to follow source-
containment recommendations; and (3) individuals with CF
should consider the physical challenges and the ability to per-
form CF treatments during and after training when selecting
a healthcare profession.476,477
The only definite restriction for healthcare personnel with
CF is that he or she should not work with patients with CF
or other healthcare personnel with CF. With the stricter IP&C
practices recommended in this guideline, it will become more
challenging for people with CF to work in a healthcare en-
vironment where other people with CF receive care. For ex-
ample, it is not feasible that healthcare personnel with CF
could wear a mask routinely in healthcare settings. In con-
trast, such individuals should wear masks as previously de-
scribed for all healthcare personnel (Section IV.D.2) and when
they are in areas frequented by people with CF. Family mem-
bers of individuals with CF can work in healthcare professions
without restrictions.
Adolescents and young adults interested in healthcare pro-
fessions should seek advice from members of their CF care
team to learn about lower-risk options and to receive advice
based on their own health status. This type of counseling
should be incorporated, when relevant, into programs for
transition from pediatric to adult CF care.
Individuals with CF who work in a healthcare profession
are encouraged to disclose their diagnosis to their occupa-
tional health service to determine the safest work assignment.
The occupational health service must comply with Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act requirements478
as relevant. The employment laws that govern the protections
and procedures for healthcare personnel with CF include the
Americans with Disabilities Act and section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act as summarized in the 2003 Infection Control
Guideline for CF.1
VI. Psychosocial and Medical Impact of
Transmission-Based Isolation Precautions
Acknowledging the potential psychosocial and medical im-
pact of IP&C recommendations for people with CF, their
families, and the CF care team is critical to overcome chal-
lenges to implementation and to promote consistent imple-
mentation of the recommendations. While few studies have
been performed in CF, there are several relevant studies per-
formed in other patient populations.
Studies among non-CF patients. Studies have examined
the impact of transmission precautions among non-CF pa-
tients with MRSA, TB, or SARS-CoV infection or with
cancer.479-482 Patients placed under Transmission Precautions
may experience increased anxiety, depression, loneliness, and
stress as well as anger and hostility.483,484 Compared with con-
trol patients, adult patients isolated for MRSA were more
likely to have preventable adverse events (eg, falls, ulcers, or
fluid and electrolyte abnormalities), to complain about their
care, to have fewer vital signs taken, and to have more days
without physician progress notes.485 Two systematic reviews
similarly concluded that patients under Contact Precautions
had less contact with healthcare personnel; decreased satis-
faction with their care; more noninfectious adverse events,
including decubitus ulcers and falls; delayed transfer to long-
term care facilities; and more symptoms consistent with anx-
iety and depression.486,487 Inconsistent use of PPE by health-
care personnel or the time required to put on PPE was
confusing and troubling to patients and increased their
anxiety.479
Others found that patients under Contact Precautions were
more likely to have symptoms of depression and anxiety at
the time of admission but were not at increased risk of de-
veloping depression, anxiety, or negative moods during hos-
pitalization.488 Similarly, personal attributes were associated
with the development of depression and anxiety rather than
the use of isolation precautions.479
Not all the psychosocial effects of isolation precautions are
negative. Short-term infection prevention measures did not
influence patients’ level of anxiety, depression, or quality of
life, but such patients had a positive attitude toward the pre-
cautions used.484 Some patients felt they had more freedom
from ward routines and more control over their own activ-
ities. Some liked the privacy and quiet, particularly at night.479
Studies among people with CF. Parents and children with
CF 10 years of age and older were surveyed about their
center’s segregation policy, whereby children with CF were
provided single rooms when hospitalized and had to remain
in their room throughout hospitalization.489 The majority
agreed with the policy and understood that it was intended
to maintain the children’s health. Most parents felt that the
health benefits outweighed the negative impacts, including
social isolation. Parents worried about boredom, being able
to keep their child in the hospital room, and the increased
burden of entertaining their child. However, they also ex-
pressed relief at not having to worry about cross infection.
The primary concerns expressed by the children were bore-
dom and isolation. Factors that influenced the children’s
opinions were level of maturity, stage of development, and
their experiences during previous admission(s). Following the
spread of an epidemic clone of P. aeruginosa, the majority
(85%) of parents and children with CF 12 years of age and
older (63%) gave favorable responses for the need for cohort
segregation, although negative responses were largely from
the adolescent age group.490
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table 11. Possible Strategies to Minimize the Adverse Psychosocial Impact of Isolation Precautions
among People with Cystic Fibrosis (CF)
Incorporate people with CF and their families into discussion of daily plan of care
Encourage visits from individuals without CF
Provide additional activities to help children pass the time (eg, art supplies, board and card games)
Provide television, DVDs, and video games
Consider animal-assisted therapy
Enlist visits from child life staff or volunteers
Provide computer and e-mail access
Provide written and individualized information about the need for isolation precautions
Increase psychological support
Bring familiar items from home
Allow to leave room (if feasible) accompanied by a trained staff member at least once daily
Arrange single-patient use of play room with cleaning after individual leaves
Provide daily schedule of medically related interventions
Ensure consistent communication with healthcare personnel
Interventions to minimize the impact of isolation pre-
cautions. The CDC recommends that hospitals should an-
ticipate and counteract possible anxiety, depression, percep-
tions of stigma, reduced contact with healthcare personnel,
and other adverse events that may result from isolation pre-
cautions.5,6 Interventions to improve communication and
physical facilities can ameliorate the negative effects; patient
satisfaction was highest among isolated patients who were
kept informed about their care.491 Providing both written and
individualized information with improved communication
from staff can increase satisfaction and positive emotions.492
Increasing psychological support is also helpful. Investi-
gators emphasize that patients in isolation require frequent
contact with other people, including visitors and healthcare
personnel, to prevent boredom and loneliness.492-494 Com-
munication can be enhanced by human touch and humor
displayed by healthcare personnel, especially by nurses who
generally spend more time at the bedside.
Parents of children with CF emphasized that providing play
therapy services, televisions, video games and movies, toys,
crayons, and structured daily activities (eg, physiotherapy,
school, pet therapy, and exercise) can reduce the impact of
isolation.489,492,494,495 Children suggested that access to the In-
ternet, mobile phones, and interactive resources and being
able to leave their rooms would make isolation more toler-
able.489 Physical facilities can also be altered to decrease the
impact of isolation. Familiar items from home, such as pic-
tures or personal belongings, can decrease the impact of iso-
lation, as can providing patients with windows that view the
ward or the outdoors.492,494 Possible strategies to minimize the
adverse psychosocial impact of isolation precautions are pro-
vided in Table 11.
Online social networking. Online social networking can
provide an opportunity for adults and children with CF to
communicate with each other about personal issues and to
give and receive valuable peer support outside the healthcare
setting.496 CFfone has been developed to provide an inter-
vention to improve adherence in adolescents with CF via a
web-enabled cell phone that provides CF information and
social support.497 However, CF caregivers should recognize
both the power and the potential risks of these tools, should
face-to-face meetings result from the communication initi-
ated by online resources.
Thus, while IP&C practices serve to protect people with
CF from acquiring or spreading pathogens, awareness of the
potential adverse effects of isolation should prompt the CF
care team, people with CF, and their families to implement
strategies designed to alleviate negative effects. This could
improve adherence to IP&C practices and improve the quality
of healthcare encounters.
VII. Challenges to Implementation of IP&C
Recommendations
Challenges experienced by healthcare personnel. Potential
challenges to implementation of healthcare guidelines include
knowledge, attitude, and practice barriers.498 Relevant chal-
lenges and potential solutions to enhance implementation of
the IP&C in CF guideline are displayed in Tables 12498,499 and
13. Several barriers to implementation of the 2003 Infection
Control Guideline for CF were identified among healthcare
personnel (n p 528). These included lack of awareness of
the guidelines (40%), lack of familiarity with the recommen-
dation to discourage socialization among hospitalized people
with CF (31%), disagreement with the recommendation to
discourage socialization (32%), and lack of confidence (self-
efficacy) that the respondent could discourage socialization
(48%).499 Lack of self-efficacy was strongly associated with
poor adherence to the recommendation to educate people
with CF to perform hand hygiene and to disinfect their neb-
ulizers. Others have similarly reported that recommendations
that require counseling and education of patients are asso-
ciated with a lack of self-efficacy by providers.498
Most respondents (84%) caring for individuals with CF
believed that implementation of the guideline would improve
the health outcomes of their patients.499 Access to a copy of
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table 12. Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practice Barriers Related to Implementing the Infection Prevention and Control Guideline in Cystic
Fibrosis (CF)
Category, paradigm Barrier Potential solutions
Knowledge
Lack of awareness or
familiarity
No knowledge of infection prevention and
control guideline or no familiarity with
specific recommendations
Easy access to guidelines
Review recommendations with CF care team and inpa-
tient staff
Lack of education No provision of education to healthcare
personnel or to people with CF or
families
Engage people with CF and their families
Develop easy-to-understand, eye-catching educational
handouts/brochures
Provide education and booster education in age- and
language-appropriate form
Attitudes
Lack of agreement Disagreement with specific
recommendations
Review evidence, provide rationale
Lack of self-efficacy Not confident can practice specific
recommendations
Provide models of best implementation practices and
skills workshops
Identify successful patient models
Lack of outcome expectancy Do not believe recommended practice can
improve health outcomes
Track center-specific and national trends to link adher-
ence to outcomes and share with staff, patients, and
families
Inertia of current practice Believe recommendations are ineffective or
not applicable and reluctant to change
familiar practices
Share quality improvement initiatives and successful in-
terventions among CF centers
Recruit early adaptors, positive deviants
Practices
Lack of resources Lack of time, money, personnel, space,
supplies, equipment, and/or administra-
tive support
Belief that practices are inconvenient,
time-consuming, costly
Engage with infection prevention and control teams




Perform quality improvement initiatives and report out-
comes to staff, families and administrators
Anticipate and monitor for unintended consequences
note. Modeled after Cabana et al498 and Garber et al.499
the 2003 Infection Control Guideline for CF was associated
with increased agreement with the recommendations and in-
creased self-efficacy. Notably, physicians were more likely to
have a copy of the guideline than other members of the CF
care team. Interventions to overcome the lack of self-efficacy
could include didactic lectures, practical skills workshops and
training, and sharing best practices by early adopters of the
recommendations (Section IV.B).500
Challenges experienced by people with CF and their fam-
ilies. Potential challenges related to implementation of the
2003 Infection Control Guideline for CF experienced by peo-
ple with CF and the parents of children with CF were also
explored.381 Among 1,399 respondents, 65% were aware of
the guideline. Of those aware, 34% reported that they had
never discussed the guideline with their CF care team, and
only 30% reported that they had discussed the guideline more
than once. More than 1 discussion with the CF care team
was associated with increased knowledge, self-efficacy, and
outcome expectancy. This suggests that booster or enhanced
education could reduce barriers to implementation of IP&C
practices. While 83% knew that germs could be transmitted
person to person, only 64% and 59% knew that people with
CF should avoid close contact even when not coughing or
in the CF clinic, respectively. Most respondents were advised
to perform hand hygiene (80%), to avoid close contact with
others with CF (70%), and to clean their nebulizers (90%).
However, fewer were educated about specific practices, such
as performing hand hygiene when entering (39%) or leaving
(49%) the CF clinic or cleaning their nebulizer after each use
(69%). Few respondents believed that their health outcomes
could be improved by avoiding close contact during hospi-
talization (30%) or in the CF clinic (32%). These findings
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table 13. Strategies to Enhance Implementation of the Infection Prevention and Control Guideline among Healthcare Personnel,
People with Cystic Fibrosis (CF), and Families of People with CF
Strategies for Implementing Education Programs
Use of the language and level of understanding most appropriate to the audience, including different groups of healthcare personnel,
people with CF, and their families
Provide rationale for recommendations to healthcare personnel, people with CF, and their families
Identify and utilize early adapters/positive deviants among different groups of healthcare personnel, people with CF, and their
families
Involve patients and families in problem solving and developing educational tools
Provide education that does not require people with CF being together in the same room (eg, webinars, Internet, apps)
Encourage family members who do not have CF to attend group education sessions
Distinguish “must dos” from other information provided to guide prudent decision making
Healthcare personnel, people with CF, and their families can network with other CF centers
Continually strive to develop innovative methods of education for healthcare personnel, people with CF, and their families and share
with others
Strategies for Audit and Feedback
Involve healthcare personnel who will be recipients of feedback in planning the performance feedback program
Provide audits with immediate feedback and communication of trends in performance to healthcare personnel at regular intervals
(eg, quarterly, semiannually, annually)
Strategies to Empower People with CF to Advocate for Adherence to Recommended Practices
Place signage in public areas indicating the importance of promoting patient safety by politely communicating if lapses in IP&C
practices are observed
Provide option for anonymous reporting of lapses
provide insights into specific educational content for indi-
viduals with CF and their families. Enhanced educational
materials designed specifically for people with CF and their
families exist (http://www.cff.org) but should be expanded
by individual centers as needed.
research agenda
SCV S. aureus
1. The role of SCV S. aureus (and SCVs of other species,
eg, P. aeruginosa) should continue to be studied to provide
evidence for the need to standardize the processing of CF
specimens to look for this phenotype.
Transmission of CF Pathogens
2. Future studies should continue to address the frequency
of shared strains of CF pathogens, including P. aeruginosa
and NTM. This could potentially be accomplished using ref-
erence laboratories, such as have been developed for B. cepacia
complex.
3. The routes of transmission of M. abscessus, including
the potential for transmission by droplet nuclei, should be
further studied.
4. The role played by specific niches in the natural envi-
ronment (eg, natural bodies of water or soil) in the trans-
mission of CF pathogens should continue to be studied.
Defining Best IP&C Practices
5. Additional studies are needed to describe the imple-
mentation and impact of effective IP&C practices in CF cen-
ters without epidemic clones or in CF centers that reduced
transmission during a recognized outbreak. These should in-
clude epidemiologic studies, observational studies, and eth-
nographic research.
6. Additional studies should be performed to determine
the efficacy of cohort segregation based on pathogen status
versus all-patient separation.
7. Vaccination rates, particularly for influenza, obtained for
people with CF and healthcare personnel could be used as
patient safety and quality measures at CF centers.
8. Criteria should be developed to define a person with CF
who had previously been culture positive for a specific path-
ogen and is now culture negative for that pathogen to be free
of that pathogen.
Barriers to Implementation
9. The CF community is strongly encouraged to engage
the IP&C community in discussions to find strategies to im-
plement these recommendations and to overcome barriers to
implementation.
10. Additional studies are required to understand the dif-
ferences between the perceptions of healthcare personnel and
people with CF and families regarding outcome expectancy
following implementation of IP&C practices.
Healthcare Personnel with CF
11. In 2003, healthcare personnel with CF were identified
as a group that would benefit from further research. Ten years
later, that need remains.
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